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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The draft Public Health (Alcohol) Bill (PHAB), published in December 2015, along with amendments 
introduced in the Oireachtas in Autumn 2016, contain a number of measures that if enacted would 
impact on the price, availability, labelling and the marketing of alcohol in Ireland. The stated policy 
objectives of the Bill are to: 
 ensure the supply and price of alcohol is regulated and controlled in order to minimise the 
possibility and incidence of alcohol-related harm;  
 delay the initiation of alcohol consumption by children and young people;  
 reduce the harms caused by the misuse of alcohol; and  
 reduce alcohol consumption to 9.1 litres of pure alcohol per person per annum (the OECD 
average in 2012) by 2020. 
 
The Bill proposes to achieve these objectives through the introduction of regulations with regard to: 
1. minimum unit pricing (MUP); 
2. labelling of alcohol products; 
3. advertising and marketing of alcohol, alcohol sponsorship and price promotions; and 
4. structural separation of alcohol products in mixed trading outlets.  
 
The proposed measures have raised concerns domestically in the alcohol industry but also at EU level 
as a number of Member States have submitted comments and detailed opinions with regard to 
potential impacts on the Single Market.  
 
The Alcohol Beverage Federation of Ireland (ABFI) has commissioned DKM to examine whether or 
not the proposed legislation and the regulations that would flow from it would have the desired 
impacts, and to identify the costs, benefits and other consequences associated with the proposals.  
 
Alcohol Consumption in Ireland 
Recorded aggregate consumption of alcohol in Ireland peaked in 2007 and has been in decline since. 
Per capita consumption has been in decline since 2001, from a peak of 14 litres of pure alcohol to 
just under 11 litres in 2015. A continuation of the trend in place since 2000 would see Irish per capita 
consumption reach the target figure of 9.1 litres per capita by 2020. This declining consumption trend 
is common to a number of Western European countries.  
 
The evidence indicates that both total consumption and binge drinking among Irish younger people 
– a particular focus for the Bill - have likewise been in decline.  
 
Total consumer expenditure on alcohol stood at €6.54 billion in 2015, equivalent to 7.1% of total 
consumption of personal income. This percentage has also been on a gradual downward path over 
the last two decades. 
 
In terms of sales channels, the off-trade is estimated to account for approximately 60% of the total 
sales volumes. Until 2007 the majority of alcohol consumption in Ireland occurred in the on-trade, 
although the shift towards the off-trade had been apparent since the 1990s. In value terms the gap 
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is closer as prices are higher in the on-trade. Household expenditure per adult on alcohol also exhibits 
a strong relationship with household income levels, i.e. better off-households spend more on alcohol 
than less well-off households. 
 
Econometric analysis was undertaken to analyse the key drivers of demand for alcohol in Ireland. The 
analysis by and large confirmed what would be expected for a “mature” market consumer product, 
i.e. demand is negatively impacted by price and positively impacted by income, but on a less than 
one-for-one basis, i.e. alcohol demand is relatively price and income inelastic. Other findings were: 
 The price elasticity for spirits is very high – indicating that a 1% increase in price leads to an 
almost 2% reduction in demand; the on-trade appears to be the main source of this price 
sensitivity. This is an unusual result, and could potentially be masking some other factors 
impacting on spirits demand. 
 A negative time trend was found for most alcohol types, indicating a long term downward trend 
in consumption. The exceptions were wine, which was found to have a positive time trend, and 
cider, for which no trend was found. 
 Perhaps the most interesting finding was a positive UK price impact for spirits in both the on- 
and off-trade – a 1% increase in the price of alcohol in the UK relative to Ireland led to an increase 
in demand for spirits of 0.2% in the off-trade and 0.3% in the on-trade. Although a similar finding 
was not found in overall spirits demand, these results point to a potential vulnerability of spirits 
sales in Ireland to the price in Northern Ireland, which matches the findings of previous analyses. 
 
Economic Importance of Alcohol Sector 
While the majority of alcohol consumed in Ireland is domestically produced, a significant proportion 
(most obviously wine) is imported. Approximately one-third of beer and over half of spirits sold in 
Ireland is imported. The vast majority of imports come from other EU Member States (including the 
UK), with the exception of wine, of which just over 60% comes from non-EU countries.  
 
The alcohol beverage sector is extremely significant for the Irish economy. We estimate that in 2015 
the sector through its various impacts –  
 generated approximately €3 billion in GDP; 
 supported over 90,000 jobs in the economy; 
 generated over €1.1 billion in exports; 
 generated over €2.4 billion in VAT and Excise Duty, and over €660 million in payroll and profits 
taxes for the Exchequer. Further revenues are generated via Commercial Rates, Licence Fees 
and so on. 
 
The sector is also a major source of investment, in the manufacturing, distribution and retailing of 
alcohol. We estimate that for every €1 million in investment, the sector – 
 adds €0.85 million to GDP; 
 supports 11 work years of employment; 
 generates €200,000 in Exchequer revenues (excluding any savings in social welfare payments). 
 
Impacts of the PHAB Proposals on Alcohol Consumption 
This report has analysed the proposed measures in the Bill, in terms of their evidential basis and 
likely effectiveness in achieving their objectives, looking at inter alia actual experience in other 
countries.  
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A key basis for the proposals is that any alcohol consumption is damaging to health, and recent 
research evidence for this is presented. However, this is by no means the scientific consensus, and 
there is a large body of evidence that moderate alcohol consumption confers a net health benefit, 
including the well-known “Nurses’ Health Study”, administered by Harvard University, in the US. 
 
The evidential base for the proposed measures is mainly presented in the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) for the Bill. Econometric analysis was also commissioned using the University of Sheffield’s 
Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM), to estimate the impact of MUP on consumption in general as 
well as specifically on heavy drinkers, and less well-off drinkers.  
 
These have been reviewed in detail in Chapter 4 and Appendix E of this report. The appendix 
highlights numerous factual and methodological weaknesses in both the findings and conclusions of 
the RIA and in the application of the SAPM model to the Irish context, that serve to undermine the 
conclusions drawn.   
 
The other measures being proposed in the PHAB are also reviewed in this report, as follows: 
 
Labelling (Chapter 5)  
The proposals in the Bill would see a number of additional elements included on drinks labels, namely 
warnings on the danger of alcohol consumption and of alcohol consumption when pregnant, grams 
of alcohol and energy value in both kilojoules and kilocalories, and details of a public health 
information website operated by the HSE. 
 
While the label contents of many of the main producers are evolving to provide more information, 
the evidence base with respect to the effectiveness of alcohol labelling and warnings in general is not 
strong. Research papers (including those cited in the RIA) point to little or no impact on behaviour, 
with some evidence that alcohol content labelling could be counter-productive, in terms of enabling 
young people to identify drinks with the highest alcohol content at lowest cost.  
 
Likewise, grams of alcohol is a new method of presenting alcohol content (on top of ABV and number 
of standard drinks), and would be unfamiliar and potentially confusing to consumers. 
 
Marketing/Advertising (Chapter 6) 
The provisions of the Bill with respect to advertising and marketing are comprehensive, including 
restrictions on: 
 Contents of advertising; 
 Advertising in public spaces, on public transport, or near schools and playgrounds;  
 Advertising and sponsorship at sports events, or events where children are the majority of 
participants; 
 Images, logos, etc. on children’s clothing; 
 Advertising in the print media and in cinemas; and 
 Price-based promotions. 
Broadcast watersheds on TV and radio have been added to the Bill in recent amendments. 
 
A central objective of the proposed regulations is to reduce exposure of children and young people 
to alcohol advertising, and in doing so to reduce youth drinking. Again, the evidence as to the 
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effectiveness of these measures is weak, with difficulties in establishing causality and in controlling 
for other factors, while some studies indicate impact on intentions to drink as opposed to actual 
behaviour.  
 
Evidence from a range of countries which have implemented varying degrees of restrictions on 
alcohol advertising indicate that they have had little or no impact on the underlying trends of 
consumption, pointing to long term cultural aspects as being the primary drivers. 
 
Of relevance also is how young people consume advertising, and specifically the degree to which they 
consume it from traditional media. Evidence from Ireland, the UK and the US indicates that young 
people, the main targets of the proposed restrictions on broadcast advertising, are the group in 
society least likely to consume such advertising. 
 
Another stated objective is to reduce alcohol consumption in the aggregate. However, the evidence 
is that restrictions on promotion and advertising of alcohol have little impact on overall consumption. 
For mature consumer products such as alcohol, market share rather than aggregate consumption is 
the main focus of advertising. The long term patterns of alcohol consumption and market shares in 
western countries including Ireland, despite continued exposure to advertising, underline this. 
 
Structural Separation (Chapter 7)   
The structural separation proposals would make it less convenient to buy alcohol products in 
supermarkets, convenience stores and forecourts, and make them less visible to children and others. 
However, the RIA provides no evidence that this would contribute to the over-arching objectives of 
reducing harmful consumption of alcohol. While it is conceivable that consumers in some rural areas 
would reduce consumption through sheer lack of access to retail outlets selling alcohol, this would 
not affect the majority of consumers, and on the face of it is unlikely to deter those who currently 
consume alcohol to excess. 
In summary, as with MUP, we find that the evidence base with respect to labelling, 
advertising/marketing and structural separation is weak and in many cases contradictory that the 
proposed measures would deliver on their objectives. 
 
Economic Impacts of the PHAB Proposals 
While the basis for the PHAB proposals achieving their stated objectives is weak, the potential market 
impacts of the measures are substantial and negative. They would impose additional costs on 
producers, and these costs would impact more substantially on overseas producers, as well as on 
small local producers, new market entrants and smaller and rural retailers.  
 
The wider economy would also be negatively impacted, notably the advertising and marketing 
sector, and indigenous broadcasters, by measures such as the advertising restrictions and TV and 
radio watersheds.  
 
By the same token, the impact on large, well-established producers would likely be relatively limited, 
except insofar as their propensity to launch new products in or use Ireland as a test market. 
Innovation in the Irish market would likely be stifled, as new product launches or test launches (such 
as Heineken Light or Hop House 13) would be impacted. 
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The impacts of MUP warrant specific analysis. MUP would force up prices of alcohol in the off-trade 
substantially. The increased revenues would be partially captured by the Exchequer in the form of 
increased VAT receipts, with the balance shared between producers, distributors and retailers, 
probably according to their relative market power. The on-trade might also capture some benefits if 
consumers migrate away from the relatively more expensive off-trade. 
 
Large retailers would likely be in a position to gain the largest share, along with large well-established 
producers (retailers might pass some of the gain back to consumers on other product lines). Small 
producers and overseas producers would be less likely to benefit.  
 
Consumers, particularly less well-off consumers, would unequivocally lose as MUP and the other 
measures would drive up prices. MUP and the other measures would also likely lead to reduced 
choice as overseas producers and new entrants exited or did not enter the Irish market.  
 
As prices would rise the cost of living would also go up, negatively impacting in Ireland’s international 
competitiveness. 
 
Cross-border considerations are also relevant. Implementation of MUP without concomitant 
implementation in Northern Ireland, would aggravate the negative impacts for the Irish economy, 
with no benefit in terms of reduced alcohol consumption or harm. It is clear from historic experience 
and the recent weakening of Sterling that Irish consumers are prepared to cross the border to take 
advantage of price differentials. 
 
There is also a clear Single Market concern around the proposed measures at EU level, as evidenced 
by the number of comments or detailed opinions made by Member States as part of the recent TRIS 
process. This raises questions regarding the implementability of the measures as currently 
formulated in the Bill. 
 
Conclusions 
Given these negative impacts, and the lack of evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed measures 
in terms of their stated objectives, in the context of the long term downward trend in alcohol 
consumption and youth drinking in Ireland, we conclude that the measures in question are not 
justified.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 THE  PUBLIC HEALTH (ALCOHOL) BILL 
The Irish Government approved and published the draft Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill 1  (PHAB) in December 2015. The Bill contains a number of 
measures that if enacted would impact on the price, availability, labelling and 
the marketing of alcohol in Ireland.  
 
A Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) of the Bill, as is required for significant 
regulatory proposals, was published by the Department of Health (DoH) in 
December 20152. The stated policy objectives of the Bill, as articulated in the 
RIA, are: 
 To ensure the supply and price of alcohol is regulated and controlled in 
order to minimise the possibility and incidence of alcohol-related harm;  
 To delay the initiation of alcohol consumption by children and young 
people;  
 To reduce the harms caused by the misuse of alcohol; and  
 To reduce alcohol consumption to 9.1 litres of pure alcohol per person 
per annum (the OECD average in 2012) by 2020. 
 
Appendix E of the report reviews the RIA produced by the Department of 
Health, in terms of completeness, analysis, accuracy and how it meets its 
requirements as set out in the Guidelines, as well as the main research sources 
it relies on. 
 
Under the EU’s Technical Regulation Information System (TRIS), 
Governments are required to inform the EU Commission of any regulatory 
proposals that may potentially impact on the internal market. A three-month 
standstill period under the EU’s Notification Procedure (Directive 2015/1535)3 
then applies, to allow other Member States and the Commission to examine 
the proposals, and to issue comments or detailed opinions thereon. Where 
these are issued, the standstill period may be extended by a further three 
months. The TRIS system applied in the current case: the standstill period 
commenced on 27th January 2016, and was due to close on 28th April 2016. 
Comments and/or detailed opinions were issued by some 14 Member States 
and the Commission, and thus the standstill period was extended to 28th July 
20164. 
                                                          
1 http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/PHAB-2015-as-published.pdf  
2 http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Appendix-IV-Regulatory-Impact-Analysis-RIA-Alcohol.pdf  
3 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/tris/en/about-the-20151535/the-notification-procedure-in-brief1/  
4 TRIS Notification 2016/42/IRL (Ireland). 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/tris/en/search/?trisaction=search.detail&year=2016&num=42  
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1.2 PROPOSED MEASURES IN THE BILL 
The Bill proposes to achieve its objectives through the introduction of 
regulations with regard to: 
1. minimum unit pricing (MUP); 
2. labelling of alcohol products; 
3. advertising and marketing of alcohol, alcohol sponsorship and price 
promotions; and 
4. structural separation of alcohol products in mixed trading outlets.  
 
The specific requirements under these headings are summarised below. 
1.2.1 Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) 
Section 10 of the Bill provides that the minimum retail price of an alcohol 
product including all taxes would be €0.10 per gram of alcohol in the product 
(inclusive of VAT). Grams of alcohol are measured as Volume (ml) x ABV 
strength x 0.7895. Thus: 
 a 500ml can of beer at 4.2% ABV would contain 16.57 grams of alcohol 
and attract an  MUP of €1.66; 
 a one litre bottle of spirits at 40% ABV would contain 315.6 gram of 
alcohol and attract an MUP of €31.56; 
 a 750ml bottle of wine at 12.5% ABV would contain 73.97 grams of alcohol 
and attract an MUP of €7.40. 
 
The Minister for Health would have the power to increase the MUP (but not 
to reduce it), three years after its initial introduction, and every 18 months 
thereafter. 
1.2.2 Labelling of Alcohol Products & Notices in Licensed Premises 
Section 11 of PHAB deals with alcohol product consumer labelling. The key 
provision is that, in the case of non-reusable containers, alcohol must be sold 
in containers bearing: 
“(i) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol 
consumption, 
(ii) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol 
consumption when pregnant,  
(iii) the quantity in grams of alcohol contained in the container concerned,  
(iv) the energy value expressed in kilojoules and kilocalories contained in the 
container concerned, and  
(v) details of a website, to be established and maintained by the (Health 
Service) Executive, providing public health information in relation to alcohol 
consumption.” 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 0.789 represents the conversion factor from volume in millilitres to weight in grams. 
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In the case of alcohol sold in reusable containers, it must be  
“accompanied by a document in such form as may be prescribed specifying the 
matters set out in paragraphs (i) to (v)”.  
 
Requirements would be placed on the sellers of alcohol products (including 
online sellers) to display notices providing similar information.  
 
The Minister would have the power to prescribe the form, size, colour, 
location, etc. of the various notices and warnings, taking into account expert 
advice on effectiveness and having regard to the rate and patterns of 
consumption, health risks and other societal harm from consumption, and 
other matters considered appropriate. 
1.2.3 Advertising, Sponsorship & Promotion of Alcohol  
For convenience we treat the provisions regarding adverting, sponsorship and 
promotion of alcohol under a single heading, as they are closely related. The 
relevant provisions are contained in Sections 12 to 18 and 21 of the Bill. In 
summary, they provide for: 
 
Contents of Advertising (Section 12) 
Similarly to the requirements regarding labelling, advertising of alcohol 
products would be required to include a warning on the dangers of consuming 
alcohol and of consuming alcohol when pregnant, and a weblink to a HSE 
health information website. The Minister would have powers to prescribe the 
size, colour, duration, etc. of the warnings, etc., taking into account expert 
advice on effectiveness and rates and patterns of consumption and related 
health and other societal harm. 
 
The Bill would preclude alcohol advertisements from including anything (apart 
from the above warnings and information requirements) other than: 
“(a) an image of, or reference to, one or more alcohol products (whether of the 
same or different kinds) either in a container or containers (which may be 
opened or unopened) or in a glass or glasses; 
(b) details of whether the product concerned is intended to be diluted with a 
non alcoholic beverage and where it is intended to so be diluted, an image of 
or reference to the non alcoholic beverage; 
(c) an image of, or reference to, the country and region of origin of the product 
concerned; 
(d) an image of, or reference to, the method of production of the product 
concerned; 
(e) an image of, or reference to, the premises where the alcohol product 
concerned was manufactured; 
(f) the price of the product concerned; 
(g) a brand name or variant thereof, trade mark and brand emblem of the 
product concerned; 
(h) a corporate name and corporate emblem of the product concerned; 
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
(i) an objective description of the flavour, colour and smell of the product 
concerned; 
(j) the name and address of the manufacturer (or his or her agent) of the 
product concerned; 
(k) the alcoholic strength by volume of the product concerned; 
(l) the quantity in grams of alcohol contained in the product concerned; 
(m) the energy value expressed in kilojoules and kilocalories of the product 
concerned.” (Section 12(7)) 
 
The Bill would also preclude the use of an image of or reference to an alcohol 
product in advertisements for any other good or service (Section 12(9)).  
 
Advertising in Certain Places (Section 13) 
Advertising of alcohol products would be prohibited in parks and public open 
spaces, on public transport (vehicles and stations), and within 200 metres of 
the perimeter of a school, playground or a child services location.  
 
Advertising during Events (Section 14) 
Advertising of alcohol products would be prohibited “in or on a sports arena” 
during a sports event, or at events aimed primarily at children (those under 
the age of 18) or in which they are the majority of participants. This includes 
horse racing, dog racing and motor racing tracks. 
 
Sponsorship (Section 15) 
Sponsorship with the aim of promoting alcohol products would be prohibited 
at events aimed primarily at children or in which they are the majority of 
participants, or at motor racing events. There would be no prohibition on 
sponsorship of horse racing or dog racing, and of events aimed primarily at or 
involving adults. 
 
Children’s Clothing (Section 16) 
Children’s clothing and footwear could not contain alcohol product names, 
images, logos, etc. 
 
Advertising in Print Media (Section 17) 
With the exception of trade publications, a maximum of 20% of advertising 
space in a publication could be devoted to alcohol products. Advertising on 
front or back covers or wrappers, envelopes, etc, would be prohibited.  
 
The requirements regarding warnings and content [Section 12(7)] would apply 
equally to domestically produced and imported publications. Advertising in 
publications where 20% of the audience is likely or intended to be children 
would be prohibited.  
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Cinema Advertising (Section 18) 
Alcohol products could only be advertised at screenings of movies with an over 
18 certification.  
 
Sales & Supply of Alcohol Products (i.e. Promotions) (Section 21) 
This section would give the Minister the power to prohibit or restrict:  
 The supply of alcohol to consumers at a reduced price or free – 
 on purchase of another product (whether alcohol or not),  
 for a limited time period, or 
 to a particular class of persons.  
 Other business promotions likely to encourage consumers to consume 
alcohol in a harmful way. 
 Advertising of the above promotions. 
 
The Minister would be required to have regard specifically to “the need to 
reduce alcohol consumption”, and within that the need to reduce health and 
societal harm from alcohol consumption including in particular the need to 
reduce “public order offences arising from alcohol consumption”. It is 
noteworthy that this is the only section in the Bill which specifies a need to 
reduce alcohol consumption per se. 
 
Broadcast Watershed 
While not included in the 2015 Bill as published, in the course of the Oireachtas 
debate on the Bill in Autumn 2016, amendments were introduced which 
include a broadcast watershed for TV and radio. Amendment 36 states that 
“advertisements for alcohol products cannot be broadcast on television before 
9 p.m. and that such advertisements cannot be broadcast on the radio other 
than between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. on weekdays”6. 
1.2.4 Structural Separation of Alcohol Products in Mixed Trading Outlets 
The provisions relating to Structural Separation are contained in Article 20 of 
the Bill. Under this section, mixed retailers would have to confine alcohol sales 
and advertising to - 
(i) a distinct area of their shop separated from the rest of the shop by a 
physical barrier, outside of which alcohol and alcohol advertisements 
would not be “readily visible”, and which customers would not have to 
pass through to access other non-alcohol products, or 
(ii) a single point of sale containing a storage unit for alcohol, not accessible 
to the public, through which alcohol products would not be visible when 
closed, and with no advertising thereon, or 
(iii) one or more adjacent storage units for alcohol, through which products 
or advertising would not be visible when closed.     
 
                                                          
6 https://www.kildarestreet.com/sendebates/?id=2016-10-26a.251&s=speaker%3A470  
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It is noteworthy that Section 20 would not apply to pubs, or to off-licences in 
which sales “comprise wholly or mainly alcohol products”.   
1.3 THIS REPORT 
The Alcohol Beverage Federation of Ireland (ABFI) has a number of concerns 
regarding the Bill, and has commissioned DKM to examine whether or not the 
proposed legislation and the regulations that would flow from it would have 
the desired impacts, and to identity the costs, benefits and other unintended 
consequences associated with the proposals.  
 
This document represents DKM’s report in response to the above Brief. It is 
laid out as follows: 
 Chapter 2 describes the consumption of alcohol in Ireland, and the trends 
therein over recent years. 
 Chapter 3 assesses the beverages sector in Ireland, and its economic 
importance, including contribution to GDP, employment, exports and 
Exchequer revenues. 
 The next chapters review the proposed legislation in more detail and how 
the various elements would impact on the economy in terms of the 
alcohol market and consumers, as well as delivering on its stated 
objectives:  
 Chapter 4 assesses the Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) proposals; 
 Chapter 5 assesses the Product Labelling proposals; 
 Chapter 6 assesses the proposed restrictions on Marketing of alcohol 
(Advertising, Sponsorship and Promotions); 
 Chapter 7 assesses the Structural Separation proposals.  
 Chapter 8 presents our conclusions. 
 The report is summarised in an Executive Summary at the beginning of 
the report. 
 
As indicated above, a review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Bill is 
given in Appendix E.  
 
Three informational notes are relevant: 
1. Alcohol consumption in different countries is generally presented as 
consumption per capita in litres. This usually refers to consumption of 
litres of pure alcohol equivalent per capita aged 15 years and over, and 
should be considered as such in this report unless the context indicates 
otherwise. 
2. Throughout this report, alcohol consumption data relates to releases from 
bonded warehouses and direct imports that are subject to Excise Duty, as 
published by the Revenue Commissioners. This is an accurate proxy for 
retail sales of alcohol in Ireland, albeit with a potential lag between release 
from bond and eventual sale and consumption. However, it does have a 
number of limitations, namely that personal imports are excluded, as are 
“home brew”, and smuggled and other illegal product. In addition, 
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consumption by overseas tourists visiting Ireland is included in the data, 
while consumption by Irish tourists while overseas is excluded. These 
limitations apply to all international alcohol consumption data, to varying 
degrees. Notably, EU rules allow significant imports for personal 
consumption, and it is well-established that EU consumers take advantage 
of cross-border price differentials, which are largely driven by tax 
differences7.  
3. A key issue in this report is with respect to alcohol products imported from 
other EU Member States, as the marketing and sale of these products in 
Ireland is subject to the rules of the Single Market. Notwithstanding the 
recent Brexit vote, for current purposes the UK is taken to be an EU 
Member State. 
 
  
                                                          
7 See for instance http://www.grantthornton.ie/globalassets/1.-member-firms/ireland/insights/publications/grant-
thornton---illicit-trade-2015-2016..pdf ,  
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/alcohol/documents/alcohol_rand_en.pdf ,  
http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0587.pdf and https://www.hri.global/files/2011/07/21/02.3_Nordlund_-
_Unrecorded_Alcohol_Consumption_(Nordic_Countries)_.pdf .   
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2. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN IRELAND 
 
 
2.1 VOLUMES 
2.1.1 Aggregate Volumes 
Recorded consumption of alcohol in Ireland peaked in 2007 and has been in 
decline since, as can be seen from Figure 2.1. Within overall consumption, a 
number of trends are apparent: beer has lost market share since the mid-
1990s, while cider and especially wine have grown their market shares.  
Figure 2.1: AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION OF PURE ALCOHOL (MILLION LITRES) PER ANNUM IN 
IRELAND, 1995-2015 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners. Wine assumed to average 12.5% ABV. 
 
These trends are more apparent in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, which present historic 
consumption by alcohol type as an index with 1995 as the base.  
 
The sharp growth in consumption of cider and wine compared to other alcohol 
types is apparent, although cider has been on a downward trend since 2007 
and wine appears to have plateaued in recent years. The pattern of lager 
consumption matches that of cider although the growth is much less 
pronounced. Stout and in particular ale have been on a long term downward 
trend, although it is noticeable that this appears to have stabilised or even 
reversed somewhat in recent years. However, volumes are still half or less than 
they were in the Nineties. 
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Figure 2.2: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION INDEX BY TYPE (1995 = 100) 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners  
Figure 2.3: BEER CONSUMPTION INDEX BY TYPE (1995 = 100) 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners, industry sources. 
2.1.2 Consumption per Capita 
When considered at a per capita basis, consumption has been in decline for 
longer. Average consumption per capita was just under 11 litres of pure 
alcohol in 2015, from a peak of 14 litres in the early 2000s (Figure 2.4). It is 
noteworthy that per capita consumption started to decline even as the 
economy continued to grow strongly in the early 2000s. It suffered a sharp 
drop in the early years of the recession, and appears then to have resumed the 
more gradual long term downward trend as the economy and general 
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household consumption recovered more recently. This declining pattern of 
consumption is common across a number of Western European countries8.   
Figure 2.4: AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF PURE ALCOHOL PER CAPITA (LITRES) PER ANNUM IN 
IRELAND, 1995-2015 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners, CSO 
 
Evidence indicates that both overall consumption and binge drinking among 
younger people have likewise been in decline. The regular European School 
Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD) surveys point to consistent 
reductions over a number of surveys undertaken between 2003 and 20159, 
while a 2016 OECD report indicates that Irish 15-year-olds have experienced 
fewer episodes of drunkenness than the European average for their peers10. 
 
This downward trend is of relevance, since one of the stated aims of the PHAB 
is to reduce alcohol consumption to 9.1 litres of pure alcohol per person per 
annum (the OECD average in 2012) by 2020. One can calculate how many years 
into the future this might be achieved, if the trend in place since 2000 were to 
continue. The chart overleaf presents this: interestingly, it indicates that if the 
trend in place for the period 2000-2015 continues, average consumption of 9.1 
litres will be reached in 202011.    
 
 
 
                                                          
8 http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/oecd-health-statistics-2014-frequently-requested-data.htm  
9 The 2011 ESPAD Report - Substance Use Among Students in 36 European Countries, by reference to Use of any alcoholic 
beverage during the past 12 months, the past 30 days and amount consumed during last drinking day (p.127, 129, 133). The 
report also finds reductions use of cigarettes and illicit drugs among Irish students.  Slightly different questions were 
reported on in the 2015 ESPAD Report, but they point to continued downward trends in consumption. 
http://www.espad.org/sites/espad.org/files/ESPAD_report_2015.pdf  
10 OECD, 2016, Health at a Glance: Europe 2016 State of Health in the EU Cycle, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-europe-2016_9789264265592-en#page1  
11 -0.266951(2020) + 548.3328 = 9.092 litres 
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Figure 2.5: AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF PURE ALCOHOL PER CAPITA (LITRES) PER ANNUM IN 
IRELAND, LINEAR EXTENSION OF 2000-2015 TREND 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners, CSO, DKM estimates 
2.1.3 Volumes By Sales Channel 
In volume terms, the off-trade is estimated to have accounted for 60% of 
alcohol sales in 2014, with the remainder occurring in the on-trade12. This 
represents a reversal of the historic pattern – up to 2007 the majority of 
alcohol consumption in Ireland occurred in the on-trade, although the shift 
towards the off-trade had been apparent since the 1990s. That said, the 
market share of the on-trade in Ireland remains high by international 
standards, notably for beer 13 . The vast majority of wine, by contrast, is 
purchased in the off-trade.  
2.2 VALUE 
The CSO National Accounts indicate that total expenditure on alcohol stood at 
€6.542 billion in 2015 (in 2015 market prices), or 7.1% of total consumption of 
personal income14. This percentage has been on a gradual downward path 
over the last two decades, having been 10.6% in 1995. 
 
The Household Budget Survey 2009-2010 (HBS) provides a detailed breakdown 
of expenditure by Irish households on goods and services15. While it appears 
to under-report expenditure on alcohol in an overall sense16, it indicates that 
                                                          
12 Foley, A., 2015. The Drinks Market Performance in 2014, for Drinks Industry Group of Ireland; personal communication. 
13 http://www.brewersofeurope.org/uploads/mycms-files/documents/publications/2015/statistics_2015_v3.pdf 
14 
http://www.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Database/eirestat/National%20Income%20and%20Expenditure%20Annual%20Results%2
02015/National%20Income%20and%20Expenditure%20Annual%20Results%202015_statbank.asp?SP=National%20Income
%20and%20Expenditure%20Annual%20Results%202015&Planguage=0  
15 http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/housingandhouseholds/householdbudgetsurvey2009-2010volume2/  
16 If the average weekly expenditure per household is multiplied up by the number of weeks in the year and the number of 
households in the State, the resultant value is less than the aggregate expenditure on alcohol estimated by the CSO. This is 
a common phenomenon internationally, and also applies to tobacco expenditure. 
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at that time some 59% of household expenditure on alcohol was in the on-
trade, with the balance in the off-trade. The difference between the volume 
split and the value split would reflect the relative difference in prices in the 
two channels. We would expect that on a value basis there has been some 
further move to the off-trade since 2009-201017. 
 
The HBS also recorded household expenditure by income decile, which 
notwithstanding the under-reporting issue gives some sense of how alcohol 
expenditure varies by income level18. The following graph summarises the 
average reported expenditure on alcohol per week in 2009-2010 in the on- and 
off-trade, per inhabitant aged 15+ in the household, by income decile. The data 
is presented in this way as there is a strong correlation between household 
size and household income.  
Figure 2.6: REPORTED WEEKLY EXPENDITURE ON ALCOHOL PER INHABITANT AGED 
15+, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME DECILE, 2009-2010  
 
Source: CSO HBS 2009-2010 
 
There is a clear positive relationship – the higher the household income, the 
more is spent on alcohol per inhabitant aged 15+. The exception is the lowest 
two deciles, which spend more per inhabitant aged 15+ than the next three 
deciles, but this may be reflective of the number of children per adult (under 
15s per over 15s) in households by income decile, which is at its lowest for the 
lowest income decile and rises through to the 6th decile. Fewer dependents 
may leave a higher proportion of disposable income for areas of expenditure 
such as alcohol.  
 
As one might expect, the income-related pattern is more pronounced in the 
on-trade, although it is here that the lowest two deciles feature strongly also. 
                                                          
17 A new HBS for was undertaken from February 2015 to February 2016, but results would not be expected until 2017. 
18 We are effectively assuming that the propensity to under-report is the same across income levels. 
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Expenditure in the off-trade is much flatter, and the income-related pattern 
only kicks in – and then weakly - in the upper half of the income distribution.  
 
Because of the nature of the HBS, we are not in a position to report the 
volumes of alcohol consumed, only the value. One might expect some further 
flattening of the off-trade line, if people in lower income decile households 
tend to buy less expensive alcohol. 
2.3 DRIVERS OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION 
The key drivers of demand for consumer products are in general income and 
price, with other potential drivers featuring, depending on the nature of the 
product. Demand falls as prices go up, and in general demand increases as 
incomes go up. Demand can also increase as the price of competing products 
(“substitutes”) increase, and fall as the price of products used with the product 
in question (“complements”) increases. The more tightly a product is defined, 
the more price sensitive it tends to be, as there are more close substitutes. 
Thus for instance one would expect alcohol to be less price sensitive than beer, 
and beer to be less price sensitive than lager. 
 
The market for alcohol in Ireland and the western world in general can be 
characterised as “mature”, i.e. the product is well-established and well-known 
to consumers, and the scope for overall market growth is limited. In these 
circumstances products tend to be less price and income sensitive, as 
consumption levels in one period are significantly affected by previous 
consumption levels. There can also be long term trends in play. Indeed, as 
indicated earlier in this chapter, consumption per capita is on a long downward 
trend in Ireland and many western countries. 
 
We have used econometric analysis to attempt to estimate the key drivers of 
demand for alcohol per capita in Ireland, as set out in Appendix F. Demand was 
tested for each type of alcohol as a whole and in the off- and on-trades, where 
data allowed, although the best results were found for the combined sales 
channels. Cross-price elasticities (the sensitivity of demand for one type of 
alcohol to a price change in another type) were also tested for, but an effect 
was not detected. 
 
Our results are summarised in Table 2.1 overleaf. The values presented in the 
table are elasticities, i.e. the percentage change in demand as a result of a 1% 
increase in prices or incomes.  
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Table 2.1: SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF DEMAND FOR ALCOHOL PER CAPITA  
  Elasticities 
Time Trend Comment 
  
Price Same 
Channel 
Price 
Other 
Channel 
Income UK Price 
Channels Combined  
Alcohol -0.378 0.313   
negative if tested 
Vs off- and on-
trade prices 
  
Beer  0.24   negative   
Lager -0.0667     negative 
price impact appears to be 
in on-trade 
Stout -0.0422     negative   
Ale -0.109     negative   
Cider -0.239       
price impact appears to be 
in off-trade 
Spirits -1.86 0.834   negative 
price impact appears to be 
in on-trade 
Wine  0.0698   positive   
Off-Trade 
Alcohol           not tested 
Beer             
Lager             
Stout           not tested 
Ale           not tested 
Cider -0.74   0.804       
Spirits -0.564 -1.298 1.354 0.207     
Wine           not tested 
On-Trade 
Alcohol           not tested 
Beer         negative   
Lager -0.137       negative   
Stout           not tested 
Ale           not tested 
Cider     0.211       
Spirits -1.195 -0.729 0.803 0.289 negative   
Wine           not tested 
Notes: blank cells indicate no statistically significant impact was detected. The split between off- and on-trade 
volumes are industry estimates. Shaded cells indicate sales channels not tested due to lack of data. See Appendix F 
for further details. 
Sources: DKM analysis based on Revenue Commissioners, CSO and industry data. 
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The key findings, considering each type of alcohol as a whole (i.e. off- and on-
trade combined) are: 
 With the exception of beer and wine, a negative price elasticity was 
found, i.e. an increase on price leads to a reduction in demand, as one 
would expect. 
 With the exception of spirits, these price elasticities are low (less than 
one), indicating that there is less than a one-for-one relationship between 
price and demand, which again is as one would expect. 
 The price elasticity for spirits is very high – indicating that a 1% increase 
in price leads to an almost 2% reduction in demand. Further analysis 
points to the on-trade as being the main source of this price sensitivity. 
 A positive income impact was found for all alcohol types except cider and 
individual beer types. Again there is a less than one-for-one effect, 
although the spirits income elasticity is close to one. 
 A negative time trend was found for most alcohol types, indicating a long 
term downward trend in consumption. 
 The exceptions were wine, which was found to have a positive time trend, 
and cider, for which no trend was found. 
 The UK price was not found to have an impact on demand for the various 
alcohol types. 
These results are broadly as one would expect – alcohol is relatively price and 
income inelastic (less than a one-for-one impact), and for most types there is 
a long term downward trend, independent of the other factors tested for. 
 
The results when we tested the off- and on-trades were somewhat less 
satisfactory. Impacts were only detected for cider and spirits, with some 
impacts for beer and lager in the on-trade, while a number of alcohol types 
could not be modelled for lack of data. The findings were: 
 Negative price elasticities with respect to the same sales channel were 
found for lager, cider and spirits in the off-trade, and for cider in the on-
trade. The impact was more than one-for-one in the case of on-trade 
spirits. 
 Spirits also recorded negative price elasticities for the other sales channel, 
i.e. a price increase in the off-trade was found to have a negative impact 
on demand in the on-trade, and vice versa. This is a somewhat counter-
intuitive result. 
 Positive income effects were found for spirits and cider in both sales 
channels, and were stronger in the off-trade. 
 A negative time trend was found for beer, lager and spirits in the on-trade. 
 Perhaps the most interesting finding was a positive UK price impact for 
spirits in both the on and off-trade – a 1% increase in the price of alcohol 
in the UK relative to Ireland led to an increase in demand for spirits of 
0.2% in the off-trade and 0.3% in the on-trade. Although a similar finding 
was not found in overall spirits demand, the results point to a potential 
vulnerability of spirits sales in Ireland to the price in Northern Ireland, 
which matches the findings of previous analyses. 
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2.4 MARKET CONCENTRATION 
The Irish alcohol beverages sector is highly concentrated, with the five largest 
suppliers accounted for almost 85% of the total sales value in 2015. In the on-
trade the two largest suppliers accounted for 70% of total consumption value 
in 2015. The off-trade is somewhat less concentrated: suppliers outside of the 
five largest companies supplied held over 30% by value of the market in 2015.   
2.5 ORIGIN 
While the majority of alcohol consumed in Ireland is domestically produced, a 
significant proportion (most obviously wine) is imported, as demonstrated in 
the table below. Approximately one-third of beer and over half of spirits sold 
in Ireland is imported (these exclude personal imports).  
 
The data indicates that the vast majority of imports come from other EU 
Member States (including the UK), with the exception of wine, of which just 
over 60% comes from non-EU countries. A limitation of this data however is 
that it is based on the last port of loading before product arrives in Ireland, and 
this may not reflect the products’ true origin. For instance, a significant volume 
of wine is recorded as being imported from the UK, which is obviously not a 
true reflection of origin, and market data indicates that non-EU wine holds a 
higher share of the market than the trade statistics would imply.  
Table 2.2: ALCOHOL IMPORTS TO IRELAND 2015 
 
Total  
Volumes  
%age 
imported 
Of 
EU* 
Which: 
non-EU 
Beer (‘000 litres alcohol) 18,539 34.6% 94.4% 5.6% 
Wine ('000 litres product)  87,280 100.0% 56.0% 44.0% 
Cider  ('000 litres product)  58,101 14.3% 87.5% 12.5% 
Spirits ('000 litres alcohol) 7,358 52.4% 90.6% 9.4% 
*Port of last loading. EU includes UK. 
Sources: CSO Trade statistics, Revenues Commissioners, Irish Wine Association (wine 
EU/non-EU split relates to 2014).  
 
Appendix A gives a more detailed breakdown of imports by country, per the 
CSO’s trade statistics. 
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3. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF ALCOHOL SECTOR 
 
The alcohol beverage sector is a significant element of the Irish economy.  It 
generates impacts in terms of incomes, employment, exports and Exchequer 
revenues. The industry is recovering from the recent economic downturn, and 
investment is gaining momentum, with growth particularly evident in the 
whiskey and craft beer sectors. There are a number of aspects to the sector, 
including: 
 alcohol production, which produces beverages for the domestic and 
export markets, and 
 alcohol distribution and retail (on- and off-trade), of both domestically 
produced and imported beverages.  
 
Economic impacts arise across three dimensions:  
 direct – in the firms directly involved in the sector,  
 indirect – in the Irish firms supplying goods and services to them, and  
 induced – as the wages generated by the direct and indirect impacts are 
spent in the wider economy. 
 
Finally, economic impacts arise through firms’ ongoing operations – the 
production, distribution and sale of alcohol – and their investment in new 
facilities.  
3.1 CONTRIBUTION TO GDP 
3.1.1 Ongoing Operations 
The contribution to GDP of a sector comprises the profits and payroll 
generated directly in the sector, and through the indirect and induced impacts. 
 
Based on CSO data, we estimate that turnover in the alcohol beverages 
industry totalled approximately €2.9 billion in 2015 (excluding Excise Duties 
and VAT), while direct GDP generated was €1.3 billion 19 . The indirect 
contribution to GDP, based on purchases of Irish-supplied goods and services, 
is estimated at just over €300 million. Finally, the induced GDP impact is 
estimated at €107 million.  
 
As indicated in Section 2.2, total consumer expenditure on alcohol stood at 
€6.542 billion in 2015 (inclusive of VAT and Excise Duty). This can be taken to 
be the retail turnover of the on- and off-trade combined20, and incorporates 
the GDP contribution of both the retail and distribution sectors (as well as of 
the manufacturing sector to the degree it supplies the domestic market).  
                                                          
19 Based on the CSO’s 2012 Census of Industrial Production, and the 2015 PRODCOM data and Industrial Turnover and 
Volumes Indices for the Beverages sector (NACE Code 11), separating out alcohol and non-alcohol beverages. 
20 Strictly speaking it includes consumption of alcohol by Irish residents while abroad, and excludes consumption by non-
Irish residents while in Ireland, but for current purposes we assume these two cancel out. 
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Isolating the impact of the retail and distribution sectors only, we estimate that 
the direct and indirect addition to GDP amounts to €914 million in 2015, while 
the related induced impact amounts to approximately €340 million.  
Therefore, the total estimated contribution of the alcohol sector to Irish GDP 
in 2015 can be summarised as follows: 
Table 3.1: ESTIMATED TOTAL IMPACT ON GDP OF ALCOHOL SECTOR, 2015 
 
Manufacturing Distribution  
& Retail 
Total 
 
€ million  € million  € million  
Direct 1,320 881 2,201 
Indirect 309 33 342 
Induced 107 338 445 
Total 1,735 1,253 2,988 
Note: The manufacturing impacts as they relate to the domestic market have been 
netted out of the Distribution & Retail impacts, to avoid double-counting. 
Source: CSO, DKM estimates. 
 
In all, the alcohol sector makes a major contribution to Irish GDP, which we 
estimate at €3 billion annually. 
3.1.2 Investment  
Further economic impacts are generated by investment by the sector in the 
Irish economy. For instance, Diageo alone has invested €200 million in its St. 
James’ Gate facility in recent years, while the Irish Whiskey Association 
estimates that €1 billion will be invested in the sector over the coming decade. 
Significant investment is also undertaken in the distribution and retailing of 
alcohol.  
 
DKM estimates based on the CSO’s Input-Output tables indicate an increase in 
GDP of €0.85 million for every €1 million of capital expenditure in the Irish 
economy, taking into account the direct, indirect and induced impacts.  
3.2 EMPLOYMENT  
3.2.1 Ongoing Operations 
A comprehensive analysis of the employment impacts of the alcoholic 
beverages sector was undertaken in 2014 by Anthony Foley of Dublin City 
University (DCU) Business School, on behalf of the Drinks Industry Group of 
Ireland (DIGI)21. The table below summarises the report’s findings:  
 
                                                          
21 Drinks-Related Employment in Dáil Constituencies 2013, 
http://www.drinksindustry.ie/assets/Documents/Drinks%20related%20employment%20in%20Dail%20constituencies%202
013.pdf  
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Table 3.2: ESTIMATED EMPLOYMENT GENERATED BY THE ALCOHOL SECTOR, 2013 
 
Total 
Direct - Manufacturing 3,800  
Direct – Distribution & Retail 58,000  
Indirect 16,600  
Induced 12,500  
Total 90,900  
Source: Foley (2014). 
 
These jobs are spread throughout the economy, from agriculture to the 
hospitality sector, to the media, including broadcasting and advertising 
production. 
3.2.2 Investment  
Further employment is generated by investment by the sector in the Irish 
economy. DKM estimates based on the CSO’s Input-Output tables and payroll 
data that for every €1 million of capital expenditure in the Irish economy, 11 
work years of employment are generated, taking into account the direct, 
indirect and induced impacts.  
3.3 EXPORTS 
CSO Data indicate that the value of Irish exports of alcohol totalled €1.1 billion 
in 2015, up from €932 million in 2014, an increase of 18%. The breakdown by 
main destination is set out in the following table: 
Table 3.3: DESTINATION OF IRISH ALCOHOL EXPORTS BY VALUE, 2015 
 Beer 
€ million 
Spirits 
€ million 
Cider 
€ million 
Other 
€ million 
Total  
€ million  
%age 
Split 
US 79 398 7 1 485 44% 
Great Britain 58 33 38 3 131 12% 
Northern Ireland 66 4 0 0 70 6% 
Canada 14 52 1 0 66 6% 
Germany 13 39 0 0 51 5% 
France 11 22 0 1 34 3% 
South Africa 0 17 0 0 17 2% 
Australia 0 11 4 0 15 1% 
Other 44 183 5 0 233 21% 
Total 285 759 55 5 1,104 100% 
%age Split 26% 69% 5% 0% 100%  
Source: CSO Trade Section 
 
North America is clearly the biggest export market, accounting for 50% of the 
total, with the UK (incl Northern Ireland) accounting for 18%. In terms of 
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product, spirits account for approximately 70% of exports, with beer at 25% 
and cider at 5%. 
 
In addition, the tourism sector is an important source of service exports.  A 
2013 visitor attitudes survey for Fáilte Ireland reported that 80% of visitors to 
Ireland were motivated to travel to the country by the desire to experience an 
Irish pub22. This was the most cited reason for visiting, and illustrates the 
important position of the Irish pub as an attraction for the currently robust 
Irish tourism sector. 
3.4 EXCHEQUER REVENUES 
3.4.1 Ongoing Operations 
The alcohol beverages sector is an important contributor to Exchequer 
revenues. Revenue is generated most obviously through the imposition of VAT 
and Excise Duty on alcohol sales in Ireland, and in addition through the levying 
of profits and payroll taxes at the various levels of production, distribution and 
retailing in the sector, as well as through the wider economic impacts of the 
sector.  
 
Excise & VAT 
Taxes on domestic alcohol sales make a very significant contribution to the 
Exchequer: in 2015 Excise Duty of €1.2 billion and VAT of €1.223 billion were 
collected, for a total of €2.42 billion. Figure 3.1 overleaf shows the historic 
pattern of alcohol consumption taxes up to 2015.   
 
Revenues grew strongly to 2007, and fell sharply in the following years. 
Revenues then started to grow again from 2012 onwards. As sales volumes 
continued to fall in subsequent years (Figure 2.1), this increase in revenues was 
solely due to increasing excise rates - Ireland has among the highest excise tax 
rates in the EU23, and the highest alcohol retail prices in the EU24. 
 
Payroll & Profits Taxes 
These arise in the production, distribution and retail sectors, via the direct, 
indirect and induced impacts. Based on above measures of GDP impacts and 
average tax rates, we estimate the Exchequer revenues in 2015 as per Table 
3.4 overleaf25 . In total, over €660 million in payroll and profits taxes are 
estimated to be generated per annum.  
                                                          
22 
http://www.failteireland.ie/FailteIreland/media/WebsiteStructure/Documents/3_Research_Insights/4_Visitor_Insights/The
_Visitor_Attitudes_(Port)_Survey_Report_2013.pdf?ext=.pdf  
23 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/alcoholic_beverages/rates/excise_du
ties-part_i_alcohol_en.pdf  
24 http://www.rte.ie/news/business/2016/0615/795880-eurostat-ireland/  
25 Note the basis for calculating these tax revenues differs from the basis for employment impacts per Table 3.2, as the 
methodology differs somewhat and they relate to a more recent year. 
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Figure 3.1: ALCOHOL EXCISE AND VAT TAX REVENUES IN IRELAND, 2004-2015, € 
MILLION 
 
Source: Revenue Commissioners. 
Table 3.4: ESTIMATED PAYROLL & PROFITS TAX REVENUES GENERATED VIA THE 
ALCOHOL SECTOR, 2015 
 
Manufacturing Distribution  
& Retail 
Total 
 € million  € million  € million  
Direct 149  287  437  
Indirect 55  74  130  
Induced 23  74  97  
Total 228  435  663  
Note: The manufacturing impacts as they relate to the domestic market have been 
netted out of the Distribution & Retail impacts, to avoid double-counting. 
Source: CSO, DKM estimates. 
 
Further tax revenues would also be generated in the form of Commercial 
Rates, and various other taxes such as licence fees. 
3.4.2 Investment  
We estimate that for every €1 million of investment by the industry, some 
€200,000 in Exchequer revenues are generated, taking into account the direct, 
indirect and induced effects (excluding any savings in social welfare 
payments). 
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3.5 SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS  
The alcohol beverage sector is extremely significant for the Irish economy. We 
estimate that in 2015 the sector through its ongoing operations –  
 generated approximately €3 billion in GDP; 
 supported over 90,000 jobs in the economy; 
 generated over €1.1 billion in exports; 
 generated over €2.4 billion in VAT and Excise Duty, and over €660 million 
in payroll and profits taxes for the Exchequer. Other revenues are 
generated via Commercial Rates, Licence Fees and so on. 
 
The sector is also a major source of investment in the economy, in the 
manufacturing, distribution and retailing of alcohol. We estimate that for 
every €1 million in investment, the sector – 
 adds €0.85 million to GDP; 
 supports 11 work years of employment; 
 generates €200,000 in Exchequer revenues (excluding any savings in 
social welfare payments). 
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4. MINIMUM UNIT PRICING (MUP) 
 
 
The previous chapters of this report estimated the size and economic 
importance of the alcohol sector in Ireland. The purpose of this and 
subsequent chapters is to assess the economic costs, benefits and other 
unintended consequences associated with the proposed regulations in the Bill. 
We present and discuss: 
 The provisions of the Bill and their objectives; 
 The likely effectiveness of the provisions in terms of achieving these 
objectives;  
 Likely impacts on the market; and 
 Likely impacts on consumers. 
 
This chapter deals with Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP). 
4.1 PROVISIONS OF THE BILL & OBJECTIVES  
4.1.1 Provisions  
Section 10 of the Bill provides that the minimum retail price of an alcohol 
product including all taxes would be €0.10 per gram of alcohol in the product. 
Grams of alcohol are measured as Volume (ml) x ABV strength x 0.78926. Thus: 
 a 500ml can of beer at 4.2% ABV would contain 16.57 grams of alcohol 
and attract an  MUP of €1.66; 
 a one litre bottle of spirits at 40% ABV would contain 315.6 grams of 
alcohol and attract an MUP of €31.56; 
 a 750ml bottle of wine at 12.5% ABV would contain 73.97 grams of alcohol 
and attract an MUP of €7.40. 
 
The Bill would give the Minister for Health power to increase the MUP, three 
years after its initial introduction, and every 18 months thereafter. Notably, it 
does not provide the power to reduce the MUP. 
4.1.2 Objectives  
MUP is perhaps the provision of the PHAB that has attracted most attention 
and controversy. Similar proposals are being/have been considered in 
neighbouring jurisdictions, and in September 2015 the Advocate General of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Yves Bot, presented an opinion on similar 
Scottish proposals27.  
 
                                                          
26 0.789 represents the conversion factor from volume in ml to weight in grams. 
27 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=166846&doclang=EN  
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The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) on the Bill, which is discussed in detail in 
Appendix E, indicates that the measure is “designed to prevent the sale of 
alcohol at very cheap prices”, while its objectives can be seen as follows: 
“A minimum pricing policy for alcohol would help to reduce consumption of 
alcohol in Ireland but especially with helping to reduce consumption of alcohol 
by those who drink in a harmful and hazardous way. It would also have a 
greater impact on discouraging children and young people to drink, as they are 
price sensitive.” 
 
Thus, the objective of introducing MUP can be seen as threefold:  
(i) to reduce alcohol consumption,  
(ii) to reduce harmful alcohol consumption, and  
(iii) to discourage children and young people from drinking. 
4.2 LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS 
Alcohol prices in Ireland are already among the highest in Europe, indicating 
that price is not a major driver of overall consumption in Ireland, although 
price differences within and between categories, and with neighbouring 
jurisdictions, can be expected to shift consumption patterns. Expectations of 
reductions in harmful drinking and in drinking by the young are based on the 
premise that both young people and the “heaviest drinkers” are price 
sensitive, and are thus amenable to behavioural change on foot of the MUP 
measure.  
 
In assessing whether this is actually likely to be the case, we consider: 
(i) the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM), developed by the University 
of Sheffield, and applied to the Irish proposals as part of the RIA in support 
of the measures, and  
(ii) other research and actual experience elsewhere on the issue. 
4.2.1 University of Sheffield Model 
Research by the University of Sheffield, based on their SAPM28, is presented in 
the RIA in support of the premise that MUP will achieve the Bill’s objectives as 
stated above. As well as MUP, the model is used to analyse the effects of – 
 a ban on below-cost selling and  
 a ban on price-based promotions, 
on different drinker groups (low risk, increasing risk and high risk) and income 
groups (in poverty and not in poverty), in an Irish context.  
 
A more detailed discussion of the Sheffield paper is presented in Appendix E 
of this report, and finds a number of shortcomings, which undermine the 
reliability of its findings and thus of the policy implications flowing therefrom.  
 
                                                          
28 Angus, C., Meng, Y., Ally, A., Holmes, J. and Brennan, A. (2014). Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for 
alcohol in the Republic of Ireland – An adaption of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version3. University of Sheffield.  
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In summary, the SAPM requires detailed and comprehensive data, much of 
which was not available when the authors undertook their Irish analysis. To 
deal with this the authors made a number of adjustments to the dataset, 
notably: 
 The modelling used data from the 2013 National Alcohol Diary Survey 
(NADS), which recorded householders’ actual alcohol purchases over the 
previous week, as well as asking questions on the quantity and frequency 
of their usual consumption patterns. Based on this the authors derived 
the mean weekly alcohol consumption, which forms the dependent 
variable in their model. However, the use of a single week’s consumption 
pattern is less than ideal as a basis for estimating actual usual 
consumption, and is subject to significant error. In particular the 
proportion of high alcohol consumers and low alcohol consumers can be 
overestimated and of moderate consumers underestimated, due to the 
variance that could be expected in a single week’s consumption 
(notwithstanding that respondents were asked about usual consumption 
patterns). Additionally, the level of intoxication was measured by peak 
alcohol consumption in the previous week, which for the same reason is 
not necessarily accurate. 
 The NADS data is subject to misclassification, which the authors tried to 
correct for. However, they did not differentiate between structural zeroes 
(i.e. abstainers or non-consumers) and stochastic zeroes due to the short 
reference period, which undermines the correction method29.  
 The NADS did not generate sufficient information to classify respondents 
as being in “poverty” or “not in poverty”, so the authors matched their 
data with the household composition and income data from the CSO’s 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), to derive an equivalised 
household income. This is a less than satisfactory means of generating 
poverty data for the model, and undermines their evaluation of pricing 
policies and effects on consumption by reference to household income 
levels. 
 The price data reported in the NADS diaries was higher than that indicated 
by overall market data, while consumption volumes were lower. The 
authors argued that the survey respondents were overestimating price 
due to issues of memory, or biases introduced by missing price data, and 
adjusted the survey price data to the market data, which not only shifts 
the price distribution down but changes the shape of the distribution. 
However they did not adjust the consumption data. This introduces direct 
bias into the analysis, and undermines their results. 
 Additionally, the price adjustment was only made for off-trade purchases. 
Therefore the authors changed the distribution for one section of the 
price data and not the other. By adjusting the price data in this way the 
results are subject to severe biases, which will overestimate the effect of 
                                                          
29 Duffy J. (2015). Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in the Republic of Ireland – an adaptation of the 
Sheffield alcohol policy model version 3. 
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an MUP strategy. While acknowledging this methodological flaw, the 
authors nonetheless relied on the model results for their conclusions.  
 As it was not possible to calculate Irish price elasticities of alcohol demand 
from the NADS data, the authors assumed that price elasticities are the 
same in Ireland and in England, and applied English elasticities to adjust 
the Irish data. This is a large assumption to make and is not necessarily 
valid. Detailed aggregate alcohol market data is available for Ireland, from 
which it would have been possible to estimate the required elasticities.   
 The authors assumed that risk functions developed elsewhere to establish 
the relationship between alcohol consumption and the risk of health 
conditions are applicable to the Irish population, which is not necessarily 
valid.  
 
Because of the above issues, the Sheffield University conclusions regarding the 
impact of MUP and other pricing policy instruments in Ireland are unreliable.  
4.2.2 International Research & Experience on MUP 
We are concerned here with two issues – (a) whether the heaviest drinkers 
and young drinkers are in fact more price sensitive than the generality of the 
population, and (b) whether MUP and similar policies put in place elsewhere 
have been effective in terms of their stated aims. 
 
Heavy Drinkers & Young Drinkers 
Regarding heavy drinkers, there does not appear to be a consensus in the 
literature in this regard, with much of the literature indicating that heavy 
drinkers are less price sensitive than light or moderate drinkers. A 2012 
literature review by London Economics for instance finds that: 
“Overall, a clear majority of the relevant studies show that heavier 
drinkers are less responsive to price changes than moderate drinkers”30. 
 
With regard to drinking by children and young people, there is evidence that 
this group is price sensitive31, although some evidence also indicates that over-
age males are less so than the underaged and females32. 
 
International Experience with MUP 
International experience with MUP or similar policies is limited, with one of 
the few examples being Social Reference Pricing (SRP) adopted in many 
Canadian provinces. The evidence indicates that the introduction of SRP led to 
reductions in recorded consumption, as one would expect, but studies 
assessing actual reduction in alcohol-related harm as a result of SRP are 
limited.  
                                                          
30 http://londoneconomics.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Differential-price-responsiveness-among-drinker-types-LE-
Working-paper-Dec-2012.pdf  
31 For instance http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/alcohol/impacts-
alcohol-price-review?view=Binary  
32 For example http://fjc.people.uic.edu/Presentations/Scans/Final%20PDFs/cep1996.pdf  
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Econometric analysis of the impact of SRP in Canada on alcohol-related harm 
appears to be limited to three papers by Stockwell et al. 33. These consider 
impacts on of changes in minimum prices and off-licence densities in British 
Columbia (BC), during the first decade of this century, respectively on (i) 
hospital admissions, (ii) mortality and (iii) crime.  Since minimum prices had 
been in place in BC since 1989, the studies analysed the impacts of changes in 
minimum prices rather than their introduction. The papers respectively found 
that a 10% increase in the average minimum price of all alcoholic beverages 
was associated with: 
 an 8.95% decrease in acute alcohol-attributable admissions and a 9.22% 
reduction in chronic alcohol-attributable admissions two years later; 
 a 31.72% reduction in wholly alcohol-attributable deaths; 
 decreases of 18.8% in alcohol-related traffic offences and of 9.2% in 
violent crime. 
 
There are, however, a number of limitations in these studies, which must be 
kept in mind, notably: 
 The authors acknowledge that the findings relate to statistical 
correlations and do not necessarily indicate causality. 
 The period under consideration – 2002 to 2009/2010, is short. This is 
particularly the case with the crime paper, which analyses annual data 
whereas the hospital admissions and mortality papers analyse quarterly 
data. 
 Minimum prices in BC during the period under consideration were much 
lower than actual price levels in Ireland, or in other Canadian provinces 
such as Saskatchewan. Despite this, alcohol consumption in BC was 
significantly lower than in Ireland during the period under consideration. 
 Minimum prices in BC are also unrelated to alcohol content, and thus are 
quite different from what is being proposed in Ireland. On the face of it, 
is difficult to see how the effects found in these papers could come from 
the type of minimum prices in place in BC.  
 With respect to the hospitalisation paper, alcohol-related hospitalisations 
per capita rose each year during the period under consideration in BC, 
which on the face of it is difficult to reconcile with a positive impact from 
minimum pricing34. 
 None of the three studies used a control – i.e. a similar area where 
minimum prices were not in place or did not change during the period 
under consideration. With respect to the crime paper for instance, it has 
                                                          
33 Stockwell T, et al., 2013, “Minimum alcohol prices and outlet densities in British Columbia, Canada: Estimated impacts on 
alcohol attributable hospitalisations”. American Journal of Public Health. 2013:e1-e7. 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301289 
Stockwell T, et al., 2013, “The Relationship between Minimum Alcohol Prices, Outlet Densities and Alcohol Attributable 
Deaths in British Columbia, 2002 to 2009”.  Addiction. 108(6) February 2013. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235519955_The_Relationship_between_Minimum_Alcohol_Prices_Outlet_Den
sities_and_Alcohol_Attributable_Deaths_in_British_Columbia_2002_to_2009   
Stockwell T, et al., 2015, “Relationships Between Minimum Alcohol Pricing and Crime During the Partial Privatization of a 
Canadian Government Alcohol Monopoly” Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 76(4), 628–634 (2015). 
34 http://www.thejournal.ie/minimum-unit-pricing-alcohol-ireland-facts-2932210-Aug2016/  
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been noted that crime has been on a long term downward trend in most 
western countries35, including Canada36, independent of alcohol pricing, 
although the Stockwell paper does also detect a negative time trend 
which may capture at least some of this effect. 
 The mortality paper finds that a 10% increase in minimum prices is 
associated with a 32% reduction in mortality. This seems implausibly 
large, given the low level of minimum prices in place in BC. 
 Likewise, the reported correlations with the level of alcohol-related traffic 
offences appear large, given the price levels involved. The same can be 
said for violent crimes, given the wide range of such crimes and the range 
of societal causes and influences. 
 
Given these limitations, caution is required in drawing conclusions from the 
studies. Further details are provided in Appendix D.  
 
It is worth noting also that market structures in Canada are quite different 
from in Ireland, in that the State has a monopoly on the distribution of alcohol, 
and a strong role in its off-trade retailing, as well as controls over prices in the 
on-trade. This makes the implementation of minimum pricing more 
straightforward than in Ireland; it also means that minimum prices is more akin 
to a tax increase, as the State retains the increased revenues generated.  
4.3 MARKET IMPACTS OF MUP 
There are a number of dimensions to the potential market impacts of the MUP 
proposals, namely: 
 product categories – beer, wine, spirits, cider; 
 price points – value, mid-range, premium; 
 origin – domestic producers, EU producers, non-EU producers. 
 
These are considered below. Another dimension is channel, i.e. off- versus on-
trade. However, MUP almost exclusively affects the off-trade since in most 
cases prices in the on-trade exceed the proposed MUP levels. One might 
expect some diversion of volumes to the on-trade, however, as prices in this 
channel become relatively cheaper. 
 
Based on market data from Nielsen, the main retailers and other sources, we 
have estimated the degree to which MUP would impact on current volumes 
and market shares in the Irish off-trade, by product, price-point and country 
to the degree possible. We have used product market data from 2015 and 
price data as of April 2016, differentiating between branded and unbranded 
(private label/own brand and discounters) product. 
 
                                                          
35 https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22530073-200-why-violent-crime-is-plummeting-in-the-rich-world/  
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582004-crime-plunging-rich-world-keep-it-down-governments-should-focus-
prevention-not   
36 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/what-s-behind-canada-s-improving-crime-stats-1.1315377  
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Our findings are summarised below, with detailed back-up in Appendix B.  
4.3.1 Beer & Cider 
Approximately two-thirds of beer and 85% of cider consumed in Ireland is 
domestically produced (covering both the on- and off-trade). Almost all of it 
originates in the EU, with the bulk of the imported product coming from the 
UK. Trade statistics indicate that less than 2% comes from outside the EU, 
though this may be somewhat of an under-estimate of the products’ actual 
origins.  
 
Branded Beers & Cider 
The majority of the major branded categories sold in the off-trade in Ireland, 
based on prices observed in April 2016, would be affected by MUP – just under 
60% of beers and 75% of ciders. The average price uplift for those products 
affected would be 23% for beer but 54% for cider. 
 
In terms of origin, almost 60% of Irish categories and over 70% of UK categories 
would be affected by MUP, while almost all of the most popular brands from 
other EU countries would be affected. Of the main countries of origin, Irish 
beer and cider is least affected. 
 
Unbranded Beer & Cider 
Here we are concerned with the beer and cider sold in the discounters (Aldi 
and Lidl). While we do not have aggregated market or market share data, DKM 
undertook a price survey in April 2016, and assessed the impact of MUP on 
this basis. We found that approximately 60% of both beers and ciders would 
be affected, with an average uplift for those categories affected of almost 50% 
for beer and just over 70% for cider. The impact on non-Irish product 
categories varies greatly, as they include both premium products and some 
low-price products. The latter would see very substantial price increases. 
4.3.2 Wine 
Market data indicates that branded wine holds 78% of the Irish off-trade 
market, with unbranded wines (sold in the discounters) holding the balance. 
The split of branded wine between EU and non-EU origins is estimated to be 
40:60, although this ratio is reversed for the unbranded product37.   
 
Branded Wine 
We estimate that just under 10% of branded wines would be impacted by 
MUP. Assuming no changes in volumes, the overall average prices for branded 
wine would increase by 1.1%, but for the wines affected, the average price 
increase would be almost 20%. 
                                                          
37 These splits are somewhat at variance with the official trade statistics, but likely reflect port of last loading issues in the 
latter. 
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EU producers hold approximately 40% of the branded wine market, and 15% 
of these would be affected by MUP. The overall average price of EU wine 
would rise by 1.8% if MUP as proposed was implemented, while for the wines 
affected prices would rise by almost 20%. 
 
The impact by country varies greatly. Over 20% of branded wine from Spain 
and Italy, and over one-third of the wine from Germany would be affected by 
MUP. For those wines affected, the price of Spanish and German wine would 
increase by 25-30% on average. While only a small proportion of French wine 
would be affected, for those wines affected, prices would likewise rise by 
approximately 25%.  
 
For branded wine from outside the EU, approximately 5% would be affected 
by MUP, and average price would rise by 0.6%; for the wines affected prices 
would rise on average by 18%. The proportions of non-EU wines affected by 
MUP are lower, but the price increases facing them are substantial: for 
Australian and US wines the increase would be 25-30%. 
 
Unbranded Wine 
Unbranded wine (sold in discounters) holds 22% of the Irish off-trade market 
by volume, with France being the most popular country of origin. While 
branded wine is roughly-speaking 60:40 of non-EU origin, for unbranded wine 
the ratio is reversed – EU wine accounts for just under 60% of total volumes.  
 
We do not have a full price point range for unbranded wine, but average retail 
price by country of origin is available, and this indicates that: 
 All except Argentinian and New Zealand wine would be affected by MUP.  
 The average overall price increase would be approximately 20%, or €1.30 
per bottle. 
 The price of German, South African and Chilean wine would be increased 
by over one-third on average. 
 French wine, the most popular category, would go up in price by on 
average over 20%. 
 
This would add €25 million to national cost of living, under current 
consumption patterns. 
 
This analysis is however by reference to the price averaged for each country of 
origin, which could hide significant variation within origins. As a check, DKM 
undertook a price survey of one of the discounters in April 2016. This found 
that: 
 Some 34 out of 57 product categories in our survey would be affected by 
MUP (60%), and the overall price uplift would be 16%. 
 For the products affected, the average price uplift would be 28%. 
 100% of the US, South African, German and Hungarian, 83% of the Chilean 
and 75% of Italian wines would be affected by MUP. 
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 The only countries not affected by MUP would be New Zealand and 
Argentina. 
 Almost half of the French wines would be affected, with average price 
uplift of over 36%. German and Chilean wine categories would also 
experience an uplift of over 30%. 
 
Both market sources and the DKM survey confirm that the unbranded wine 
sector would experience significant price increases if MUP as proposed were 
implemented. 
4.3.3 Spirits 
It is estimated that branded spirits hold approximately 76% of the off-trade 
market in Ireland. However, unbranded spirits retail at a significant price 
discount to their branded equivalents: while holding 24% market share by 
volume, we estimate that they hold only 17% by value. This implies that the 
average price of branded spirits is 70% higher than that of unbranded spirits. 
 
Branded Spirits 
Our analysis of the impact of the proposed MUP measure on branded spirits 
can be summarised as follows: 
 Just under 25% of branded spirits in the Irish market would be affected by 
the proposed MUP measures. This varies by product – Irish whiskey for 
instance would not be affected at all, while 60% of gin and 80% of Scotch 
would be affected. Over 40% of the most popular category – vodka – 
would be affected. 
 The overall price impact is modest, at 1.5%; however, for those products 
that are affected, the aggregate price increase would be 7.4%. 
 At the category level, the degree of price impact varies considerably; most 
products are modestly affected, but the 25% of American whiskey sold in 
Ireland would see a more than 40% price uplift, while the 12% of cream 
liqueurs that would be affected would see prices rise by more than 26%. 
The uplift in the price of affected vodka would be 6.2% on average. 
 
This would add €16.5 million to the national cost of living, under current 
consumption patterns. 
 
Unbranded Spirits 
With regard to the impact of MUP on the unbranded spirits market:  
 Practically all of the unbranded spirits sold on the Irish market would be 
affected by MUP. 
 The impact on prices would be very substantial – approximately a 40% 
uplift overall. However, vodka – which has the largest share of the 
unbranded market would see an increase in price of 50%. The least 
affected category – Irish whiskey - would see prices uplifted by 
approximately 11%. 
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Overall, we estimate that MUP as it affects unbranded spirits would add €25 
million to the national cost of living, under current consumption patterns. 
4.3.4 Summary of Market Impacts  
It is clear that MUP would have significant impacts on the off-trade in Ireland, 
and particularly with respect to product sold in the discounters. In summary: 
 The majority of the major branded beers and ciders would be affected – 
just under 60% of beers and 75% of ciders. The average price uplift for 
those products affected would be 23% and 54% respectively. 
 Approximately 60% of unbranded beers and ciders would be affected, 
with an average uplift for those categories affected of almost 50% for beer 
and just over 70% for cider. 
 Just under 10% of branded wines would be impacted by MUP. The overall 
average prices for branded wine would increase by 1.1%, but for the 
wines affected, the average price increase would be almost 20%. 
 Most unbranded wines would be affected, with price uplifts of between 
20% and one-third. 
 Just under 25% of branded spirits would be affected. For those products 
that are affected, the aggregate price increase would be 7.4%. 
 Practically all unbranded spirits would be affected by MUP. The impact on 
prices would be very substantial – approximately a 40% uplift overall. 
 
It is also clear that: 
 Irish beer, cider and spirits, both branded and unbranded, would be less 
affected than product imported from other EU countries and elsewhere. 
 Overseas suppliers to the Irish market who currently take advantage of 
low cost bases to compete on price would lose that advantage, and it is 
reasonable to assume that a proportion of them would exit the market. 
 
The latter would have implications for the Single Market, as is reflected in the 
number of Member States which have submitted observations on the Bill as 
part of the TRIS process, and in the Advocate General’s opinion with respect 
to the proposal to introduce MUP in Scotland.  
4.4 IMPACT OF MUP ON CONSUMERS 
Consumers in general would lose as a result of MUP, as prices would increase. 
As indicated above, the prices of most categories of product currently sold in 
the off-trade would be affected. The impact would be felt most significantly by 
less well-off consumers, who are most likely to consume the products that 
would be affected by MUP. 
 
Consumers would also likely experience a reduction in choice as a result of a 
proportion of producers – who currently compete on price - exiting the 
market. 
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Increased alcohol prices would increase the Consumer Price Index and the cost 
of living in Ireland. Ireland is a small open economy highly dependent on 
international trade, and as such, maintaining cost competitiveness is vital38. 
Given that Ireland is already a high cost economy39, further increases in the 
cost of living are unwelcome, as they would increase wage pressures in the 
wider economy40. Our analysis indicates significant increases in the cost of 
living, with current consumption patterns. 
4.5 CROSS-BORDER IMPACTS OF MUP 
The above analysis has considered the market and consumer impacts of MUP 
for Ireland in isolation. A further impact is that, in the absence of equivalent 
measures being put in place in Northern Ireland, one could expect leakage of 
alcohol sales from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland.  
 
Historically, Irish (and other EU) consumers have shown themselves to be 
willing to travel significant distances to avail of price differences in alcohol, 
notably spirits. ESRI research has indicated for instance that for certain years 
in the 1980s some 25% of the spirits consumed in the Republic of Ireland had 
been purchased in Northern Ireland, albeit at the time there was a significant 
price differential across a range of consumer goods41.  
 
Higher car ownership and road improvements in the meantime, as well as 
political and security improvements would on the face of it make the Irish 
market more vulnerable to cross-border leakage. This would reduce the 
impact on consumers to some degree, although they would be forced to spend 
some of the savings on additional travel expenses, as well as lost time. Losses 
to the Exchequer would be unambiguous. 
 
The cross-border dimension has been brought into sharper focus by the recent 
Brexit vote, and the subsequent sharp fall in the value of Sterling. The last 12 
months have seen a depreciation of more than 17% in the value of Sterling42 
(see chart overleaf), which provides the Northern Ireland retail sector with a 
competitiveness boost across the entire range of consumer goods, up to and 
including cars43.  
 
While inflation could be expected to dilute this somewhat in the medium term, 
at the time of writing, consumer price inflation in the UK remains subdued 
                                                          
38 http://www.competitiveness.ie/Publications/2015/Ireland%20s%20Competitiveness%20Scorecard%202015.pdf  
39 http://www.competitiveness.ie/Publications/2016/Cost-of-Doing-Business-2016.pdf  
40 http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/wage-growth-is-back-as-private-sector-pay-rises-for-three-quarters-
31483801.html  
41 Fitz Gerald, J., 1998, The Distortionary Effects of Taxes on-trade in Border Areas: The Case of the Republic of Ireland - 
United Kingdom Border. ESRI Memorandum Series 183. https://www.esri.ie/pubs/MEMO183.pdf  
42Central Bank of Ireland, comparing the Euro:Sterling exchange rate on 1st December 2015 with 25th November 2016. 
43 http://www.independent.ie/regionals/argus/news/car-imports-increase-after-brexit-vote-35007435.html  
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(0.9% in the year to October 2016) 44 . Traditionally, consumer prices in 
Northern Ireland have been below the UK average (although only marginally 
so for alcohol) 45, so the North is well-placed to capitalise on the currency 
advantage.  
Figure 4.1: STERLING VS EURO, DECEMBER 2015 - NOVEMBER 2016 
 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland  
 
Indeed, evidence has already emerged of increased traffic volumes crossing 
the border since Brexit, which appears to coincide with shopping times46, while 
other sources confirm both consumers’ and retailers’ intentions to take 
advantage of lower prices in Norther Ireland47. A recent survey for instance 
indicated that one-quarter of Irish adults intended to cross the border to shop 
over the last three months of 2016, with 43% of these intending to buy alcohol 
(the third most popular category after Christmas presents and clothes)48. 
 
While the impacts of exchange rates can vary over time, and recent 
movements may reverse, the above confirms that consumers are willing to 
react in response to differences in cross-border prices. If MUP is implemented 
in the Republic but not in the North, then there will be a permanent shift in 
price levels, which will be to the detriment of the retail trade, consumers and 
the Exchequer in the Republic. 
                                                          
44 https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/latest , 28th November 
2016. 
45  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/regional-consumer-price-
levels/2010/index.html  
46 For example http://www.independent.ie/business/brexit/weekend-exodus-to-the-north-is-on-the-rise-since-brexit-vote-
35187254.html; http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-37871271.  
47 For example http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/were-stocking-up-in-massive-quantities-northern-stores-brace-
themselves-for-influx-of-republic-shoppers-35205473.html  
48 http://www.thejournal.ie/sterling-euro-christmas-shopping-3077021-Nov2016/?utm_source=twitter_self  
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A proportion of consumers might also be expected to resort to illicit product, 
whether smuggled or illegally produced. Indeed surveys quoted in a recent 
report by the two police forces on the island confirms that purchase and 
consumption of illicit produce is already significant: Some 16% of ROI survey 
respondents had knowingly purchased illicit alcohol, while 24% of Northern 
Irish respondents admitted to purchasing counterfeit alcohol49. Apart from 
funding organised crime, there are serious health dangers in consuming 
counterfeit product50. 
 
 
  
                                                          
49 A Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2014, http://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/22721/1/cross-border-crime-
assessment-final.pdf  
50 http://alcoholireland.ie/home_news/sharp-increase-in-seizures-of-potentially-dangerous-counterfeit-alcohol-in-year-to-
date/ ; http://www.thesun.ie/irishsol/homepage/news/7229410/Distill-idents-Crackdown-on-counterfeit-booze-scams-as-
bogus-alcohol-is-top-crime-earner.html . 
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5. LABELLING OF ALCOHOL PRODUCTS & NOTICES IN 
LICENSED PREMISES 
 
 
5.1 PROVISIONS OF THE BILL & OBJECTIVES  
5.1.1 Provisions  
Section 11 of PHAB deals with alcohol product consumer labelling. The key 
provision is that, in the case of alcohol sold in non-reusable containers, the 
containers would have to carry: 
“(i) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol 
consumption, 
(ii) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol 
consumption when pregnant,  
(iii) the quantity in grams of alcohol contained in the container concerned,  
(iv) the energy value expressed in kilojoules and kilocalories contained in the 
container concerned, and  
(v) details of a website, to be established and maintained by the Executive, 
providing public health information in relation to alcohol consumption.” 
 
Reference to the Executive refers to the Health Service Executive (HSE), the 
Irish public health services provider. 
 
Alcohol sold in reusable containers would have to be “accompanied by a 
document in such form as may be prescribed specifying the matters set out in 
paragraphs (i) to (v)”. Requirements are placed on the sellers of alcohol 
products (including online sellers) to display notices providing similar 
information.  
 
The Bill would give the Minister the power to prescribe the form, size, colour, 
location, etc. of the various notices and warnings required under Section 11, 
taking into account expert advice on effectiveness and having regard to the 
rate and patterns of consumption, health risks and other societal harm from 
consumption, and other matters considered appropriate. 
5.1.2 Objectives  
The objectives of this Section, as articulated in the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(see further discussion in Appendix E), are to increase awareness of the 
impacts of alcohol consumption, in a context where the current labelling 
arrangements are argued to provide inadequate or unclear information:  
“Research indicates that accurate information on the alcohol content of 
specific beverages is essential to promote drinker’s tracking of alcohol intake. 
However, ‘standard drink’ or units are widely misunderstood by the general 
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public … very few people understand what a standard drink is. However, the 
majority supported labelling alcohol containers to include calories (82%), 
alcoholic strength (98%), ingredients (91%) and health warnings (95%). Many 
studies show a greater awareness among consumers of the risks highlighted in 
warnings”. (RIA, p.15/16) 
 
The RIA further notes that a consultative process conducted by the 
Department of Health with the industry concluded that a three-year 
transitional period would be sufficient for the purposes of phasing in new 
labels to meet the proposed legislation’s requirements. 
5.2 LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS 
Labels on alcohol products sold in Ireland already include details of alcohol 
content (ABV) and number of standards drinks.  Over time, the main producers 
are tending to voluntarily add more information on labels, such as warnings on 
the dangers of consuming alcohol while pregnant51.  
 
The question then is, how effective are the specific additional requirements 
with respect to labelling in the proposed legislation likely to be?  
 
It is on the face of it not clear how including details of energy content 
(kilojoules and kilocalories) would impact on harmful consumption of alcohol. 
Likewise, grams of alcohol is a new method of presenting the amount of 
alcohol in a product (on top of ABV and number of standard drinks), and would 
be unfamiliar to consumers. Indeed, the usage of grams - a measure of weight 
as opposed to volume – applied to a liquid product might confuse consumers. 
 
Turning to the evidence base, a North-American-focussed paper, cited in the 
RIA in support of labelling52, notes that while labelling increases awareness of 
the risks of harmful alcohol consumption and is supported by the general 
public: 
“Reviews and primary studies concerning the impacts of the US alcohol 
warning label experience, whether written by independent researchers or 
those employed by the alcohol industry, agree fairly closely that impacts on 
drinking behaviour are either nonexistent or minimal.”  
 
                                                          
51 This is a voluntary step and mirrors legislative and voluntary arrangements in a number of EU countries 
(http://www.eurocare.org/content/download/11057/58942/version/1/file/Factsheet+-
+Health+warning+labels+on+alcoholic+beverages.pdf ). 
52 Stockwell, T, 2006, A Review Of Research Into The Impacts Of Alcohol Warning Labels On Attitudes And Behaviour, Centre 
for Addictions Research of BC University of Victoria British Columbia, Canada 
http://www.uvic.ca/research/centres/carbc/assets/docs/report-impacts-alcohol-warning-labels.pdf      
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Another paper by the same author states: “grams or other weight-based 
measures are unlikely to be useful in helping drinkers to understand alcohol 
content”53, while similar conclusions are drawn by other researchers54. 
 
Indeed, Australian focus-group based research55 points to potential counter-
productive impacts for young drinkers, a particular focus of harm-reduction 
efforts: 
“The majority of the participants reported that they are aware of the existence 
of standard drink labelling; notice standard drink labels; and take these into 
account when choosing what to purchase. However, this was predominantly to 
help them choose the strongest drinks for the lowest cost.” 
 
The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 2010 Global Strategy to Reduce the 
Harmful Use of Alcohol56  - another report quoted in the RIA – meanwhile 
states: 
“Harm reduction approach can be supported by stronger promotion of 
products with a lower alcohol concentration, together with mandated health 
warnings on alcohol-product containers. Although such warnings do not lead 
to changes in drinking behaviour, they do impact on intentions to change 
drinking patterns and remind consumers about the risks associated with 
alcohol consumption.”(p.32) 
 
The evidence base for the effectiveness of warnings on labels is thus not 
strong. While some of the publications cited above suggest that labelling and 
warnings could be effective in conjunction with other measures such as 
advertising and accessibility (or that labelling and warnings should not be used 
in isolation), evidence that such combinations of measures are actually 
effective is likewise scarce.  
5.3 MARKET IMPACTS OF LABELLING PROPOSALS 
Labelling of products for human consumption is regulated at EU level, by 
Directive 1169/201157, which came into force in December 2014. With respect 
to alcohol, the Directive requires that labels display the alcohol strength by 
volume (ABV); it also excludes alcohol products from requirements to present 
                                                          
53 Kerr, W.C. & Stockwell, T., 2012, “Understanding standard drinks and drinking guidelines”, in Drug Alcohol Review, 2012 
Mar; 31(2): 200–205. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3276704/#R18  
54 For instance Agostinelli, G. & Grube, J.W. (2002). “Alcohol counter-advertising and the media: A review of recent research.” 
Alcohol Research and Health, 26, 15-21. 
Grube, J.W. & Nygaard, P. (2001). “Adolescent drinking and alcohol policy.” In Contemporary Drug Problems, 28, 87-132.  
55   Jones SC, & Gregory P, 2009, The impact of more visible standard drink labelling on youth alcohol consumption: helping 
young people drink (ir)responsibly?” Drug Alcohol Review, May; 28(3): 230-4. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21462396  
56 
file:///S:/CURRENT%20ASSIGNMENTS/2016%2002%20ABFI%20Public%20Health%20Alcohol%20Bill%20(Job)/Literature/W
HO%20Global%20strategy.pdf  
57 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011R1169&from=EN  
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nutritional information as well as lists of ingredients on labels. The Bill would 
thus add a number of additional requirements on labelling.  
 
The market impact would arise as producers wishing to supply the Irish market 
would have to redesign their product labelling specifically for this market. 
While some of the additional cost could be absorbed within the increases 
envisaged via MUP, a high proportion of product lines in the off-trade and 
effectively all products in the on-trade would not be impacted by MUP (see 
Chapter 4), so costs would have to be absorbed or passed on, or a combination 
of both. 
 
The potential impacts of these requirements on the industry can be considered 
across a number of dimensions:  
(i) size of producer,  
(ii) whether the producer is Irish or not, and 
(iii) volumes of each product sold on Irish market and other markets. 
 
Specific Irish labelling would impose additional costs on producers. Industry 
sources indicate that the cost of redesigning a single label for largescale 
manufacturers is approximately €14,000, while the entire suite of labelling 
(including front and back label, and outer packaging) for a single product line 
is approximately €50,000. Some additional stock control costs could also arise 
as producers would have to differentiate between product for the Irish market 
and for other markets. 
 
At one end of the spectrum, a large producer, well-established in the Irish 
market, whose product lines each sell in large volumes on the Irish market, 
would be able to accommodate the proposed requirements with relatively 
minor additional cost and disruption. It could spread the cost over a large 
volume of sales, and would likely be able to accommodate the label changes 
within its normal labelling “refresh” cycle, given the three year transition 
period envisaged in the Bill. The label contents of many of the main producers 
are in any event evolving to provide more information. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum a small producer, a producer with modest 
sales volumes in Ireland, or a producer with Irish volumes spread across a wide 
range of products (such as a wine importer), would be more significantly 
impacted.  
 
For a firm such as a start-up producer, one wishing to break into the Irish 
market, or even an established producer introducing a new product to the 
market, the additional cost per product line could be burdensome. 
Furthermore, the smaller a firm’s/product line’s market share, the less scope 
there is to pass additional costs on. 
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Discussions with smaller operators in the beer market indicate that their 
labelling costs would be significantly lower than for the major suppliers as 
quoted above. However, even at these lower costs levels, the labelling 
requirement could be significant on very short product runs, and they have 
quoted instances where it has been unviable to produce a short line for a 
particular export market where they would have had to create a separate label 
for it. 
 
Between these two ends of the spectrum are products and producers that 
would likely be impacted to varying degrees by the proposed measures. Given 
the modest size of the Irish market (approximately 0.8% of the total EU 
market 58 ), even substantial producers may find the proposed measures 
burdensome for some of their lines.  
 
These proposals could represent a barrier to entry to the Irish market, for both 
small local producers and for producers with a modest presence in the Irish 
market or seeking to enter or introduce a new product to the Irish market. As 
a result of the additional costs that would be imposed, products might be 
withdrawn from the Irish market, or new products might not be introduced.  
 
By the same token, large domestic producers would be impacted at a relatively 
modest level. The global alcohol industry – specifically beer and spirits - is 
highly concentrated, and the Irish market reflects this (see Chapter 2). So the 
proposed measures could potentially have the effect of protecting these 
domestic producers from competition. 
 
There is another specific aspect of the labelling proposals that the industry 
takes issue with, and that is the requirement to include “a warning that is 
intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol consumption”. The 
industry contends strongly that danger only arises in terms of over-
consumption of alcohol, or consumption in inappropriate circumstance, such 
as when pregnant or when intending to drive. While the literature is mixed, 
there is a significant body of research that points to a mildly beneficial net 
health impact from moderate alcohol consumption59.  
 
This reinforces the burden of the specific labelling requirements for Ireland, 
since producers would be reluctant to include this warning on products 
destined for other markets. Likewise, a link to a website operated by the Irish 
                                                          
58 DKM estimate based on Eurostat data for 2013. 
59 For example 
Mostofsky E. et al., 2016, “Key Findings on Alcohol Consumption and a Variety of Health Outcomes From the Nurses’ Health 
Study”, in American Journal of Public Health, Volume 106, Issue 9 (September 2016), 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303336  
Di Castelnuovo, A., et al. “Alcohol dosing and total mortality in men and women: an updated meta-analysis of 34 
prospective studies.” Archives of Internal Medicine, 2006; 166:2437–
2445. http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=769554  
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Health Service Executive would not be relevant for most consumers in an 
international market. 
5.4 IMPACT ON CONSUMERS 
5.4.1 Reduced Choice  
Certain products could potentially be removed from the Irish market, or not 
be introduced to the market, including new and short lines by small scale 
producers. Potential new market entrants would face additional costs, which 
might discourage them from entering the market. 
5.4.2 Increased Prices 
Prices could rise for two reasons: 
(i) Directly, production costs could rise as a result of the labelling 
requirements, and at least some of these would be passed onto 
consumers. As indicated, this would be on top of price increases if MUP 
were to be introduced.    
(ii) Indirectly, reduced competition, if certain products were removed from 
or not introduced to the market, could lead to higher prices than would 
otherwise be the case. 
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6. ADVERTISING, SPONSORSHIP & PROMOTION OF 
ALCOHOL  
 
 
For convenience we treat the provisions regarding adverting, sponsorship and 
promotion of alcohol products collectively, as they are closely related. 
6.1 PROVISIONS OF THE BILL & OBJECTIVES  
6.1.1 Provisions  
The provisions of the Bill with respect to advertising, sponsorship and 
promotion are comprehensive, and are contained in Sections 12 to 18 and 21. 
In summary, they provide for: 
 
Contents of Advertising (Section 12) 
As with the labelling requirements, advertising of alcohol products would have 
to include a warning on the dangers of consuming alcohol and of consuming 
alcohol when pregnant, and a weblink to a HSE health information website. 
The Minister would have powers to prescribe the size, colour, duration, etc. of 
the warnings, etc., taking into account expert advice on effectiveness and rates 
and patterns of consumption and related health and other societal harm. 
 
The Bill is highly prescriptive of what can be included in an advertisement for 
alcohol, apart from the various warnings. Contents would be restricted to: 
“(a) an image of, or reference to, one or more alcohol products (whether of the 
same or different kinds) either in a container or containers (which may be 
opened or unopened) or in a glass or glasses; 
(b) details of whether the product concerned is intended to be diluted with a 
non alcoholic beverage and where it is intended to so be diluted, an image of 
or reference to the non alcoholic beverage; 
(c) an image of, or reference to, the country and region of origin of the product 
concerned; 
(d) an image of, or reference to, the method of production of the product 
concerned; 
(e) an image of, or reference to, the premises where the alcohol product 
concerned was manufactured; 
(f) the price of the product concerned; 
(g) a brand name or variant thereof, trade mark and brand emblem of the 
product concerned; 
(h) a corporate name and corporate emblem of the product concerned; 
(i) an objective description of the flavour, colour and smell of the product 
concerned; 
(j) the name and address of the manufacturer (or his or her agent) of the 
product concerned; 
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(k) the alcoholic strength by volume of the product concerned; 
(l) the quantity in grams of alcohol contained in the product concerned; 
(m) the energy value expressed in kilojoules and kilocalories of the product 
concerned.” [Section 12(7)] 
 
Further, it would be prohibited to include an image of or reference to an 
alcohol product in an advertisement for any other good or service. A voluntary 
code already exists in terms of the content of alcohol advertising, but the 
above proposals represent a step change in the level of restriction, and are 
reflective of the most restrictive regulations currently in place among EU 
Member States.  
 
Advertising in Certain Places (Section 13) 
Advertising of alcohol products would be prohibited in parks and public open 
spaces, on public transport (vehicles and stations), or within 200 metres of the 
perimeter of a school, playground or a child services location.  
 
Advertising during Events (Section 14) 
Advertising of alcohol products would be prohibited in a sports arena during a 
sports event, or at events aimed primarily at children (those under the age of 
18) or in which they are the majority of participants. This includes horse racing, 
dog racing and motor racing tracks. 
 
Sponsorship (Section 15) 
Sponsorship with the aim of promoting alcohol products would be prohibited 
at events aimed primarily at children or in which they are the majority of 
participants, or at motor racing events. There would be no prohibition on 
sponsorship of horse racing or dog racing, and of events aimed primarily at or 
involving adults. 
 
Children’s Clothing (Section 16) 
Children’s clothing and footwear could not contain alcohol product names, 
images, logos, etc. 
 
Advertising in Print Media (Section 17) 
With the exception of trade publications, a maximum of 20% of advertising 
space in a publication could be devoted to alcohol products. Advertising on 
front or back covers or wrappers, envelopes, etc, would be prohibited. 
 
The current voluntary code has a similar requirement, but it is set at 25%, so 
the proposed legislation would represent a significant further restriction. The 
20% rule and the requirements regarding warnings and content [Section 12(7)] 
would apply equally to imported publications. 
 
Advertising in publications where 20% of the audience is likely or intended to 
be children would be prohibited.  
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Cinema Advertising (Section 18) 
Alcohol products could only be advertised at screenings of movies with an over 
18 certification.  
 
Sales & Supply of Alcohol Products (i.e. Promotions) (Section 21) 
This section would give the Minister the power to prohibit or restrict:  
 The supply of alcohol to consumers at a reduced price or free – 
 on purchase of another product (whether alcohol or not),  
 for a limited time period, or 
 to a particular class of persons.  
 Other business promotions likely to encourage consumers to consume 
alcohol in a harmful way. 
 Advertising of the above promotions. 
 
In the case of this Section, the Minister should have regard specifically to “the 
need to reduce alcohol consumption”, and within that the need to reduce 
health and societal harm from alcohol consumption including in particular the 
needed to reduce “public order offences arising from alcohol consumption”. It 
is noteworthy that this is the only section in the Bill which specifies a need to 
reduce alcohol consumption per se. 
 
Broadcast Watershed 
While not included in the 2015 Bill as published, in the course of the Oireachtas 
debate on the Bill in Autumn 2016, amendments were introduced which 
include a broadcast watershed for TV and radio. Amendment 36 states that 
“advertisements for alcohol products cannot be broadcast on television before 
9 p.m. and that such advertisements cannot be broadcast on the radio other 
than between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. on weekdays”60. 
6.1.2 Objectives 
Reading the Bill and the related RIA, it is clear that the prime objective of these 
provisions is to reduce the exposure of children and young people to alcohol 
advertising: “There is a compelling body of research evidence which shows that 
exposure to alcohol marketing, whether it is on TV, in movies, in public places 
or alcohol branded sponsorship, predicts future youth drinking”. 
 
The RIA also states that self-regulation, as is in place currently in Ireland, is 
inadequate for this purpose. It further notes that the Bill “implements the 
existing Code of Practice for Sponsorships by Drinks Companies as far as 
possible and provides for enforcement powers and penalties.” (p.18) with 
regard to the restriction on promotions (Section 21), the RIA notes that similar 
powers included under Section 16 of the Intoxicating Liquor Act (2008), but 
were not commenced.  
                                                          
60 https://www.kildarestreet.com/sendebates/?id=2016-10-26a.251&s=speaker%3A470  
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The latter section is worded very similarly to Section 21 of PHAB, but it is 
noteworthy that it refers to the need to reduce consumption of alcohol where 
such consumption is “to an excessive extent”. This qualification is dropped 
entirely from Section 21, which uniquely refers to the need to reduce alcohol 
consumption per se. 
 
The broadcast watershed was not in the Bill as published, and was not dealt 
with specifically in the RIA, although it notes that the 2012 Steering Group 
Report on a National Substance Misuse Strategy (NSMS)61 did recommend a 
9.00pm TV and radio watershed. It also notes that a watershed could 
potentially divert revenues from indigenous broadcasters, but concludes that 
given the latters’ market share, and the fact that alcohol advertising represents 
only 5% of total advertising revenues, “any spending reduction is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on revenue streams for broadcasters”.  
6.2 LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS 
A key issue with respect to restricting advertising in an attempt to control 
alcohol consumption is the question of whether advertising drives 
consumption levels, or market share.  
 
For mature consumer products such as alcohol, market share is the main focus 
of advertising. The long term decline in alcohol consumption in Ireland, despite 
continued exposure to advertising, would appear to confirm this, particularly 
when one considers the evolution over time in the relative market shares of 
different types of alcohol, as presented in Chapter 2. Evidence from other 
countries is similar. In the US for instance, consumption per capita per recent 
decades has remained static, despite a huge increase in expenditure on drinks 
advertising over the same period62, while relative market shares of alcohol 
types can shift63. 
 
A central objective of the proposed regulations with respect to advertising, 
sponsorship and promotion is to reduce exposure of children and young 
people to alcohol advertising, and in doing so to reduce youth drinking. Some 
evidence does point to a link between exposure to advertising and youth 
drinking64. However, difficulties in establishing causality and in controlling for 
other factors are a common issue with these studies65, while some indicate 
impact on intentions to drink by young people as opposed to actual drinking 
behaviour66.  
 
                                                          
61 http://health.gov.ie/blog/publications/steering-group-report-on-a-national-substance-misuse-strategyfebruary- 
2012/  
62 http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/alcohol-ads-increased-400-over-40-years-americans-arent-
drinking-more-163668  
63 http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/whiskey-tequila-spirits-2014/  
64 For example http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/alcohol/Forum/docs/science_o01_en.pdf  
65 For example http://www.ias.org.uk/uploads/pdf/Marketing/AERC_FinalReport_0051.pdf  
66 For example http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17568965  
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Another stated objective, specifically with respect to restrictions on 
promotions, is to reduce alcohol consumption. However, the evidence is that 
restrictions on promotion and advertising of alcohol have little impact on 
overall consumption67. 
 
Of central relevance to the question of effectiveness, is how young people 
consume advertising, and specifically the degree to which they consume it 
from traditional media.  
 
Box 6.1: The Loi Evin 
An important case study in the current context is France, which has among the most 
restrictive regulations on alcohol advertising and sponsorship in the western world, known as 
the Loi Evin, which was enacted in 1991, with some changes since. Many of the elements of 
the PHAB mirror those in the French legislation. 
 
The pattern of alcohol consumption in France is interesting. On the one hand, consumption 
has been in long term decline68. At the same time, however, the level of youth and underage 
drinking, and of binge drinking, is growing69 70 71, despite increasing the age at which alcohol 
can be bought72.  
 
It is noteworthy that highly restrictive and rigorously enforced73 legislation, in a country 
where overall consumption has been falling, has not been effective in curtailing the trends in 
youth drinking in France. These findings point to long term cultural factors as stronger 
influencers of behaviour than regulatory measures. A more detailed discussion on alcohol 
regulation in European countries is presented in Appendix C. 
 
 
Irish data from late 201574 is telling in this regard: 
“According to TAM's figures, the number of ads ("commercial spots") that 
Irish people see on TV is plummeting. In the last two years, it has fallen by 
a whopping 25pc in the key demographics of housekeepers with children 
and those ages 15 to 34.” 
and 
                                                          
67  For example Nelson, JP. & Young, JP., 2003, Meta-Analysis Of Alcohol Advertising Bans: Cumulative Econometric 
Estimates of Regulatory Effects. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228649385_Meta-
Analysis_of_Alcohol_Advertising_Bans_Cumulative_Econometric_Estimates_of_Regulatory_Effects  
68 http://www.aim-digest.com/digest/members%20over%20yr/french%20consumption.pdf  
69 The 2011 ESPAD Report - Substance Use Among Students in 36 European Countries, by reference to Use of any alcoholic 
beverage during the past 12 months (p.127, 129, 133). The report also finds high levels of use of cannabis and other illicit 
drugs among French students.  
http://www.espad.org/Uploads/ESPAD_reports/2011/The_2011_ESPAD_Report_FULL_2012_10_29.pdf  
70 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1823730,00.html  
71 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/jan/29/alcohol-children-binge-drinking-france  
72 http://www.thelocal.fr/20131003/france-drinking-smoking-alcohol-cigarettes-alcoholism  
73 http://www.ias.org.uk/What-we-do/Publication-archive/The-Globe/Issue-2-2004-amp-1-2004/The-Loi-Evin-a-French-
exception.aspx  
74 http://www.independent.ie/business/technology/ireland-is-moving-away-from-live-tv-but-no-one-will-admit-it-
34274099.html  
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“Does it matter whether TV content is live or not? To many people it 
doesn't. …….. But for advertisers, which fund RTE, TV3, UTV and a host of 
other broadcasters, it makes all the difference in the world. And their 
visibility has plummeted with Irish audiences in the last two years.” (DKM 
emphases) 
 
This is matched by international trends. 2016 data from the US indicates that: 
“Teens (12-17) watched 14 hours and 18 minutes of traditional TV per 
week in Q2, a rather large 13.5% drop year-over-year and a 36.2% 
contraction over the past 5 years; 
Older Millennials (25-34) watched 20 hours and 56 minutes per week in 
Q2, a 5.5% decrease year-over-year (up from 3% in Q1) but a more 
expansive 25.6% drop over 5 years”75. 
Note this US report includes Pay-Per-View in its definition of traditional TV. 
 
Likewise in the UK: 
“Young viewers are driving the drop in time spent watching TV. Since 
2010, viewing on traditional TV dropped by over a quarter among 16-24 
year olds and children, and by 19% for those between 25-34 year olds. 
Worryingly for traditional broadcasters, viewers between 35 and 44 year 
olds also reduced their time spent watching traditional TV by a substantial 
17% in the last 5 years.” 76 
 
In summary, young people, the main targets of the proposed restrictions on 
broadcast advertising, are the group in society least likely to consume such 
advertising, which again raises the question of the likely effectiveness of the 
proposals. 
6.3 IMPACT ON THE MARKET 
6.3.1 Impact on Producers 
The Bill would impose significant restrictions on the capacity of alcohol firms 
to advertise and promote their products, across a number of dimensions. In 
particular: 
 The contents of alcohol advertisements would be limited to images of and 
references to the product itself, physical characteristics, how it may be 
drunk, its origin, strength, method of production, price and brand. This 
would on the face of it exclude most advertisements currently being used 
in Ireland – certainly in the broadcast media.   
 The requirement to include warnings on the danger of alcohol 
consumption, similar to the labelling requirements, and the power of the 
Minister to specify the form, colour and duration of such warnings. 
                                                          
75 MarketingCharts, 2016, The State of Traditional TV: Q2 2016 Update, http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/are-
young-people-watching-less-tv-24817/  
76 Business Insider UK, 2016, More young people are watching less traditional TV, http://uk.businessinsider.com/more-
young-people-are-watching-less-traditional-tv-2016-7?r=US&IR=T  
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 The ban on alcohol advertising at sports events. 
 The 20% restrictions on alcohol advertising in print media, which would 
also apply to imported publications. 
 The power of the Minister to effectively ban price-based alcohol 
promotions. 
 
In particular, new entrants to the market, whether they be domestic start-ups, 
overseas firms seeking to enter the market, or more established firms seeking 
to launch a new product, would be severely restricted: 
 They would be unable to undertake promotions, which are a relatively 
low cost means of marketing or test marketing low volume or novel 
products. 
 The 20% restriction might mean that new entrants are “squeezed out” of 
print media advertising, particularly in a highly concentrated market such 
as Ireland.  
 Broadcast advertisements would have to be significantly adapted for the 
Irish market – producers would likely have to develop an entirely different 
advertisement for Ireland, which might undermine the commerciality of 
certain products given the modest size of the market. 
 
The cumulative impact would on the face of it be to favour large, established 
incumbents, at the expense of smaller indigenous firms and overseas firms, as 
the latter’s capacity to promote their products would be severely restricted. 
 
The proposals would impact especially on spirits producers, since they are 
already banned from advertising on the broadcast media in Ireland, and are 
therefore particularly dependent on outdoor advertising.  
 
The ban on outdoor advertising within 200 metres of the perimeter of a school 
or childcare facility compares with the current voluntary code of practice, 
which enforces a ban within 100 metres of the school entrance. This change 
increases the area of the “cordon sanitaire” from just over three hectares to a 
minimum of over 12.5 hectares, and in reality significantly more depending on 
the size of the facility in question77. In an urbanised environment with a high 
density of schools, this could put a significant proportion of the urban area 
effectively off-limits for outdoor alcohol advertising. This is demonstrated by 
the following graphic, which shows the impact of the proposed 200m 
restriction compared to the existing 100m restriction, on the number of 
locations where outdoor alcohol advertising would be allowed in the Terenure 
district of Dublin. The evidence base for this extension is not presented.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 For instance, if the school or childcare facility in question occupies an area 100 metres in diameter, then the cordon 
sanitaire would enclose almost 20 hectares; if it occupies an area 200m in diameter then it encloses 28 hectares. 
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Figure 6.1: COMPARISON OF IMPACT OF 200M AND 100M OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
RESTRICTIONS ON ALLOWED ADVERTISING LOCATIONS IN TERENURE, DUBLIN  
Proposed 200m Restriction 
 
Existing 100m Restriction 
 
Source: Outdoor Advertisers of Ireland  
 
We note that advertising would be allowed on vehicles delivering alcohol 
products. Since these are mobile, they can in effect circumvent the restrictions 
on outdoor advertising, for those products that have a sufficiently strong 
market position to justify advertising on the sides of delivery vehicles. Again, 
this would favour domestic incumbents vis à vis those with a small market 
share (notably start-ups and overseas firms). 
 
Combined with the tighter restrictions on print media, the proposals would 
further reduce the scope for new and innovative spirits producers to promote 
their products in the Irish market. This is notably relevant for the Irish whiskey 
industry, which having been highly concentrated for many decades is now 
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seeing a significant number of new producers78. By definition, these must 
produce in Ireland, and they face a challenge to differentiate their product 
from the dominant incumbents, which would be made significantly more 
difficult by these proposals. 
 
Ireland is currently a popular test market for alcohol products, as a small, 
English-speaking market with an already highly-developed regulatory 
structure. Large established firms use the Irish market to test products, before 
extending their launch to larger markets. Recent high profile examples include: 
 Diageo’s Hop House 13 craft-style beer, developed and brewed in Dublin, 
which was successfully launched in Ireland and at the time of writing is 
being extended to the UK79.  
 Heineken Light, a low alcohol and low calorie beer, available in the US for 
a number of years, which has been launched in Ireland before a full launch 
in Europe80. The draft beer is brewed in Ireland while the bottled and can 
versions are imported. 
 Jameson Caskmates, an innovative whiskey product aged in craft stout 
casks, which has been developed and test-marketed in Ireland and since 
been launched globally81 (see Box 6.2 overleaf).  
 
There would be a question mark over whether this aspect of the Irish market 
would survive these proposals, which would have a detrimental impact on 
more innovative firms in Ireland and internationally seeking to test out their 
new products here. 
6.3.2 Impact on the Media 
Audio-visual Media 
Another economic sector that would be adversely affected by the proposals is 
the advertising sector. The alcohol industry is a significant advertiser in Ireland, 
spending approximately €29 million on buying media space in 201582, mostly 
on TV. A further approximately €5 million per annum is spent on 
creation/production of advertising. With the proposed restrictions on 
advertising and marketing of alcohol, the number of ads being produced and 
broadcast for the Irish market would be reduced. 
 
Significant numbers of people are employed producing advertisements of 
various sorts for the industry, either directly in the alcohol firms themselves, 
in the advertising agencies, or in the supporting sectors such as audio-visual 
production, printers, technical staff, actors, and so on.  
 
                                                          
78  http://www.thejournal.ie/craft-whiskey-ireland-2339012-Sep2015/ ; http://www.thespiritsbusiness.com/2016/01/top-
10-new-irish-whiskey-distilleries/  
79 http://barmagazine.co.uk/guinness-to-roll-out-new-lager-after-success-in-ireland/  
80 http://www.drinksindustryireland.ie/heineken-lights-exclusive-irish-launch/ 
81 http://www.drinksint.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5612/Beer-finished_Jameson_Caskmates_launches.html  
82 Carat Ireland, quoted in Department of Health Regulatory Impact Analysis. 
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The scope for Irish agencies to bid for work with multinational alcohol 
producers operating in Ireland would likely be severely reduced, as such ads 
would not be run in Ireland and marketing decisions would be made outside 
of Ireland. A case in point is Heineken, which is a major procurer of audio-visual 
advertising content aimed at an international market, commissioned from the 
Irish sector. Recent examples include campaigns centred around the Rugby 
World Cup83, and the European launch of Heineken Light84, as well as the 
advertising campaign for Orchard Thieves cider. 
 
Going forward, the restrictions on the alcohol market could have a negative 
impact on the capacity of the Irish advertising sector to grow, and for new firms 
to emerge. 
 
 
                                                          
83 http://www.adworld.ie/2015/07/17/rothco-delivers-global-rugby-world-cup-ad-heineken/  
84 http://www.adworld.ie/2016/04/29/rothco-creates-global-campaign-heineken-light/  
Box 6.2: Jameson Caskmates* 
The Irish whiskey industry is going through major expansion, with projected investment of €1 billion 
being made in Ireland between 2015 and 2025. Five years ago, Irish Distillers was one of four distilleries 
operating on the island; it is now one of 12 operational distilleries with another 20 set to open in the 
next few years. The Irish Whiskey Association projects global sales to grow to 12 million cases by 2020 
and double to 24 million cases by 2030. This represents a major opportunity for this indigenous industry 
to once again take its place among the largest whiskey producers in the world, complete with 
investment and job creation across Ireland.  
The Caskmates innovation arose as a collaboration between Irish Distillers and a local craft brewer of 
stout in Cork, Franciscan Well Brewery. Normally Irish whiskey is matured in barrels that have been 
seasoned with other whiskey (e.g. bourbon) or with wine/fortified wine (e.g. sherry, port, etc). The use 
of beer-seasoned barrels was quite novel.  
Initially Irish Distillers pilot-tested 3,500 bottles in Ireland in key on- and off-trade accounts – to gauge 
customer reaction and refine the product. The results exceeded expectations – quickly selling out with 
requests for more. Taking on board the insights and feedback from this first test, the innovation team 
made some minor refinements before scaling up for a global launch.  
In the first year, Jameson Caskmates reached the 100,000 case milestone (9-litre case equivalent, or 12 
x 700ml bottles).  Some 25 export markets were selected with a global roll-out in July 2016. 
Jameson Caskmates is ranked as a Top 4 Innovation (Nielsen, Value May 2016) in the US – a market 
where thousands of new spirits are launched every year.  Jameson Caskmates won Gold in the World 
Whiskey Awards (February 2016, Stage 1) for the best Irish blended, non-aged whiskey. 
Being able to use Ireland as a test market meant investment into the local economy, from collaborating 
with a local craft brewery and giving it access to a global platform, to purchasing goods and services 
including advertising spend in the local economy.  
Pilot tests on a small scale facilitate learning opportunities to gain feedback and refine products, as well 
as minimising risk and providing statistical evidence to support scaling up.  
 
*Data provided by Jameson  
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Domestic Broadcasting 
In addition, the broadcast media content paid for by alcohol advertising 
revenues would also be under threat, as the overall Irish broadcast advertising 
market would shrink. Sector sources indicate that, because of the way the Irish 
broadcast advertising market works (length of advertising slots are limited by 
regulation) and the balance of supply and demand in the market, loss of a large 
source of demand would depress prices across all ads. As a result, the loss of 
revenue for broadcasters would be more than the value currently directly 
attributable to alcohol advertising.  
 
Thus Irish-based TV and radio stations would earn less advertising revenues, 
and would have fewer resources to produce or buy programming content. As 
a result, their competitive position vis à vis overseas broadcasters would be 
weakened and over time their market share would be under threat. Sector 
sources indicate that alcohol advertising revenues for RTÉ as they stand 
currently would translate into 120 hours of domestically-produced TV content. 
More content would also be dependent on alcohol advertising revenues on 
other domestic channels. 
 
Overseas Broadcasters & the Internet  
Some broadcast advertising activity aimed at the Irish market could potentially 
migrate to overseas channels, to circumvent the Irish regulations85. Overseas 
channels already have a significant market share in Ireland - non-terrestrial 
Irish channels currently hold approximately 52% of the Irish TV market86.  
 
The main commercial channels – including Sky, UTV and Channel 4 - have Irish 
“opt outs”87, and the alcohol ads run on these opt outs have tended to comply 
with Irish regulations. However, future compliance would be uncertain if 
regulations became significantly more restrictive.  
 
Some advertising might also migrate to the internet and social media. 
Although such advertising is increasingly becoming personalised, and there is 
a significant degree of regulation in place for established media channels (such 
as Facebook and YouTube), the nature and rapid evolution of the digital media 
sector make it difficult to regulate unilaterally. 
 
Print Media 
One can also foresee detrimental impacts on the print media market, as 
imported publications would be required to abide by the 20% rule and other 
restrictions, which are not imposed in their domestic markets. Retail sources 
indicate that approximately 75% of the volume of magazines sold in Ireland 
                                                          
85 Similar has been reported as happening in the past in other EU countries (http://alcoholireland.ie/home_news/sweden-
calls-for-an-end-to-alcohol-advertising-on-national-television/ ). 
86 TAM Ireland February 2016 data. (http://www.tamireland.ie/box-clever/tv-basics/share-and-reach ). 
87 http://www.irishtimes.com/business/media-and-marketing/long-tail-of-multichannel-tv-hurts-irish-broadcasters-
1.1980796  
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are imported, and that for these publications their Irish sales would represent 
less than 10% of total sales. 
 
The proposed regulations would force separate print runs for the Irish market, 
which is burdensome and might render publications with a small Irish 
circulation unviable in the Irish market, forcing them to exit the market. Again, 
well-established domestic publications would have their competitive position 
reinforced. 
 
Employment Implications  
In all, we estimate that approximately 275 jobs are dependent on alcohol 
broadcast advertising in Ireland, throughout the economy (including the 
broadcast content supported by alcohol advertising). With the level of 
restriction being proposed on advertising and promotions, the future of this 
level of employment would be in question. 
6.3.3 Impact on Sports & Cultural Events  
Professional/commercialised sport is a major international industry, including 
professional team sports, horse racing, dog racing, etc. In an Irish context elite 
Gaelic Games can also be included. 
 
Irish audiences consume these sports directly by attending events or indirectly 
via television/radio (and increasingly social media). These events are 
supported by and dependent on sponsorship and advertising by a wide range 
of sectors, including alcohol. 
 
Irish-based events compete for audience with events in other countries (in 
particular the UK), and already suffer a significant disadvantage in terms of the 
small domestic market and limited international reach. In this context, 
proposals to restrict alcohol advertising at such events, or on the domestic 
media broadcasting them, place them at a further competitive disadvantage 
vis à vis events based in other countries, which are not subject to such 
restrictions. With the aid of advertising revenues the latter are in a position to 
further press home their relative advantage by making their events more 
attractive to the best competitors and thus to spectators and viewers. 
 
Sponsorship is important for most largescale festivals, events, concerts, etc. in 
Ireland. These events, many of which are supported by drinks companies in 
one way or another, have been shown to generate significant economic 
benefits, in terms of income, employment, local and international tourism, and 
Exchequer revenues88. 
 
                                                          
88 See for example http://www.dubchamber.ie/news/press-releases/news/display-news/2015/07/02/new-report-shows-
value-of-big-events-to-irish-economy  ; 
http://www.businesstoarts.ie/images/uploads/News_Release_Shining_the_light_on_successful_sponsorships.pdf ; 
http://www.goracing.ie/pics/2012/NUIMREPORT.PDF . 
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While sponsorship per se of events aimed primarily at adults would not be 
affected by the proposals in the Bill, sponsorship is generally combined with 
other forms of market activation that could fall foul of the proposed measures.   
 
Sponsorship of events generally involves more than simply “writing a cheque”, 
as companies wish to ensure that their products are associated with 
professionally run and successful events. Companies can often provide 
organisational expertise to the events, and can help to maintain standards vis 
à vis comparable events overseas. They can also for instance provide input into 
inviting and supporting performers. Event tickets are often used for 
promotional purposes by the sponsor companies. 
 
“Pouring rights”, while beneficial for the drinks companies, are also a means 
by which event organisers can access temporary facilities (equipment, 
marquees, etc.) which would only have a short term usage and would not be 
economical to provide internally, or at least to the same standard. 
 
Discussions with the organisers of a number of events indicate that, given the 
level of support provided by drinks companies, it would not be straightforward 
to find alternative sponsors of a comparable scale who would have an interest 
in reaching the same “audience”, or have the same event expertise to bring to 
the event. The gap would have to be filled by increasing ticket prices and/or 
reducing the quality of the event or facilities. 
 
They also indicate that involvement by drinks companies can actually be 
beneficial in terms of controlling excessive and/or underage drinking, as the 
companies are mindful of the reputational aspects of their involvement, and 
would not want to be associated with such drinking.   
6.4 IMPACT ON CONSUMERS 
The impact on Irish consumers once again would be negative. Consumer 
choice would be reduced as the scope for new and innovative products to 
access the market would be restricted.  
 
While sponsorship per se of events aimed primarily at adults would not be 
affected by the proposals in the Bill, sponsorship is generally combined with 
other forms of market activation that could fall foul of the proposed measures.   
Many events are also attractive to teenagers and young adults, so these could 
potentially be impacted. Marketing industry sources indicate that without 
alcohol sponsorship of events, ticket prices could increase by 1/3.  
 
Reductions in alcohol broadcasting revenues would adversely impact domestic 
broadcasters’ ability to produce programming, so there would be a reduction 
of such programming available to consume. 
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7. STRUCTURAL SEPARATION OF ALCOHOL PRODUCTS IN 
MIXED TRADING OUTLETS 
 
 
7.1 PROVISIONS OF THE BILL & OBJECTIVES  
The provisions relating to Structural Separation are contained in Article 20 of 
the Bill. Under this section, mixed retailers would have to confine alcohol sales 
and advertising to - 
(i) a distinct area, separated from the rest of the shop by a physical barrier, 
outside of which alcohol and alcohol advertisements would be “not 
readily visible”, and through which customers would not have to pass to 
access other non-alcohol products, or 
(ii) a single point of sale containing a storage unit for alcohol, not accessible 
to the public, through which alcohol products would not be visible when 
closed, and with no advertising thereon, or 
(iii) one or more adjacent storage units for alcohol, through which products 
or advertising would not be visible when closed.     
 
For convenience in what follows we refer to these three options as “separate 
area”, “point of sale” and “storage unit” options respectively.  
 
It is noteworthy that the provisions of Section 20 would not apply to pubs, or 
to off-licences in which sales “comprise wholly or mainly alcohol products”.   
 
Objectives 
The RIA sets out the objectives of Section 20 as follows: 
“Alcohol is not an ordinary consumer product and this is recognised by the 
State through a licensing system and a specific excise tax. However, when it 
comes to mixed retail outlets, e.g. supermarkets and convenience stores, it is 
frequently displayed like a regular grocery item. The regulation of the way it is 
displayed for sale it (sic.) is an important mechanism to highlight the harm it 
can cause and protect children from overexposure.”  
 
The RIA further notes that the section mirrors similar provisions in Section 9 of 
the 2008 Intoxicating Liquor Act, which was not commenced. The current 
proposals differ from Section 9 of the 2008 Act in that:  
(i) under the separate area option, alcohol was also to have been paid for 
in the area; 
(ii) under the point of sale and storage unit options, wine was excluded 
from the provisions. 
 
The objectives of the latter are listed in the RIA as follows: 
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 “access to alcohol products would be controlled in premises to which it 
applies;  
 alcohol products could not be displayed near grocery products, thereby 
discouraging the purchase of alcohol products as part of everyday 
household grocery shopping;  
 separate display of alcohol products would make them less visible to 
children.”  
 
Further: “From a policy perspective the key is that alcohol products will no 
longer be displayed like ‘every day’, ‘ordinary’ products.” It is an objective of 
the section, therefore, to “denormalise” the purchase of alcohol.   
7.2 LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS 
The proposals in Section 20 would make it less convenient to buy alcohol 
products in supermarkets, convenience stores and forecourts, and make them 
less visible to children and others. However, the important question is how 
they would contribute to the over-arching objectives of reducing harmful 
consumption of alcohol. 
 
No evidence is provided that this would be the case, in the RIA. While it is 
conceivable that consumers in some rural areas would reduce consumption 
through sheer lack of access to retail outlets selling alcohol, this would not 
affect the majority of consumers, and on the face of it is unlikely to deter those 
who currently consume alcohol to excess.  
7.3 IMPACT ON THE MARKET 
7.3.1 Impact on Producers 
The Structural Separation provisions in the Bill, in common with many of the 
other proposals can be seen as having an impact on new products seeking to 
build a market share in Ireland, vis à vis more established brands. They would 
not be as readily visible to consumers, and indeed may be “squeezed out” by 
more established products, if the proposals lead to a reduction in the total 
amount of retail space available to alcohol, which on the face of it is likely. 
 
This is likely to have more of an impact on wine than on other categories, as 
consumers generally spend more time “browsing” for wine, than is the case 
for instance with beer 89 . The inconvenience imposed by the structural 
separation proposals, particularly on smaller convenience stores, may cause 
consumers to stick with well-known brands, to the detriment of newer or less 
well-known brands.   
                                                          
89 Solomon MR, et al., 2013, Consumer Behaviour: Buying, Having, Being, Australia: Pearson, indicates that supermarket 
consumers spend more time browsing for wine and spirits than for Beer and RTDs.  
https://books.google.ie/books?id=ajDiBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA254&lpg=PA254&dq=consumers+spend+more+time+browsing+fo
r+wine&source=bl&ots=ewWOJz2kMN&sig=nN29bLMtQ4NJ8COa5MeEs1eAyaY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiezNOQ3MPO
AhVKI8AKHX-2AogQ6AEIIDAA#v=onepage&q=consumers%20spend%20more%20time%20browsing%20for%20wine&f=false  
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7.3.2 Impact on Retailers  
Section 20 of the PHAB would have obvious implications for mixed off-licence 
retailers. The Responsible Retailers of Ireland 2015 Seventh Compliance 
Report90  indicates that its membership accounts for 2,616 stores with off-
licences, of which 1,554 are full licences and 1,062 are wine only licences. 
Membership ranges from the “symbol” convenience stores to the large 
multiples, and would include the large majority of off-licences in the country. 
Some 1,600 of them are also members of the Convenience Stores & 
Newsagents Association (CSNA), and could be considered to be the smaller 
retailers of alcohol. 
 
Large mixed retailers (i.e. supermarkets), generally already have a separate 
alcohol section, but would have to invest in physical barriers and other 
arrangements to ensure that alcohol products are not visible from the rest of 
the shop, and that customers can avoid passing through the alcohol section to 
access other parts of the store. 
 
The implications for smaller mixed retailers (convenience stores), which do not 
have a physically separate alcohol sales section, are potentially greater: they 
would either have to invest in separate closable storage units, or find room for 
a storage unit behind the counter. In the latter case, a staff member would be 
required to physically hand alcohol products out to customers, which would 
have implications for staffing and payroll costs, given the long opening hours 
for such shops.  
 
The range of alcohol products might have to be reduced as the shelf space 
available would fall. The impact would be particularly marked in smaller retail 
outlets, which are likely to opt for the point of sale or storage unit options. In 
these cases, products would be even less visible and accessible to the 
consumer, and the scope for introducing new products would be further 
reduced, as retailers would be likely to concentrate on “tried and trusted” 
brands. The inability to browse without assistance would likely make such 
retailers less attractive for customers.  
 
At the margin some small shops might find that it was not commercially 
worthwhile to continue selling alcohol, which in turn would negatively 
undermine their overall business. A recent quote from the then Minister for 
Health in a trade magazine is informative in this regard: 
“Minister Varadkar also suggested that should structural separation be 
introduced, ‘it might be the case that some retailers decide that they do not 
make all that much money out of the alcohol anyway and it is not worthwhile 
continuing to stock it. If that is the case, that is not necessarily a bad thing.’”91  
 
                                                          
90 http://www.rrai.ie/_fileupload/7813%20RRAI%207th%20Compliance%20Report_03.pdf  
91 Checkout Magazine April 2015, Varadkar: Government ‘Will Engage With Retailers To Discuss Structural Separation’. 
http://www.checkout.ie/varadkar-government-will-engage-with-retailers-to-discuss-structural-separation/15404  
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Many retailers in small villages in Ireland struggle to maintain commercial 
viability and are vulnerable to ongoing leakage of business to larger towns and 
cities. If loss of revenue as a result of lost alcohol sales undermines these 
businesses, then there would be a more significant loss of consumer choice 
and amenity for rural dwellers. 
The fact that these provisions only apply to mixed retailers and not to pubs or 
standalone off-licences can be seen as being in line with the objective of 
denormalising purchasing of alcohol. In doing so however, the Bill would give 
a competitive advantage to pubs and stand-alone off-licenses vis à vis mixed 
retailers. The latter have obtained licenses under the current regulatory 
regime, and have invested in their alcohol sales business in good faith. This 
investment is now being undermined, and could be seen as an unwarranted 
interference in the marketplace.  
 
By the same token, the on-trade and stand-alone off-licences would on the 
face of it be net beneficiaries of the structural separation proposals. It is 
noteworthy also that pubs and stand-alone off-licenses are free to sell a range 
of other goods, so long as the majority of sales are of alcohol. This further 
advantages them vis à vis mixed retailers. 
7.4 IMPACT ON CONSUMERS 
Consumers would likely be negatively impacted in a number of ways: 
a) In the first instance it is likely that at least some of the costs imposed on 
retailers would be passed on.  
b) There would likely be a reduction in choice of product, as physical shelf 
space may be reduced.  
c) There would be the inconvenience of entering physically separate sections 
of shops or having to have their purchases handed to them over a counter. 
 
Another important consumer impact relates to people living in rural areas, 
who depend on local convenience stores for at least part of their retail 
requirements. Ireland, as well as having a low population density by European 
standards, has a relatively dispersed one: The EU Commission indicates that in 
2014 some 43.5% of Ireland’s population lived in thinly populated areas; this 
is the 7th highest among the EU28, and compares to an EU28 average of 
27.8%92 93.   
 
In these circumstances, the loss of consumer choice at a local level can have 
a significant negative impact. Firstly, while car-owning rural residents can by-
pass their nearest retailer to access larger urban areas and other retail options, 
                                                          
92 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7020151/3-05102015-BP-EN.pdf/bf18a8b3-998c-476d-b3af-
58292b89939b  
93 Using a slightly different definition (areas having less than 1,500 inhabitants), the CSO Census 2011 indicates that some 
38% of the population of Ireland lives in rural areas.  
http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/census/documents/census2011vol1andprofile1/Census,2011,-
,Population,Classified,by,Area.pdf  
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a proportion would not have this option, and thus would suffer a permanent 
loss of choice. As stated already, many small village retailers struggle to 
achieve commercial viability and are vulnerable to ongoing leakage to larger 
towns and cities. If loss of revenue as a result of lost alcohol sales undermines 
these businesses, then there would be a more significant loss of consumer 
choice and amenity for rural dwellers.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
This report has described and assessed each of the main regulatory proposals 
of the Public Health (Alcohol) Bill (PHAB), namely: 
1. minimum unit pricing (MUP). 
2. health labelling of alcohol products; 
3. restrictions on advertising, sponsorship and promotion of alcohol; and 
4. structural separation of alcohol products in mixed trading outlets.  
 
Assessment has been by reference to: 
 what the objectives of the proposals are, and their likely effectiveness,  
 what the impacts on the market would likely be, and  
 what the impacts on consumers would likely be. 
 
The objectives of the Bill, informed by the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) 
and other documents can be summarised as: 
 reducing alcohol consumption in general (the 2012 Steering Group Report 
on a National Substance Misuse Strategy indicates a target of reducing 
per capita consumption to the OECD average of 9.1 litres of pure alcohol 
per capita by 2020);  
 reducing alcohol-related harm; 
 specifically discouraging the “heaviest” and at risk drinkers from drinking; 
and 
 specifically discouraging children and young people from drinking, or at 
least delaying the onset of their drinking. 
 
This report has analysed the proposed measures, in terms of likely 
effectiveness to achieve their objectives, looking at actual experience in other 
countries. We find that the evidence base is weak and in many cases 
contradictory that the measures being proposed in the PHAB – MUP, labelling, 
marketing/advertising and structural separation - would deliver on their 
objectives. 
 
The potential market impacts of the measures are substantial and negative. 
They would impose additional costs on producers, and these costs would 
impact more substantially on overseas producers, as well as on small local 
producers, new market entrants and smaller and rural retailers.  
 
The wider economy would also be negatively impacted, notably the 
advertising and marketing sector, and indigenous broadcasters, by measures 
such as the advertising restrictions and TV and radio watersheds.  
 
By the same token, the impact on large, well-established producers would 
likely be relatively limited, except insofar as their propensity to launch new 
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products in or use Ireland as a test market. Innovation in the Irish market 
would likely be stifled, as new product launches or test launches (such as 
Heineken Light or Hop House 13) would be impacted. 
 
The impacts of MUP warrant specific analysis. MUP would force up prices of 
alcohol in the off-trade substantially. The increased revenues would be 
partially captured by the Exchequer in the form of increased VAT receipts, with 
the balance shared between producers, distributors and retailers, probably 
according to their relative market power. The on-trade might also capture 
some benefits if consumers migrate away from the relatively more expensive 
off-trade. 
 
Large retailers would likely be in a position to gain the largest share, along with 
large well-established producers (retailers might pass some of the gain back to 
consumers on other product lines). Small producers and overseas producers 
would be less likely to benefit.  
 
Consumers, particularly less well-off consumers, would unequivocally lose as 
MUP and the other measures would drive up prices. MUP and the other 
measures would also likely lead to reduced choice as overseas producers and 
new entrants exited or did not enter the Irish market.  
 
As prices would rise the cost of living would also go up, negatively impacting 
in Ireland’s international competitiveness. 
 
Cross-border considerations are also relevant. Implementation of MUP 
without concomitant implementation in Northern Ireland, would aggravate 
the negative impacts for the Irish economy, with no benefit in terms of 
reduced alcohol consumption or harm. It is clear from historic experience and 
the recent weakening of Sterling that Irish consumers are prepared to cross 
the border to take advantage of price differentials. 
 
There is also a clear Single Market concern around the proposed measures at 
EU level, as evidenced by the number of comments or detailed opinions made 
by Member States as part of the recent TRIS process. This raises questions 
regarding the implementability of the measures as currently formulated in the 
Bill. 
 
Given these negative impacts, and the lack of evidence of the effectiveness of 
the proposed measures in terms of their stated objectives, in the context of 
the long term downward trend in alcohol consumption and youth drinking in 
Ireland, we conclude that the measures in question are not justified.  
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APPENDIX A: IMPORTS OF ALCOHOL INTO IRELAND 
 
 
Based on CSO trade data, this Appendix examines the monetary value, volume 
level and origin of alcoholic goods imported into Ireland in 2015, considering 
EU and non-EU imports separately (UK included in EU).  
 
We would draw the readers’ attention to the following with respect to this 
data: 
 These trade data differ somewhat from the volumes of imported alcohol 
per the Revenue Commissioners’ excise duty data, presented in Chapter 
2 of this report, reflecting the fact that the latter records releases from 
bond (as well as some direct imports).  
 Data on the origins of product also differs from some industry-sourced 
data, notably for wine, because the CSO data records where the produce 
was invoiced from rather than its geographic origin and a proportion of 
product is invoiced from intermediate countries (notably the UK). 
 Litres represents litres of product, not litres of pure alcohol.  
 Value is price invoiced to the importer excluding Irish taxes, and may 
include transport costs. 
 
A1. EU Imports 
The CSO trade statistics indicate that in 2015 Ireland imported a total of €308.2 
million worth of alcohol products from the EU-28. In terms of volumes, this 
equates to 176.6 million litres of product. The UK is the largest source of 
imports, followed by France.  
 
Table A1: Ireland’s top ten EU Import Sources for Alcoholic by € and litres, 2015 
Ranking  Origin € (millions) % Split of € Litres (millions)  
1 Great Britain €85.6 27.8% 58.8 
2 France €73.8 23.9% 29.0 
3 Italy €35.4 11.5% 11.7 
4 Germany €28.0 9.1% 15.0 
5 Northern Ireland €24.6 8.0% 2.0 
6 Netherlands €24.1 7.8% 37.6 
7 Spain €22.8 7.4% 9.3 
8 Portugal €3.9 1.3% 1.2 
9 Poland €3.1 1.0% 5.4 
10 Belgium €2.4 0.8% 3.6 
 Others €4.6 1.5% 2.9 
 Total €308.2 100% 176.6 
Source: CSO 
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Table A2, presents the data broken down into different product categories. 
Beer was by far the largest category by volume, while wine is the largest by 
value. 
 
Table A2: Alcohol Imports from EU by Category, 2015 
Category € millions Litres millions 
Wine €133.6 43.3 
Spirits €86.0 8.8 
Beer €79.6 118.9 
Cider €9.0 5.7 
Total €308.2 176.6  
Source: CSO 
 
As seen in Table A3, Ireland imported €33.5 million worth of beer from Great 
Britain, which accounted for 42% of all EU beer imports. With imports of €22.3 
million, the Netherlands is also an important Import source for beer. Ireland’s 
total EU Beer imports were valued at €79.6 million, with Great Britain and the 
Netherlands alone accounting for 70% of this.  
 
Table A3: Ireland’s top ten EU Import sources for beer by € and litres, 2015 
Ranking  Origin € (millions) % Split Litres (millions) 
1 Great Britain  €33.5 42.1% 43.3 
2 Netherlands €22.3 28.1% 37.1 
3 France €8.9 11.2% 16.0 
4 Germany €6.0 7.5% 7.5 
5 Poland €2.7 3.4% 5.3 
6 Belgium €2.2 2.7% 3.5 
7 Spain €1.1 1.4% 1.8 
8 Czech Rep €1.0 1.2% 1.1 
9 Italy €0.8 1.0% 1.5 
10 Portugal €0.5 0.6% 0.6 
 Others €0.7 0.8% 1.0 
 Total €79.6 100.0% 118.9 
Source: CSO 
 
As seen in Table A4 overleaf, Ireland imported €48.0 million worth of Wine 
from France, while also importing sizable volumes of Wine from Italy, Spain, 
and to a lesser extent Great Britain and Germany.   
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Table A4: Irelands top ten EU Import sources for Wine by € and litres, 2015 
Ranking  Origin € (millions) % Split of € Litres (millions) Import 
Price/Litre € 
1 France €48.0 36.0% 11.6 €4.20 
2 Italy €29.7 22.2% 10.0 €3.00 
3 Spain €21.3 15.9% 7.4 €2.90 
4 Great Britain  €15.6 11.7% 6.5 €2.40 
5 Germany €14.8 11.1% 6.5 €2.30 
6 Portugal €2.6 2.0% 0.6 €4.60 
7 Bulgaria €0.4 0.3% 0.2 €2.10 
8 Netherlands €0.3 0.3% 0.2 €2.20 
9 Romania €0.2 0.2% 0.1 €2.20 
10 Poland €0.1 0.1% 0.0 €3.10  
Others €0.3 0.2% 0.1 €2.50  
Total €133.6 100.0% 43.3 €2.80 
Source: CSO 
 
Table A5 outlines Ireland top ten EU Import sources for Spirits. Ireland’s 
imports of Spirits from Great Britain amounted to €28.2 million, which was 
followed closely by Northern Ireland who registered a value of €24.5 million. 
These two countries alone, account for 61% of all EU Spirits imports. France 
also registered a reasonably large value, as for the year 2015; Ireland imported 
€16.8 million worth of goods. 
 
Table A5: Irelands top ten EU Imports partners for Spirits by € and litres, 2015 
Ranking  Import source € (millions) % Split of € Litres (millions) 
1 Great Britain  €28.2 32.8% 3.8 
2 Northern Ireland €24.5 28.5% 2.0 
3 France €16.8 19.5% 1.4 
4 Germany €7.1 8.2% 0.9 
5 Italy €4.8 5.6% 0.2 
6 Netherlands €1.3 0.0% 0.2 
7 Sweden €1.3 1.5% 0.3 
8 Portugal €0.8 1.5% 0.0 
9 Latvia €0.4 0.9% 0.0 
10 Spain €0.4 0.5% 0.0  
Other €0.8 0.9% 0.1 
  Total €86.0 100.0% 8.8 
Source: CSO 
 
Finally, Over 90% of cider imports into Ireland are from Britain. 
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A2. Non EU Imports 
Ireland imported €135.7 million worth of alcohol products from non-EU 
countries in 2015. As seen in Table A6, the leading non-EU source is Chile, 
followed by Australia and New Zealand. These three accounted for 72% of the 
total Non EU imports.  
 
Table A6: Ireland’s Imports of Alcohol by € and litres, 2015 (Non EU) 
Ranking  Import source € (millions) % Split by Value Litres (millions) 
1 Chile 48.4 35.7% 16.0 
2 Australia 28.8 21.2% 8.6 
3 New Zealand  20.8 15.3% 3.9 
4 United States  14.6 10.8% 3.9 
5 Mexico 7.4 5.5% 5.9 
6 South Africa 6.2 4.6% 2.2 
7 Argentina  5.6 4.1% 1.8 
8 Ukraine 4.0 2.9% 0.3 
 Total €135.7 100.0% 42.8 
Source: CSO 
 
Table A7 breaks the data down into different product categories. Wine is by 
far the most important category in value and volume, accounting for 79% of 
all litres imported. Note that, as already indicated, the litres data refer to litres 
of product rather than litres of pure alcohol. 
 
Table A7: Ireland’s Alcohol Imports by Category, 2015 (Non EU) 
Product category € (millions) Litres (millions) 
Wine €115.2 34.0 
Spirits €10.5 0.9 
Beer €9.4 7.1 
Cider €0.6 0.8 
Total €135.7 42.8 
Source: CSO 
 
Table A8 outlines the origins of non-EU beer imports. Mexico is by far the 
largest source, followed by the US. 
 
Table A8: Ireland’s Imports partners for beer by € and litres, 2015 (Non EU) 
Ranking Origin  € (millions) % Split of € Litres (millions) 
1 Mexico 7.1 75.8% 5.9 
2 United States  1.9 19.8% 0.8 
3 Australia 0.3 3.7% 0.3 
4 Others  0.1 0.8% 0.0  
Total €9.4 100% 7.1 
Source: CSO 
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As Table A9 indicates, Ireland’s non-EU imports of wine are predominantly 
sourced from Chile. Chile, Australia and New Zealand between them account 
for 85% of the total. 
 
Table A9: Ireland’s Import sources for Wine by € and litres, 2015 (Non EU) 
Ranking Origin € (millions) % Split of € Litres (millions) Import 
Price/litre € 
1 Chile €48.4 42.0% 16.0 €3.00 
2 Australia €28.4 24.6% 8.3 €3.40 
3 New Zealand €20.7 18.0% 3.9 €5.40 
4 South Africa €6.2 5.4% 2.2 €2.80 
5 USA €5.9 5.2% 1.8 €3.30 
6 Argentina €5.6 4.9% 1.8 €3.10  
Others €0.0 0.0% 0.0 €6.80  
Total €115.2 100.0% 34.0 €3.40 
Source: CSO 
 
Ireland’s imports of Spirits from outside the EU are almost entirely from the 
US and Ukraine.   
 
Table A10: Ireland’s Import sources for Spirits by € and litres, 2015 (Non EU) 
Ranking Import source € (millions) % Split Litres (millions) 
1 United States  €6.26 59.8% 0.55 
2 Ukraine €3.95 37.7% 0.34 
3 Mexico €0.26 2.4% 0.02 
 Others €0.01 0.08%                      0.006   
Total €10.48 100.0% 0.91 
Source: CSO 
 
Finally, over 90% of Ireland’s cider imports from outside the EU are from the 
US. 
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APPENDIX B: IMPACT OF MUP ON ALCOHOL PRICES 
Based on market data from Nielsen, industry sources, the CSO and price 
surveys, DKM has estimated how MUP would impact on current volumes and 
market shares of alcohol products, by category and country to the degree 
possible (based on 2015 data). The findings are summarised in this appendix. 
Only the off-trade is considered as there would be little if any impact on the 
on-trade from MUP at the level proposed in the PHAB. As in Appendix A, litres 
refers to litres of product as opposed to litres of pure alcohol. 
 
B1 WINE 
Market data from Nielsen on the wine off-trade in Ireland is available for the 
general market and for the discounters (Aldi and Lidl). For convenience in what 
follows we refer to the former as “branded” (although it includes for instance 
Tesco own-brand wines), and the latter as “unbranded”. The market share 
breakdown of the two is as follows for 2015: 
 
Table B1: Total Off-licence wine Market, 2015  
9 Litre 
Cases '000s 
Litres '000s Market 
Share by 
Volume 
Retail 
Sales 
Value 
€'000 
Market 
Share 
Value 
Branded 5,618 50,561 78% 592,898 83% 
Unbranded 1,630 14,673 22% 124,967 17% 
Total 7,248 65,234 100% 717,865 100% 
Source: Nielsen. 
 
As can be seen, the discounters are estimated to hold a 22% share of the 
market by volume and 17% by value, and this has been growing rapidly in 
recent years94. 
 
Nielsen data gives a detailed breakdown of wine sold in the off-trade in Ireland 
in 2015, by volume, price and origin. Volumes by origin are given in the table 
overleaf. While Chile has the largest overall market share, followed by 
Australia, it is noteworthy that France has the largest market share among the 
discounters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
94 http://www.euromonitor.com/wine-in-ireland/report  
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Table B2: Total Off-licence Wine Market, Origin & Market Share, 2015  
Volumes 9 Litre Cases '000s Market Share 
 
Branded Unbranded Total Branded Unbranded Total 
Chile 1,380.5  204.2  1,584.6  24.6% 12.5% 21.9% 
Australia 1,049.6  188.4  1,238.0  18.7% 11.6% 17.1% 
France 812.9  398.9  1,211.8  14.5% 24.5% 16.7% 
Spain 679.4  171.7  851.1  12.1% 10.5% 11.7% 
Italy 521.5  273.8  795.4  9.3% 16.8% 11.0% 
Us 380.5  48.4  428.8  6.8% 3.0% 5.9% 
South Africa 244.9  182.2  427.1  4.4% 11.2% 5.9% 
New Zealand 297.7  18.0  315.7  5.3% 1.1% 4.4% 
Argentina 125.2  30.8  156.1  2.2% 1.9% 2.2% 
Germany 49.0  40.0  88.9  0.9% 2.5% 1.2% 
Portugal 24.0  2.0  25.9  0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 
Rest Of World 52.8  72.0  124.9  0.9% 4.4% 1.7% 
Total 5,617.9  1,630.4  7,248.2  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Nielsen 
 
B1.1 Branded Wine 
For a sub-set of branded wine (including most but not all retailers), Nielsen 
also provides a range of price points by country of origin. Price point data on 
an overall basis is summarised in the following table and the chart overleaf. 
 
Table B3: Wine Off-Licence Trade, Volumes at Retail Price Points 
(2015) 
Price Point  
(75cl bottle) 
9 Litre  
Cases ‘000s 
Market Share % 
€14 plus 133 4.1% 
€13-13.99 79 2.4% 
€12-12.99 167 5.1% 
€11-11.99 241 7.3% 
€10-10.99 426 13.0% 
€9 - 9.99 1,235 37.6% 
€8 - 8.99 571 17.4% 
€7 - 7.99 231 7.0% 
€6 - 6.99 73 2.2% 
€0 - 5.99 127 3.9% 
Total 3,283 100.0% 
Source: Nielsen 
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Figure B1: Wine Off-Licence Trade, Volumes at Retail Price Point (2015) 
 
Source: Nielsen 
 
The peak retail price point for wine sold in the off-trade in Ireland is between 
€9 and €10 per bottle. For comparison, assuming the average wine strength is 
12.5% ABV, the MUP would be €7.40 per bottle.  
 
As indicated, Nielsen also provides the above data for each country of origin. 
Based on this we have estimated the relative impacts on each major producer 
country, as well as on the EU and non-EU countries as a whole. In summary, 
for branded wines sold in the off-trade in Ireland:  
 Just under 10% would be impacted by MUP as proposed in the PHAB. 
Assuming no changes in volumes, overall average prices would increase 
by 1.1%, but for the wines affected, the average price increase would be 
almost 20%. 
 Some 15% of EU wine would be affected by MUP, and the overall average 
price would rise by 1.8%; for the wines affected prices would rise on 
average by almost 20%. 
 Approximately 5% of non-EU wine would be affected by MUP, and the 
overall average price would rise by 0.6%; for the wines affected prices 
would rise on average by 18%. 
 
The proportions of the wine market impacted can be demonstrated graphically 
in the charts overleaf, for EU wine and non-EU wine. We also summarise the 
impact at each individual country level, in the table and charts overleaf. The 
charts also show the MUP price point (vertical line) and the percentage of the 
total volumes that would be affected by MUP. 
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Figure B2:  Branded Wine Off-Licence Trade Volumes (in 9-litre Cases), at Retail Price 
Points for 75cl Bottle, & MUP Impact, EU & Non-EU (2015) 
   
Source: Nielsen, DKM Estimates. 
 
Table B4:  Impact of MUP on Irish Branded Wine Market by Country 
Country of Origin 2015 Volumes 
9-Litre Cases 
Share of 
Market % 
Impact of MUP 
Volumes 
Affected  
9-Litre Cases 
%age 
affected 
by 
country 
Price 
Increase 
Overall 
Price 
Increase 
on 
affected 
Product 
EU 
  
    
France 502,204 15.3% 15,343 3.1% 0.4% 23.8% 
Spain 434,221 13.2% 100,339 23.1% 3.9% 26.6% 
Italy 311,028 9.5% 63,411 20.4% 1.4% 9.1% 
ROW incl Romania* 36,848 1.1% 9,311 25.3% 1.0% 4.4% 
Germany 24,370 0.7% 8,445 34.7% 7.3% 29.4% 
Portugal 12,257 0.4% 1,003 8.2% 0.8% 15.3% 
Sub-Total 1,320,927 40.2% 197,852 15.0% 1.8% 19.1% 
Non-EU 
  
    
Chile 776,286 23.6% 51,394 6.6% 0.6% 13.7% 
Australia 579,105 17.6% 14,048 2.4% 0.4% 24.0% 
USA 247,078 7.5% 18,488 7.5% 1.5% 30.6% 
New Zealand 200,815 6.1% 276 0.1% 0.0% 35.7% 
South Africa 94,216 2.9% 6,012 6.4% 0.4% 7.8% 
Argentina 64,907 2.0% 4,657 7.2% 0.5% 10.4% 
Sub-Total 1,962,408 59.8% 94,875 4.8% 0.6% 17.6% 
Total Market 3,283,335 100.0% 292,727 8.9% 1.1% 18.6% 
*”Rest of World including Romania”. This category is mostly of EU origin, and for convenience is included in the 
EU category. Source: Nielsen, DKM Estimates.  
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Figure B3:  Branded Wine Sold in Off-Licence, Volumes (in 9-litre Cases) at Retail 
Price Points for 75cl Bottle, & MUP Impact, By Country of Origin (2015) 
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Source: Nielsen, DKM Estimates. 
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It is clear that the impact per country varies greatly. We estimate that over 
20% of wine from Spain and Italy, and over one-third of the wine from 
Germany would be affected by MUP. Other EU countries such as Romania 
would also be significantly affected. For the wine that is affected by MUP, the 
price of Spanish and German wine would increase by 25-30% on average. 
While only a small proportion of French wine would be affected, for the wine 
that is affected, prices would likewise rise by approximately 25%. 
 
The proportions of non-EU branded wine that would be affected by MUP are 
lower, but the price increases facing the wine that is affected are substantial: 
for Australian and US wine the increase is 25-30% on average. 
 
B1.2 Unbranded Wine 
Unbranded wine (i.e. sold by discounters) holds 22% of the Irish off-trade 
market by volume, and as Table B2 indicates France is the most popular 
country of origin. EU wine accounts for just under 60% of total volumes of 
unbranded wine sold in the off-trade in Ireland. This is a reversal of the 
proportions for branded wine, where roughly-speaking 60% is of non-EU 
origin. 
 
We do not have a full price point range for unbranded wine as is the case with 
branded wine, but Nielsen does provide average retail price by country of 
origin, and we can use this to estimate the average impact of MUP by country 
of origin and in aggregate, as per the table overleaf. This indicates that: 
 Based on average price per country, all except Argentinian and New 
Zealand wine would be affected by MUP.  
 The average overall price increase would be approximately 20%, or 
€1.30 per bottle. 
 German, South African and Chilean wine would be increased by over 
one-third on average, while US wine would almost double in price. 
 French wine, the most popular category, would go up in price by on 
average over 20%. 
 This would add €25 million to the cost of living, before changes in 
consumer behaviour are taken into account. 
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Table B5:  Impact of MUP on Unbranded Wine Off-Trade, 2015 
Origin 9 Litre Cases 
'000s 
Avg Retail 
Price 
MUP avg price 
uplift  
avg price 
uplift  % 
Aggregate 
Current sales 
value €'000 
Increase in 
Aggregate Sales 
Value €'000 
Chile 204.2 €5.50 €7.40 €1.90 34.5% €14,437 €4,979 
Australia 188.4 €6.40 €7.40 €1.00 15.6% €15,501 €2,414 
France 398.9 €6.10 €7.40 €1.30 21.3% €31,286 €6,651 
Spain 171.7 €7.10 €7.40 €0.30 4.2% €15,676 €655 
Italy 273.8 €6.70 €7.40 €0.70 10.4% €23,588 €2,453 
US 48.4 €3.80 €7.40 €3.60 94.7% €2,362 €2,236 
South Africa 182.2 €5.50 €7.40 €1.90 34.5% €12,885 €4,444 
New Zealand 18.0 €9.10 €7.40 €0 0.0% €2,106 €- 
Argentina 30.8 €9.00 €7.40 €0 0.0% €3,567 €- 
Germany 40.0 €5.20 €7.40 €2.20 42.2% €2,673 €1,129 
Portugal 2.0 n/a 
     
Rest Of World 72.0 €6.90 €7.40 €0.50 7.2% €6,390 €460 
Total/Average 1,630.4 €6.10 €7.40 €1.30 19.5% €130,471 €25,423 
Source: Nielsen, DKM analysis 
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This analysis is however by reference to the price averaged for each country 
of origin, which could hide significant variation within origins. As a check, 
DKM undertook a price survey of one of the discounters in April 2016, the 
results of which are presented in the following table: 
 
Table B6:  Impact of MUP on Irish Unbranded Off-Trade Wine Market by Country     
Average %age Price uplift 
Origin Number of 
price 
points 
Impacted by 
MUP 
%age 
Impacted by 
MUP 
Overall  For 
Categories 
Impacted by 
MUP 
Chile 6 5 83.3% 26.0% 31.2% 
Australia 6 2 33.3% 8.8% 26.4% 
France 19 9 47.4% 17.3% 36.6% 
Spain 5 2 40.0% 7.2% 18.1% 
Italy 12 9 75.0% 15.4% 20.6% 
US 2 2 100.0% 26.5% 26.5% 
South Africa 2 2 100.0% 21.5% 21.5% 
New Zealand 1 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Argentina 1 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Germany 1 1 100.0% 37.9% 37.9% 
Hungary 2 2 100.0% 21.0% 21.0% 
Total 57 34 59.6% 16.4% 27.5% 
Source: DKM product survey. 
 
While not directly comparable, because sales volumes could not be taken 
into account, the findings of the DKM survey were somewhat different to the 
Nielsen data, and suggest significant variation in price within country of 
origin, for unbranded wine: 
 Some 34 out of 57 product categories in our survey would be 
affected by MUP (60%). The overall price uplift would be 16%. 
 For the products affected, the average price uplift would be 28%. 
 100% of the US, South African, German and Hungarian, 83% of the 
Chilean and 75% of Italian wine categories would be affected by 
MUP. 
 As with Nielsen, the only countries not affected by MUP would be 
New Zealand and Argentina. 
 Almost half of the French wines would be affected, and the average 
price uplift for these would be over 36%. Affected German and 
Chilean wines would also experience price uplifts of over 30%. 
 The results for US wine do not match well with the Nielsen data. 
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B2 Spirits 
 
Based on market data for the top-selling branded spirits Stock-Keeping Units 
(SKUs) volumes, and prices in the leading retail chains in Ireland, we have 
estimated the impact of the proposed MUP measure on the current market 
for spirits in Ireland. For convenience we categorise sales into branded and 
unbranded (private label/own brand, and the discounters – Lidl and Aldi)95. 
Unbranded spirits by this definition are estimated to hold 24% of the spirits 
market in Ireland by volume. Our data is for the 12 months to February 2016, 
but for convenience we refer to this as 2015. 
 
B2.1 Branded Spirits 
Table B7 overleaf presents our analysis of the impact of the proposed MUP 
measure on the branded spirits market. In summary: 
 Just under 25% of branded spirits in the Irish market would be affected 
by the proposed MUP measures. This varies by product – Irish whiskey 
for instance would not be affected at all, while 60% of gin and 80% of 
Scotch would be affected. Over 40% of the most popular category – 
vodka – would be affected. 
 The overall price impact is modest, at 1.5%; however, for those products 
that are affected, the aggregate price increase is 7.4%. 
 At the category level, the degree of price impact varies considerably; 
most products are modestly affected, but the 25% of American whiskey 
impacted by MUP would  see a more than 40% price uplift, while the  
12% of cream liqueurs affected would see prices rise by more than 26%. 
The uplift in the price of affected vodka would be 6.2%. 
 We estimate that this would add approximately €16.5 million to the cost 
of living (assuming no change in consumer behaviour). 
 
B2.1 Unbranded Spirits 
We have likewise analysed the impact of MUP on the unbranded spirits 
market, in Table B8 overleaf. In summary:  
 Unbranded spirits retail at a significant discount to their branded 
equivalents; while holding 24% market share by volume, we estimate 
that they hold 17% market share by value. 
 Practically all of the unbranded spirits sold on the Irish market would be 
affected by MUP. 
 
                                                          
95 There is some imprecision in this categorisation. For instance, some of Tesco’s own brand is included in the branded 
data, while some of branded products are sold by the discounters.  
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Table B7:  Impact of MUP on Irish Branded Spirits Market by Category, 2015* 
Category 2015 Volumes 
9-Litre Cases 
‘000s 
Share of 
Market by 
Volume % 
Total Market 
Value €'000 
Impact of MUP 
Volumes 
Affected 
9-Litre 
Cases ‘000 
%age 
affected 
%age Price 
Increase 
Overall 
%age Price 
Increase on 
affected 
Product 
Aggregate 
Increase in 
Prices €'000 
Vodka 427.1 40.4% €116,820 183.6 43.0% 2.5% 6.2% €7,242 
Irish Whiskey 276.8 26.2% €93,629 0.0 0.0%    
Gin 58.4 5.6% €16,498 35.6 60.9% 2.1% 3.8% €624 
Brandy 56.6 5.4% €25,151 0.0 0.0%    
Cream Liqueur 56.4 5.4% €9,914 7.0 12.4% 1.8% 26.5% €2,622 
Red Rum 51.8 5.0% €14,977 0.0 0.0%    
American Whisky 41.3 4.0% €12,666 10.5 25.4% 7.1% 43.1% €5,453 
White Rum 35.8 3.4% €9,873 0.0 0.0%    
Scotch Whisky 27.0 2.6% €7,320 22.4 82.8% 6.0% 7.4% €540 
Other** 24.7 2.4% €7,292 0.0 0%    
Total Market 1,056.0 100.0% €314,139 259.1 24.5% 1.5% 7.4% €16,482 
*Data are for the year to February 2016. **Liqueurs, schnapps, etc.  
Sources: various industry sources, DKM analysis.  
 
  
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
Table B8:  Impact of MUP on Irish Unbranded Spirits Market by Category, 2015* 
Category 2015 Volumes 
9-Litre Cases 
‘000 
Share of 
Market by 
Volume % 
Total Market 
Value €'000 
Impact of MUP 
Volumes 
Affected 9-
Litre Cases 
‘000 
%age 
affected 
%age Price 
Increase 
Overall 
%age Price 
Increase on 
affected 
Product 
Aggregate 
Increase in 
Prices €'000 
Vodka 128.0 37.6% €22,889 128.0 100% 49.6% 49.6% €11,351 
Irish Whiskey 40.3 11.8% €10,229 40.1 100% 11.2% 11.3% €1,148 
Gin 22.9 6.7% €4,234 22.9 100% 52.6% 52.6% €2,227 
Brandy 33.6 9.9% €6,858 33.6 100% 39.1% 39.1% €2,685 
Cream Liqueur 22.1 6.5% €2,537 20.6 93% 12.4% 14.1% €315 
Red Rum 10.3 3.0% €2,146 7.9 77% 30.3% 42.3% €650 
American Whisky 13.7 4.0% €2,699 13.7 100% 44.3% 44.3% €1,196 
White Rum 22.8 6.7% €3,551 22.8 100% 78.1% 78.1% €2,774 
Scotch Whisky 42.2 12.4% €8,570 41.5 99% 40.8% 42.1% €3,496 
Other** 4.5 1.3% €673 3.2 72% 36.8% 66.7% €248 
Total Market 340.5 100.0% €64,386 334.5 98% 40.5% 41.5% €26,089 
*Data are for the year to February 2016. **Liqueurs, schnapps, etc.  
Sources: various industry sources, DKM analysis. 
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 The impact on prices would be very substantial – approximately a 40% 
uplift overall. However, vodka – which has the largest share of the 
unbranded market would see an increase in price of 50% while white 
rum would see a price increase of almost 80%. The least affected 
category – Irish whiskey - would see prices uplifted by approximately 
11%. 
 Overall, we estimate that MUP as it affects unbranded spirits would add 
€26 million to the cost of living (assuming no change in consumer 
behaviour). 
 
Overall, the impact of MUP as proposed on the spirits off-trade would be to 
add €43 million to the cost of living (before taking into account changes in 
consumer behaviour). It is clear also that the impact would be greater on 
imported spirits than on Irish-produced spirits – Irish whiskey is the least 
affected category of spirits. 
 
B3 Beer & Cider 
 
B3.1 Branded Beer & Cider 
We have obtained a list of the top 60 branded beer and cider categories 
(product and packaging configurations) in the Irish market in 2015, so, for 
example, Budweiser is listed under the following configurations: 
 
BUDWEISER BOT,300ML 20PK 
BUDWEISER CAN,500ML 
BUDWEISER CAN,500ML 12PK 
BUDWEISER CAN,500ML 8PK 
 
This list was then matched with prices in the leading supermarkets, as of April 
2016. The prices were then checked versus the proposed MUP for the 
product, to determine the impact if MUP were introduced.  
 
Unfortunately we do not have access to the relative market shares of those 
product categories, and so cannot estimate weighted averages or impact on 
the cost of living of MUP. We can only estimate simple averages of the 
impacts.  
 
Overall, we found that 37 of the 60 top beer and cider product categories 
would experience a price increase under MUP, ranging from a few percent 
or less, to over 60% in some instances. The simple average price uplift across 
the total range would be just under 20%, while the simple average price uplift 
for those products affected by MUP would be 30%. Differentiating between 
beer and cider, our findings can be summarised in the following table. It is 
clear that cider would be more impacted than beer by MUP. 
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Table B9:  Branded Beers & Cider Impact of MUP   
Product Categories Simple Average %age Price Uplift  
Total Impacted 
by MUP 
%age Impacted 
by MUP 
Overall  Categories 
Impacted by MUP 
Beer 48 28 58.3% 13.4% 22.9% 
Cider 12 9 75.0% 40.4% 53.9% 
Total 60 37 61.7% 18.8% 30.4% 
Source: Nielsen, various retailer websites, DKM analysis. 
 
In terms of origin, all of the top 60 branded beer/cider categories originate 
in the EU. As indicated in Chapter 2, approximately one-third of the beer 
consumed in Ireland is imported. The following table summarises the impact 
of MUP by country: 
 
Table B10:  Branded Beers & Cider Impact of MUP by Country  
Product Categories Simple Average %age Price Uplift  
Total Impacted 
by MUP 
%age Impacted 
by MUP 
Overall  Categories 
Impacted by MUP 
Ireland 26 15 57.7% 15.2% 26.4% 
UK 14 10 71.4% 26.0% 36.4% 
Poland 8 7 87.5% 25.1% 28.6% 
Netherlands 3 2 66.7% 22.2% 33.3% 
Belgium 2 2 100.0% 44.1% 44.1% 
France 2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Germany 2 1 50.0% 5.2% 10.5% 
Spain 2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Italy 1 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 60 37 61.7% 18.8% 30.4% 
Source: Nielsen, various retailer websites, DKM analysis. 
 
Ireland and the UK account for most of the branded categories consumed in 
Ireland; almost 60% of Irish categories and over 70% of UK categories would 
be affected by MUP. Poland also features strongly, and 7 out of 8 Polish 
categories would be affected by MUP, as would most Dutch and all Belgian 
categories. It is noteworthy that of the main countries of origin, Irish beer 
and cider is least affected, according to our analysis. 
 
B3.2 Unbranded Beer & Cider 
 
Here we are concerned with the beer and cider sold in the discounters. While 
we do not have aggregated market data, DKM undertook a price survey in 
April 2016, and assessed the impact of MUP on this basis. Our results are 
presented in the following tables: 
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Table B11:  Unbranded Beers & Cider Impact of MUP   
Product Categories Simple Average %age Price Uplift  
Total Impacted 
by MUP 
%age Impacted 
by MUP 
Overall  Categories 
Impacted by MUP 
Beer 18 11 61.1% 29.4% 48.1% 
Cider 5 3 60.0% 42.9% 71.4% 
Total 23 14 60.9% 32.3% 53.1% 
Source: Retailer websites, DKM analysis. 
 
Table B12:  Unbranded Beers & Cider Impact of MUP by Country  
Product Categories Simple Average %age Price Uplift  
Total Impacted 
by MUP 
%age Impacted 
by MUP 
Overall  Categories 
Impacted by MUP 
Ireland 12 7 58.3% 25.6% 43.8% 
France 4 3 75.0% 79.6% 106.1% 
Germany 3 3 100.0% 28.1% 28.1% 
UK 2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Poland 1 1 100.0% 33.9% 33.9% 
Sweden 1 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 23 14 60.9% 32.3% 53.1% 
Source: Retailer websites, DKM analysis. 
 
In summary: 
 We identified 23 categories, 18 beers and 5 ciders; approximately 60% 
of these would be impacted by MUP, and the uplift in prices would be 
greater for cider than for beer. 
 More than half of the categories (12) are from Ireland, with 7 of these 
affected by MUP, and the average price increase for those affected over 
40%. 
 France and Germany also feature. Three out of four French categories 
would be affected, while all three German categories are impacted by 
MUP. 
 The French categories are particularly strongly affected: for those 
impacted by MUP, on average prices would more than double.  German 
categories affected would see an approximately 30% price uplift. 
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APPENDIX C: REGULATION OF ALCOHOL IN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
C1: Consumption of Alcohol in Europe 
European countries exhibit diverse levels of alcohol consumption, from 
Lithuania with 14.1 litres of pure alcohol per capita96, to Turkey with only 1.6 
litres per capita (Figure C1). Ireland had the 6th highest consumption level per 
capita in 2012. 
 
Relevant in the current context is the relationship between regulation (ease 
of availability, advertising) and price on the one hand, and consumption 
levels on the other.  
 
Figure C1: Alcohol Consumption per Capita (15+) in European Countries, 2012* 
 
*Austria, Greece and Portugal 2011; Iceland, Italy and Spain 2010. 
Source: OECD Health statistics 2015. 
 
There is no consistent pattern – 
 The Scandinavian countries have among the most restrictive policies 
when it comes to availability, advertising and price of alcohol, and their 
consumption is towards the lower end of the range, albeit there is some 
variability between them.  
 Italy on the other hand has both low regulation and price, and low 
consumption.  
                                                          
96 As is the international norm in reporting alcohol consumption rates, the data quoted relates to consumption of pure 
litres of alcohol per person aged 15 years or more. 
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 France has notably strict advertising and accessibility laws, but still has 
the fourth highest consumption level.  
 Ireland, which has among the highest prices for alcohol in Europe, 
likewise has high recorded consumption. 
 
It is thus important to look at the different European countries more closely 
in terms of the relationship between regulation and consumption. In this 
appendix we consider the Scandinavian countries and France in more detail. 
 
C2:  Scandinavia 
A complication in assessing consumption patterns in Scandinavia is that 
recorded consumption is subject to significant distortion as a result of 
patterns of cross-border purchasing and home brew/distilling97. WHO for 
instance indicates that unrecorded consumption in Sweden in 2005 was 3.6 
litres per capita98, roughly half the level of recorded consumption. This must 
be borne in mind in the following discussion. 
 
Among the Scandinavian countries, Denmark has historically had the highest 
recorded consumption per capita (Figure C2). In 1983 consumption in 
Denmark was recorded at 12.8 litres of alcohol per capita, at which point the 
equivalent in Finland was 7.9 litres, in Sweden 6.1 litres and in Norway 4.9 
litres.  
 
Figure C2: Scandinavian alcohol consumption per capita aged 15+ of litres of pure alcohol 
 
Source: OECD Health statistics 2015  
 
Danish consumption levels have since stabilised, and started to fall in the 
2000s. Consumption in Finland had been on an upward trend for longer, only 
                                                          
97 https://www.hri.global/files/2011/07/21/02.3_Nordlund_-
_Unrecorded_Alcohol_Consumption_(Nordic_Countries)_.pdf 
98 http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alcohol_report/en/  
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starting to fall from around 2008, and by 2012 was comparable with Danish 
levels of 9.3 litres of alcohol. Consumption in Sweden and Norway has 
similarly been on upward trend in recent decades, though not as strongly. All 
but Sweden have started to record reductions in consumption in recent 
years. 
 
In what follows the specifics of regulation in each country are discussed. 
 
C2a: Denmark 
Denmark is the least restrictive Nordic country when it comes to alcohol 
price, availability and advertising, and as indicated above has also been the 
highest consumer of alcohol among the Nordic countries since the 1950s. 
Consumption peaked in 2000 at over 13 litres of pure alcohol per capita, but 
has fallen steadily since, and by 2013 had reached 9.4 litres.  
 
Surveys indicate that the Danish public view alcohol consumption as a private 
issue which requires self-control and discipline rather than political 
interference 99 . Therefore the Danish government has since the 1930s 
focused on educating individuals about the harms of alcohol in schools and 
through national information campaigns. This has included low-risk drinking 
guidelines, public health programmes and education about unhealthy 
lifestyles including diet, smoking and alcohol-related harm.  
 
Recent regulatory developments include: 
 In 1998, new regulations were introduced prohibiting driving with a 
blood alcohol concentration above 0.05 percent, and prohibiting the 
sale of alcohol (defined as beverages of at least 2.8% ABV) to individuals 
below 15 years of age.  
 The ban on alcohol advertisements on TV was lifted in 2002. 
 The spirits tax was lowered by 45% in 2003. 
 In 2004, the age limit was raised to 16 years, and to 18 years for products 
with an alcohol volume of 16.5% or more.  
 The ban on selling alcohol in retail outlets after 8.00pm was repealed in 
2005.  
 
Regulations on the advertising of alcohol, which primarily restricts the 
advertising content, remain in place.  Specifically, advertising cannot:  
 Solicit excessive consumption of alcohol, 
 Portray abstinence or responsible drinking in a negative way, 
 Be provocative, intrusive or in any way persuasive,  
 Indicate that a certain level of alcohol consumption is healthy or can 
improve the consumer’s mental or physical capabilities, 
                                                          
99 Elmeland, K. and Villumsen, S. (2013). “Changes in Danish public attitudes and norms regarding alcohol consumption 
and alcohol policy, 1985-2011” Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs. Vol. 30 Issue 6 p. 525-538. 
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 Use individuals whose social status or position in society is more 
prominent and gives their opinion more weight (politicians, athletes, 
musicians, actors or similar), 
 Connect the consumption of alcohol to sports activities and exercise, 
 Show consumption of alcohol in the work place or at educational 
institutions, 
 Target youth or children, 
 Use individuals who due to their young appearance imply that young 
people are drinking alcoholic beverages,  
 Use models, actors or similar who appear to be below the age of 25, 
 Portray or encourage high risk behaviour (driving cars, handling 
potentially high risk machinery or other high risk behaviour), or 
 Use individuals, role models, cartoons or icons which target children and 
youth. 
 
These rules apply to all media, and include prizes or scholarships, and naming 
and labelling of products. Additionally, advertising cannot be shown at 
workplaces, educational institutions or in dormitories. Furthermore 
advertising for alcohol cannot be present at events where more than 30% of 
the audience is children or youth. The rules apply to all advertising which 
target or affect the Danish market.  
 
C2b: Sweden 
Recorded alcohol consumption in Sweden has traditionally been low 
compared other European countries, peaking in 1976 at 7.7 litres of alcohol 
per capita, after which consumption declined over a number of years. that 
said, per capita consumption has however been on an upward trend since 
2000, reaching 7.4 litres of alcohol in 2013, and as indicated above 
unrecorded alcohol consumption in Sweden is substantial. 
 
Swedish regulation is slightly more strict that that in Denmark in terms of 
advertising alcoholic beverages. The definition of an alcoholic drink is a 
beverage with more than 2.25 percent ABV, while an alcoholic light drink is 
a drink whose alcohol content is below 2.25 percent ABV. The advertisement 
has to clearly say that it is class I, low-alcohol cider or light drink.   
 
Advertising and other marketing activities cannot: 
 Use commercial advertisements on radio or TV programmes, including 
TV broadcasts via satellite,  
 Be insistent, intrusive or encourage the use of alcohol, 
 Be directed towards or show children or young people who are below 
25 years of age, 
 Be associated with situations where alcohol consumption should not 
occur according to generally accepted views, 
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 Show anything but the product or raw materials included in the product, 
individual packaging or trademarks or other comparable distinctive 
marks,  
 Include text unless it is factual, balanced and reliably portrays the 
marketed alcoholic drink (origins, raw materials, characteristics and 
use), 
 Use value statements, assessments and testimonials unless they are in 
accordance with the Swedish Marketing Act and the information is 
meaningful, balanced and up-to-date,  
 Have text which describes situations where it is dangerous or 
inappropriate to use alcohol, 
 Advertise in public transport facilities or where public transport picks 
passengers up, at hospitals or other care institutions, at public sports 
grounds and other public arenas or in or around premises primarily 
intended for or frequented by young people under the age of 25, 
 Involve competitions where there is an obligation to purchase or where 
winnings are in the form of alcohol, or 
 Advertise alcohol of 15% ABV or higher in newspapers or periodicals.  
 
Advertisement in the print media may not be larger than tabloid format, and 
must be accompanied by text, covering at least 20% of the total space of the 
advertisement, which can be one of the following: 
 Alcohol can damage your health 
 Alcohol is addictive  
 Alcohol can cause nerve and brain damage  
 Alcohol can cause liver and pancreas damage, 
 Alcohol can cause vertebral haemorrhaging and cancer, 
 Every second driver who dies in single car accidents is intoxicated,  
 Half of all victims of drowning have alcohol in their blood,  
 Drinking alcohol and working at the same time increases the risk of 
accidents,  
 Alcohol consumption during pregnancy can damage your unborn child,  
 Children who are given alcohol at home get drunk more often than other 
children, or 
 Starting to drink at an early age increases the risk of alcohol problems. 
 
When advertising low alcohol beer the advertisements or other marketing 
material cannot: 
 Advertise alcoholic light drinks in such a way that it could be confused 
for a stronger alcoholic drink.  
 Be directed towards or show children or young people who are below 
25 years of age, 
 Create an association between the light drink and higher alcohol 
content or their intoxicating effect, 
 Include jokes, words or images that associate the viewer with higher 
alcohol products,  
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 Include a disparaging assessment of alcohol-free drinks, 
 Imply that sexual prowess is stipulated by the consumption of alcohol.  
 
The Swedish rules apply to all advertising unless it is aimed directly at 
consumers outside of Sweden or falls outside of Swedish jurisdiction. 
 
Marketing of alcoholic beverages in newspapers, magazines, on the internet 
(including social media) and in other digital media as well as radio and TV 
may only occur if at least 70% of the recipients of the marketing are 25 years 
of age or above. The alcoholic strength must always be visible.  
 
With regard to alcohol companies’ websites: 
 They must clearly state that the website includes marketing for alcoholic 
beverages, and on all marketing links that the link leads to marketing for 
alcoholic drinks. 
 The age limit for purchasing alcoholic beverages must be clearly visible. 
 Prior to entering the website, active age verification is required. 
 Products and trademarks should be kept separate from images that 
contain more than the product.  
 
Alcohol companies may distribute free gifts at trade fairs, visits to production 
sites or similar, but the gift must be low value and cannot be an alcoholic 
drink.  
 
It is prohibited to sell alcohol in discount bundles e.g. “buy one get one free” 
or “buy one get the second for a lower price”. Alcoholic drinks can however 
be sold as part of a bundled meal provided an alcohol-free alternative is 
available. 
 
It is the responsibility of the advertiser that these rules are followed. 
However, many of these rules lack legal precedence so there is some 
disagreement between the regulatory body and the industry 
recommendations regarding the specifics of rules and to what degree they 
apply.  
 
Availability is also strictly regulated in Sweden: the State has operated an off-
trade monopoly since 1955 (Systembolaget). The stated goal of the State 
monopoly is to minimise alcohol-related harm by selling alcohol in a 
responsible way without the driver of profit maximisation. Individuals can 
only purchase alcohol of more than 3.5% alcohol volume at the State stores 
if they are at least 20 years of age. Individuals can purchase alcohol in 
restaurants and pubs if they are at least 18 years of age.  
 
C2c: Norway 
Norway has historically had the lowest recorded consumption of alcohol in 
Scandinavia. Consumption steadily increased from the 1960s to the 2000s, 
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however, from 3.4 litres per capita to a peak of 6.8 litres in 2008. 
Consumption has since been falling, and was 6.2 litres in 2013.  
 
Norway has also had the strictest alcohol regulation of the Nordic countries.  
A total ban on alcohol advertising remains in place, and it was only in 
November 2015 that alcohol producer’s websites were allowed to include 
basic product information. 
 
Other regulations include: 
 The age limit to purchase alcohol is 18 years for wine and beer and 20 
years for spirits.  
 In the off-trade, consumers can buy alcohol of up to 4.7% ABV in 
licenced grocery stores, but stronger alcohol can only be bought in the 
Norwegian Wine and Spirits Monopoly, Vinmonopolet.  
 The blood alcohol limit for drivers is 0.02%.  
 
Since the 1990s there has been substantial liberalisation in the market. 
Availability of alcohol has increased as the number of Vinmonopolet outlets 
has more than doubled and the opening hours have been extended, partly in 
response to pressures to allow grocery stores to sell wine and spirits. In 
addition, the individual import quota of wine into Norway was increased in 
2006.  
 
Notwithstanding the State monopoly, it has been noted that alcohol has 
become relatively more affordable as the real price indices on various types 
of alcohol have been fairly stable since 1990 while real incomes have 
increased100.  
 
C2d: Finland  
The consumption of alcohol in Finland was on a steady upward trajectory 
since 1960, from 2.7 litres per capita to a peak of 10.5 litres in 2007. 
Consumption has gradually declined since to 9.1 litres in 2013.  
 
Prior to EU membership in 1995, the State held a monopoly on production, 
import, export, distribution and off-trade retailing of alcohol. The off-trade 
monopoly (now called Alko) controlled the prices of alcohol and used it 
actively to influence consumer behaviour. For example it could increase the 
price of products which had become too popular among heavy drinkers or 
those with a high alcohol content. This practice was abolished in 1994 and 
replaced by a taxation system based on alcohol content.  
 
EU membership led to significant policy changes regarding the distribution, 
sale and advertising of alcohol in Finland, notably: 
                                                          
100 Storvoll, E. E., and Halkjelsvik, T. (2013). “Changes in Norwegian public opinion on alcohol policy, 2005-2012” Nordic 
Studies on Alcohol and Drugs. Vol. 30 Issue 6 p. 491-506. 
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 The State monopoly on production, imports, exports, distribution and 
off-trade retail of alcohol was abolished.  
 Grocery stores, kiosks, cafés and petrol stations were allowed to sell 
beer, cider and long drinks of less than 4.7% ABV.  
 The off-trade monopoly remained for beverages with an alcohol volume 
above 4.7%, with the exception of the output of local and micro- 
producers with an alcohol volume less than 13%.  
 It became legal to advertise beverages containing 1.2 to 22% ABV101.  
 
Cross-border purchases of alcohol into Finland increased significantly when 
the Soviet Union collapsed, facilitating travel to Russia and Estonia, where 
alcohol was significantly cheaper. When Finland joined the EU it negotiated 
a temporary limit to personal imports, which expired in 2003. Excise rates 
were significantly reduced in 2004 when Estonia became a member of the 
EU - excise on beer fell by 32%, on wine by 10%, and on spirits by 44%. 
Notwithstanding this, by 2005 it was estimated that a sixth of all alcohol 
consumption was imported from abroad by travellers returning to Finland102.  
 
C3: France 
Unlike the Scandinavian countries, France has traditionally had high alcohol 
consumption - as can be seen in Figure C3, consumption in 1970 was 20.4 
litres per capita. It has however been on a consistent decline since, reaching 
11.1 litres in 2013. 
 
Figure C3: French Alcohol Consumption per Capita, 1970 - 2013 
 
Source: OECD Health statistics 2015  
 
Since 1991, France has imposed among the most restrictive regulations on 
alcohol advertising and sponsorship in the western world. The 1991 Loi Evin 
                                                          
101 It also became legal to drink in public (subsequently made illegal again in 2003). 
102 Lindeman, M., et al., (2013). “Public opinions, alcohol consumption and policy changes in Finland, 1993-2013”. Nordic 
Studies on Alcohol and Drugs. Vol. 30 Issue 6 p. 5.7-524. 
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restricted alcohol advertising in terms of warnings, outlets and content, and 
was further tightened in 2015, so that: 
 All advertising on TV and public radio stations is prohibited.  
 Private radio stations can broadcast alcohol advertisement but only 
between midnight and 17:00.  
 Advertising in cinemas is prohibited although product placement is 
allowed.  
 Advertisements online is prohibited on sites targeted at young people.  
 Festival sponsorships is forbidden.  
 
Additionally the advertisement must: 
 Display an official warning about the dangers of alcohol abuse, 
 Display a warning for pregnant women,  
 Not display or imply any benefits from alcohol consumption 
(attractiveness, confidence etc.)  
 
Furthermore the Government produces advertisements aimed at preventing 
alcohol misuse and helping young people with alcohol difficulties. In 2009 
also, the minimum age at which both alcohol and cigarettes can be bought 
was raised from 16 to 18. 
 
The pattern of alcohol consumption in France is interesting. Overall 
consumption has been in long term decline, as seen in the chart above103; 
however there is no indication that the Loi Evin and subsequent regulations 
have had any impact one way or the other. 
 
At the same time, the level of youth and underage drinking, and of binge 
drinking, is growing104 105 106, despite increasing the age at which alcohol can 
be bought107.  
 
It is noteworthy that highly restrictive and rigorously enforced legislation108, 
in a country where overall consumption has been falling, has not been 
effective in curtailing the opposite trend in youth drinking. This points to long 
term cultural factors as stronger influencers of behaviour than regulatory 
measures. 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 http://www.aim-digest.com/digest/members%20over%20yr/french%20consumption.pdf  
104 The 2011 ESPAD Report - Substance Use Among Students in 36 European Countries, by reference to Use of any 
alcoholic beverage during the past 12 months (p.127, 129, 133). The report also finds high levels of use of cannabis and 
other illicit drugs among French students.  
http://www.espad.org/Uploads/ESPAD_reports/2011/The_2011_ESPAD_Report_FULL_2012_10_29.pdf  
105 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1823730,00.html  
106 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/jan/29/alcohol-children-binge-drinking-france  
107 http://www.thelocal.fr/20131003/france-drinking-smoking-alcohol-cigarettes-alcoholism  
108 http://www.ias.org.uk/What-we-do/Publication-archive/The-Globe/Issue-2-2004-amp-1-2004/The-Loi-Evin-a-French-
exception.aspx  
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C4: Conclusions  
Europe has some interesting case studies of alcohol regulation and its effect 
on consumption.  
 
Over time, regulatory restrictions in the Scandinavian countries have been 
eased, and in many cases taxes have fallen, driven in large part by the 
opening of borders and lower restrictions on cross-border purchases. While 
consumption has risen significantly over time, it is not always clear that 
regulatory or tax changes have had the impact on consumption that one 
would expect. Cross-border purchases and illegal consumption confuse the 
situation, and apparent increases in consumption may in fact represent 
“redomiciling” of this consumption. It is noteworthy also that consumption 
has peaked and been on a downward trend for the last number of years, in 
all but Sweden. 
 
France is a very different market from the Scandinavian countries as it has 
had significantly higher consumption levels historically, which have been on 
a steady decline since 1970. Significantly stricter alcohol regulation was 
introduced in 1991 and has been tightened since, but overall consumption 
levels have been seemingly unresponsive to these changes. Indeed youth 
drinking – the main target of the Loi Evin – has been increasing in France 
despite these restrictions. 
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APPENDIX D: REGULATION OF ALCOHOL PRICES IN CANADA 
D1: Social Reference Pricing in Canada 
A number of Canadian provinces and territories have set Social Reference 
Prices (SRPs) for alcoholic beverages, otherwise known as “floor” or 
“minimum” prices. This has been facilitated by the fact that alcohol 
distribution in Canada is controlled by the State, as is off-trade retail to 
varying degrees, although SRPs equally apply to the on-trade109.  
 
Essentially, SRP indexes minimum retail prices of alcohol products according 
to factors such as product category, alcohol content, the intended consumer 
and purchase price for a single unit (or most commonly purchased package 
size), ease of consumption and the history of types of products in the 
marketplace110. The way SRP is applied differs across Canadian provinces and 
territories, and some provinces do not apply SRP111. Below we describe the 
system in place in Saskatchewan, a province with a population of 1.15 
million112. 
 
Figure D1: Provinces of Canada 
 
Source: Wikipedia 
                                                          
109 This translates into significant control over pricing in the distribution chain, apart from SRF. For instance, in British 
Columbia, bar and restaurants must pay the same for alcohol as the retail prices facing consumers in State liquor stores, 
while private liquor stores are supplied at a 16% price discount. 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301289  
110 http://www.parliament.scot/S4_Bills/Alcohol%20(Minimum%20Pricing)%20(Scotland)%20Bill/BBV-173Final.pdf 
111 http://calj.org/Articles/Publications/tabid/106/ArticleId/42/Minimum-Pricing-in-Canadian-Alcohol-Jurisdictions.aspx ;  
http://www.ccsa.ca/Resource%20Library/CCSA-Social-Reference-Prices-for-Alcohol-Canada-Report-2015-en.pdf  
112 http://www.stats.gov.sk.ca/  
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Minimum alcohol prices in Saskatchewan were first introduced for spirits 
other than brandy and cognac in 2003, for beer in 2005, for wine in 2008, 
and for higher strength coolers, brandy, and cocktails in 2010. Alcohol SRPs 
in Saskatchewan are set out in the Saskatchewan Liquor & Gaming 
Authority’s regular SLGA Pricing Structure and Policy document113. The table 
below sets out a sample of the prices, for selected container sizes and by 
alcohol strength. 
 
The SRPs relate to alcohol content bands as opposed to direct alcohol 
content. This means that beyond the maximum band the SRP is effectively a 
flat minimum price unrelated to alcohol content. Concerns regarding the 
development of a ‘loophole’ around high alcohol beer led to the introduction 
of a High Alcohol Surcharge which is directly based on alcohol content of beer 
above 6.5% ABV. This issue also arose in other provinces such as Ontario.  
 
Table D1: Sample Alcohol SRPs Saskatchewan by Container Size and 
Alcohol Strength, April 2016  
Can $ € 
Beer Products (550ml): 
  
< 6.5% 2.70 1.86 
6.5% - 7.5%* 3.45 2.38 
7.5% - 8.5%* 3.90 2.69 
> 8.5%* 4.20 2.90 
Spirits, Liqueur, Brandy and Cognac Products (700ml): 
< 22.9% 12.95 8.93 
23% - 34.9% 17.00 11.73 
35% - 44.9% 22.65 15.62 
45% - 54.9% 28.35 19.56 
> 55% 33.95 23.42 
Wine Products (750ml):  
  
< 15.9% 7.95 5.48 
> 15.9% 10.70 7.38 
Cider (473ml): 
  
< 5.99% 2.30 1.59 
> 5.99% 2.70 1.86 
*In addition to the SRP, high strength beer (>6.5% ABV) is subject to a High Alcohol 
Surcharge equal to Can$40 (€27.59) per litre of pure alcohol, on the excess over 
6.5%.  
Sources: SLGA, Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
We cannot directly compare these SRPs with the proposed MUPs in Ireland, 
as they apply to alcohol content bands rather than direct alcohol content. 
However, for standard strength beer (4.2% ABV) and cider (4.5% ABV) the 
                                                          
113 https://www.slga.gov.sk.ca/Prebuilt/Public/Pricing%20Structure%20and%20Policy%20Manual.pdf 
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prices are very similar, while for standard strength wine (12.5% ABV) and in 
particular spirits the SRPs are significantly lower than the proposed Irish 
MUPs. 
 
D2: Research on Impacts of SRP 
Research on SRP in Canada has centred around two issues – (i) impacts on 
consumption, and (ii) impacts on alcohol-related harm.  
 
Impacts on Consumption  
Stockwell et al. (2012) 114 examines how the introduction of and subsequent 
increases in SRP affected alcohol consumption in Saskatchewan. They 
concluded that:  
 A 10% increase in minimum prices was associated with decreased 
consumption of beer by 10.1%, spirits by 5.9%, wine by 4.6%, and all 
beverages combined by 8.4%.  
 A 10% increase in minimum price was associated with a 22% decrease 
in consumption of higher strength beer (> 6.5% ABV), compared to an 
8.2% reduction for lower strength beers. 
 Implementation of SRP was associated with greater effects on the off-
trade than on the on-trade, as one would expect.  
 
Assuming changes in minimum prices equate to changes in actual prices, 
these elasticities indicate that there is a one-for-one price elasticity for beer. 
Spirits and wine on the other hand are relatively price insensitive, with only 
an approximate 50% relationship between a change in price and a change in 
consumption. The overall alcohol price sensitivity is relatively high, though 
still lower than one; one would expect the price sensitivity for alcohol as a 
whole to be lower than for the individual alcohol types, as the former cancels 
out substitution from one alcohol type to another. 
 
The authors concluded that SRP as implemented in Saskatchewan 
significantly lowered alcohol consumption and shifted consumption away 
from stronger products, while also increasing government revenue.  
 
However, they also acknowledge that there are limitations to the study, 
which include the lack of a control jurisdiction, a relatively short time series, 
and only a crude measure of mean price. For example, with respect to the 
control jurisdiction, the authors were unable to access detailed data from the 
neighbouring province of Alberta (population 4.25 million115) which has not 
implemented SRP.  
 
                                                          
114 http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2012.301094. The authors note that “Minimum prices were 
first introduced for spirits other than brandy and cognac in 2003, beer in 2005, wine in 2008, and higher strength coolers, 
brandy, and cocktails on April 1, 2010.” 
115 http://economicdashboard.alberta.ca/Population  
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Although Alberta reported no change in its annual per capita alcohol 
consumption from before to after the introduction of SRP in Saskatchewan, 
the authors indicate that “no estimate could be made for the influence of 
cross-border sales.” However, they conclude that it is unlikely to be large as 
“the majority of Saskatchewans live in urban areas at least 100 kilometers 
from the US or provincial borders.”  
 
It must be noted in this regard, however, that Scandinavian research has 
found that consumers were willing to travel several hundred kilometres to 
take advantage of alcohol price differentials116. Closer to home, cross-border 
leakage of alcohol purchases has been found to be very significant when 
price differentials become large117 - the distance from Dublin to Newry is just 
over 100km. 
 
Stockwell et al. (2012a)118  undertook a separate study on the impact of 
changes in minimum alcohol prices on consumption in the off-trade in British 
Columbia (BC, population 4.68 million119), considering the period 1989-2010.  
 
Minimum pricing was introduced in BC in 1989, well before its introduction 
in Saskatchewan. However, the minimum prices that applied in BC at the 
time the paper was written were significantly lower than the prices in 
Saskatchewan for most alcohol types, being some 50%, 58% and 72% lower 
for beer, cider and wine respectively. Minimum prices for spirits were 
approximately equal.  
 
In addition, the BC prices were not related to alcohol content. During the 
period under consideration, the minimum prices of beer and spirits in BC 
were increased twice and three times respectively, while those of wine and 
other alcohol types remained unchanged. After adjusting for inflation, this 
meant that “real” minimum prices for the latter fell. 
 
Time series analysis indicated that a 10% increase in mean minimum price in 
BC was associated with reduced total consumption of packaged beverages in 
the off-trade of 3.4%. For individual products, a 10% increase was associated 
with the following reductions in consumption:  
 Spirits by 6.8 %   
 Wine by 8.9%  
 Beer by 1.5%  
 Alcoholic sodas and packaged cider by 13.9%.  
                                                          
116 Asplund M et al (2005): Demand and Distance: Evidence on Cross-Border Shopping, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0587.pdf  
117 Fitz Gerald, J., 1998, The Distortionary Effects of Taxes on-trade in Border Areas: The Case of the Republic of Ireland - 
United Kingdom Border. ESRI Memorandum Series 183. https://www.esri.ie/pubs/MEMO183.pdf  
118 http://alcoholireland.ie/download/reports/minimum_pricing/Does-Minimum-Pricing-Reduce-Alcohol-
Consumption.pdf 
119 http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/StatisticsBySubject/Demography/PopulationEstimates.aspx  
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These results are somewhat at variance with those found in the 2012 
Saskatchewan study described above, in that:  
(i) overall alcohol price sensitivity is lower (as one would expect), and 
(ii) the price sensitivity of beer is very low, whereas in Saskatchewan it was 
notably high.  
 
A limitation of the analysis is that the data relate only to the off-trade, so to 
the degree that consumers substitute on-trade consumption, the above 
values over-estimate price sensitivity (the authors note that the off-trade 
dominates consumption in the province, and conclude that substitution 
effects are unlikely to be large). There also does not appear to have been any 
analysis of cross-border effects, which again could result in over-estimated 
elasticities. 
  
Impacts on Alcohol-Related Harm 
Econometric analysis of the impact of SRP on alcohol-related harm appears 
to be limited to three papers by Stockwell et al., which consider impacts on 
of changes in minimum prices and off-licence densities in BC, during the first 
decade of this century, on  
(i) hospital admissions, 
(ii) deaths, and  
(iii) crime.   
Since minimum prices had been in place in BC since 1989, the studies 
analysed the impacts of changes in minimum prices rather than their 
introduction. 
 
Stockwell et al. (2013)120  assessed the impact of changes in the average 
minimum price of alcohol on hospital admissions for alcohol-related health 
issues in BC, over the period 2002-2009. They found that a 10% increase in 
the average minimum price of all alcoholic beverages was associated with an 
8.95% decrease in acute alcohol-attributable admissions and a 9.22% 
reduction in chronic alcohol-attributable admissions two years later. 
 
Stockwell et al. (2013a)121 assessed the impact of changes in the average 
minimum price of alcohol on alcohol-attributable deaths in BC, over the 
period 2002-2009. They found that a 10% increase in average minimum 
prices for all alcohol types was associated with a 31.72% reduction in wholly 
alcohol-attributable deaths. 
 
                                                          
120 Stockwell T, et al., 2013, “Minimum alcohol prices and outlet densities in British Columbia, Canada: Estimated impacts 
on alcohol attributable hospitalisations”. American Journal of Public Health. 2013:e1-e7. 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301289 
121 Stockwell T, et al., 2013, “The Relationship between Minimum Alcohol Prices, Outlet Densities and Alcohol 
Attributable Deaths in British Columbia, 2002 to 2009”.  Addiction. 108(6) February 2013. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235519955_The_Relationship_between_Minimum_Alcohol_Prices_Outlet_De
nsities_and_Alcohol_Attributable_Deaths_in_British_Columbia_2002_to_2009   
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Stockwell et al. (2015)122  assessed the impact of changes in the average 
minimum price of alcohol on crime in BC, over the period 2002-2010. They 
found that a 10% increase in the average minimum price of alcohol was 
associated with decreases of 18.8% in alcohol-related traffic offences and of 
9.2% in violent crime. 
 
There are, however, a number of limitations in these studies, which must be 
kept in mind, notably: 
 
 The authors acknowledge that the findings relate to statistical 
correlations and do not necessarily indicate causality. 
 The period under consideration – 2002 to 2009/2010, is short. This is 
particularly the case with the crime paper, which analyses annual data 
while the hospital admissions and mortality papers analyse quarterly 
data. 
 Minimum prices in BC during the period under consideration were much 
lower than actual price levels in Ireland, or in other Canadian provinces 
such as Saskatchewan. Despite this, alcohol consumption in BC was 
significantly lower than in Ireland during the period under 
consideration. 
 Minimum prices in BC are also unrelated to alcohol content, and thus 
are quite different from what is being proposed in Ireland. As indicated 
above, the province of Saskatchewan (and Ottawa) found that SRPs 
unrelated to alcohol content led to a drift towards consumption of 
higher alcohol beer, which subsequently led to the introduction of a high 
alcohol beer surcharge. On the face of it, it is difficult to see how the 
effects found in these papers could come from the type of minimum 
prices in place in BC.  
 With respect to the hospitalisation paper, it has been noted that 
alcohol-related hospitalisations per capita rose each year during the 
period under consideration in BC, which on the face of it is difficult to 
reconcile with a positive impact from minimum pricing123. 
 None of the three studies used a control – i.e. a similar area where 
minimum prices were not in place or did not change during the period 
under consideration. With respect to the crime paper for instance, it has 
been noted that crime has been on a long term downward trend in most 
western countries 124 , including Canada 125 , independent of alcohol 
pricing, although the Stockwell paper does also detect a negative time 
trend which may capture at least some of this effect. 
                                                          
122 Stockwell T, et al., 2015, “Relationships Between Minimum Alcohol Pricing and Crime During the Partial Privatization of 
a Canadian Government Alcohol Monopoly” Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 76(4), 628–634 (2015). 
123 http://www.thejournal.ie/minimum-unit-pricing-alcohol-ireland-facts-2932210-Aug2016/  
124 https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22530073-200-why-violent-crime-is-plummeting-in-the-rich-world/  
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582004-crime-plunging-rich-world-keep-it-down-governments-should-
focus-prevention-not   
125 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/what-s-behind-canada-s-improving-crime-stats-1.1315377  
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 The mortality paper finds that a 10% increase in minimum prices is 
associated with a 32% reduction in mortality. This seems implausibly 
large, given the low level of minimum prices in place in BC. 
 Likewise, the reported correlations with the level of alcohol-related 
traffic offences appear large, given the price levels involved. The same 
can be said for violent crimes, given the wide range of such crimes and 
the range of societal causes and influences. 
 
Given these limitations, caution is required in drawing conclusions from the 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
APPENDIX E: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS & 
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD ALCOHOL POLICY 
MODEL 
 
 
E1: RIA Guidelines  
A Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), in accordance with the RIA 2009 
Guidelines126, is required for all proposed primary legislation to change the 
regulatory framework. As such it is appropriate that an RIA was undertaken 
with regard to the proposed legislation, and published along with the Bill127 
by the Department of Health (DoH).  
 
The first three chapters of the RIA Guidelines can be seen as setting out the 
general principles for undertaking an RIA, while the subsequent chapters 
deal with the specifics of producing the various elements of the RIA.  
 
With respect to the general principles, while the Guidelines indicate that 
there is no generic form of RIA for all circumstances, they give detailed 
guidance as to the contents of and methodologies for producing an RIA. They 
further indicates that:  
“It involves a detailed analysis to ascertain whether or not different 
options, including regulatory ones, would have the desired impact. It 
helps to identify any possible side effects or hidden costs associated with 
regulation and to quantify the likely costs of compliance on the individual 
citizen or business.” (p.3) 
Further, “the level of analysis involved should be proportionate to the 
significance of the proposal in question”. 
 
There is no doubt that the proposals in PHAB are highly significant for the 
industry and market in question, including as they do measures to control 
price, advertising and access to the product by consumers. These are 
unusually intrusive measures for any sector of the economy. It is therefore 
incumbent on the promoters of the Bill and the authors of the RIA to 
undertake a comprehensive RIA. In expanding on the question of 
significance, the Guidelines state: 
 “In this context, it will be useful for officials to examine whether significant 
impacts exist under any of the following headings:  
• National competitiveness;  
• The socially excluded and vulnerable groups;  
                                                          
126 Department of the Taoiseach (2009), Revised RIA Guidelines – How to Conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis, 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/Revised_RIA_Guidelines_June_2
009.pdf   
 
127 http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Appendix-IV-Regulatory-Impact-Analysis-RIA-Alcohol.pdf  
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• The environment;  
• Whether there is a significant policy change in an economic market, 
including consumer and competition impacts;  
• The rights of citizens;  
• Compliance Burdens, including Administrative Burdens;  
• North-South and East-West Relations.” (p.12) 
 
We note that in the RIA, all of the above potential impacts are addressed in 
the section starting on page 24, with the sole exception of Compliance 
Burdens, which is simply ignored. This is a gaping omission for a set of 
regulatory proposals which would explicitly generate significant compliance 
burdens at a range of levels for the sector.  
 
The Guidelines further state: “A formal Cost Benefit Analysis is required in 
the case of the most significant proposals.”  We would strongly argue that 
the significance of the proposals warrant a CBA. Not only is one not 
produced, there is no explanation given as to the rationale for not doing so. 
 
Also relevant is the timing of publication of the RIA. The RIA was published 
at the same time as the Bill, which is the minimum requirement according to 
the Guidelines (p.35). However, the Guidelines in several places highlight the 
need for early circulation and consultation on the proposals:  
“One of the fundamental goals of the RIA process is to reduce the unnecessary 
use of regulation through an examination of the possible use of alternatives. 
This means that RIA should be conducted at an early stage and before a 
decision to regulate has been taken. Ideally, RIA should be used as the basis 
for consultation.” (p.5, original emphasis) 
Clearly the RIA in this case has fallen short of the ideal. 
 
The Guidelines continue: 
“Where primary legislation (a Bill) is proposed, a Memorandum is brought to 
Government seeking approval for the General Scheme of the Bill (also known 
as the Heads of a Bill). As described in para. 1.5, a RIA should be commenced 
at the earliest possible stage (even if it is initially in a very rough format) and 
must be conducted before this Memorandum goes to Government seeking 
permission to regulate.” (p.5, original emphasis) 
 
The RIA indicates that the general Heads of the Bill were published in 
February 2015, following which the Joint Committee on Health and Children 
undertook pre-legislative scrutiny on the proposals. Given that the RIA was 
not published until December 2015, again, it appears that the timing of 
publication did not meet the requirements set out in the Guidelines. 
 
Likewise, stakeholder consultation is required by the Guidelines: 
“RIA can contribute to economic efficiency highlighting aspects of regulation 
which limit consumer choice and the level of competition in an economy. It 
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
helps to identify potential burdens on business and ensure that they are kept 
to a minimum. RIA can also identify potentially anti-competitive or 
protectionist regulations before these are enacted. Because it includes 
consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, it also provides an 
opportunity for those potentially affected by regulations to highlight any 
unforeseen consequences that may not previously have been considered.” 
(p.3)  
 
The alcohol industry strongly argues that the level of consultation 
undertaken by the Bill promoters was inadequate, given the scope of the 
impacts on the sector. 
 
E2: Contents of RIA 
Turning to the detailed contents of the RIA (covered by Chapter 4 onwards 
in the Guidelines), the following steps or contents are set out: 
 
1. Summary of RIA 
2. Statement of policy problem and objective 
3.  Identification and description of options 
4.  Analysis of costs, benefits and other impacts for each option 
5.  Consultation 
6.  Enforcement and Compliance 
7.  Review 
8.  Publication. 
 
These are reflected in the layout of the current RIA, and for convenience we 
will follow that layout in our observations below. 
 
1. Summary of RIA 
The summary sheet is included as Appendix A at the end of the RIA. 
 
2. Statement of Policy Problem and Objective 
This section of the RIA (Policy Context/Objectives) lists a range of negative 
impacts of alcohol abuse in Irish society, and highlights both the overall 
volume and the pattern of consumption in Ireland, compared to other 
countries. A set of economic costs is presented, which sum to €2.358 
billion 128 . This is based on analysis by Dr Ann Hope on behalf of the 
Department129 . We would raise a number of issues with respect to this 
estimate: 
                                                          
128 There is a small summing error in the text. 
129 Hope, A., 2014, Alcohol Literature Review,  http://health.gov.ie/blog/publications/alcohol-literature-review/  
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 Many of the values are based on percentages of the total health budget 
which have been estimated to relate to alcohol abuse, drawn in large 
measure from an earlier report, Byrne (2010)130. 
 This in turn depended in many instances on earlier estimates from the 
UK, and applied to Ireland131.  
 
Hope herself admits that the application of fixed percentages to healthcare 
budgets is not an accurate means of measuring actual costs in Ireland: 
“While this represents a decrease from Byrne’s figure ……. this does not 
indicate a reduction in alcohol related demands on the health service but is 
mainly due to significant reductions in government spending on health since 
2007.” 
Yet these estimates are relied upon in the RIA. 
 
By the same token, the percentages chosen are often from studies dating 
back to the early 2000s132. The volume of alcohol consumed per capita in 
Ireland has fallen significantly since 2002. It is a central premise of the case 
made in the RIA that alcohol-related harm can be reduced by reducing overall 
consumption:  
“It is expected that the effective implementation of the measures contained 
in the (National Substance Misuse Strategy) along with the measures 
provided for in the proposed Public Health (Alcohol) Bill will significantly 
reduce consumption and related harm.”   
 
It follows therefore that the estimates derived by Dr. Hope and relied upon 
in the RIA should have taken account of falling overall consumption over the 
last decade. This has not been done. 
 
Further, there are a number of cases where round percentages of total 
budgets are applied to the cost of alcohol abuse, on the basis of very weak 
evidence. For example: 
“As Hope’s study of alcohol related harm to other’s (Hope, 2014) one in ten 
adults reported that children for whom they have parental responsibility 
experienced at least one or more alcohol related (h)arms as a result of 
someone else’s drinking. Children who experience such harms are very likely 
to require the services funded under the allocation for children and families 
in the HSE’s budget. Ten per cent of the total allocated by the HSE for 
spending on children and families for 2013 is €54 million. It is likely that 10% 
                                                          
130 Byrne S (2010). Costs to society of problem alcohol use in Ireland. Dublin: Health Service Executive. 
http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/Publications/topics/alcohol/Costs%20to%20Society%20of%20Problem%20Alcohol%20Us
e%20in%20Ireland.pdf  
131 For example Scottish Executive (2001) Alcohol Misuse in Scotland: Trends and Costs, Edinburgh: Scottish Executive. 
Byrne indicates: “The estimates in this report are based on the methods used in similar reports from other developed 
countries, particularly the reports for England and Wales and for Scotland and Northern Ireland”. 
132 Byrne (2010) indicates: “The studies for England and Wales and for Scotland estimate the social costs of alcohol misuse 
figures as 1.7% of GDP for England and Wales in 2001 and 1.5% for Scotland in 2003. The Northern Ireland study 
estimates the social cost of alcohol misuse in Northern Ireland in 2008 to be 1.8% of GDP.” 
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of spending by the Department of Children and Youth Affairs also relate to 
alcohol related interventions. This figure is €41 million for 2013.” 
 
Later in the RIA, the total estimate of alcohol costs is compared with the total 
tax revenue from alcohol, to demonstrate that the tax revenue is not 
sufficient to cover the costs imposed on society. While there is no gainsaying 
that alcohol abuse imposes significant costs on society, it is important to have 
robust and accurate research on the actual up-to-date position in Ireland, not 
only for the current purposes but as a basis for general health and social 
policy. 
 
Section 2 of the RIA then quotes text from an academic paper as follows: 
“There is no sensible limit of alcohol consumption below which the risk of 
cancer is decreased. Even though light to moderate alcohol consumption 
might decrease the risk for cardiovascular disease - the net effect of alcohol 
is harmful. Alcohol consumption should not be recommended to prevent 
cardiovascular disease or all - cause mortality”. 
 
The assertion that the net effect of light to moderate alcohol consumption is 
harmful is by no means established in the literature. Lifting this text (without 
quotation marks) into the RIA and presenting it as established fact is 
somewhat disingenuous. While a number of academic studies have come to 
similar conclusions, there is also large body of literature indicating that light 
to moderate alcohol consumption does confer a net health benefit133.  
 
One recent US study is Mostofsky et al. (2016)134, based on the well-known 
longitudinal “Nurses’ Health Study”, administered by Harvard University135. 
This has been collecting lifestyle data from US female nurses, using 
questionnaires and diet records, every four years since 1980. The Mostofsky 
paper tested the effects of alcohol consumption on different diseases from 
hypertension to diabetes, cancer and heart disease. It found that a moderate 
intake of alcohol (up to one drink a day) caused a lower risks of hypertension, 
myocardial infection, stroke, sudden cardiac death, gallstones, cognitive 
decline and all-cause mortality compared to abstainers. Moderate 
consumption did however increase the risk of breast cancer and bone 
fractures, while higher intake increased the risk for colon polyps and colon 
cancer. Overall the researchers concluded that: 
“Regular alcohol intake has both risks and benefits. In analyses using repeated 
assessments of alcohol over time and deaths from all causes, women with low 
to moderate intake and regular frequency (> 3 days/week) had the lowest risk 
                                                          
133 See for example http://www.bu.edu/alcohol-forum/critique-183-an-unusual-analysis-of-the-association-of-alcohol-
consumption-with-mortality-24-march-2016/  
134 Mostofsky E. et al., 2016, “Key Findings on Alcohol Consumption and a Variety of Health Outcomes From the Nurses’ 
Health Study”, in American Journal of Public Health, Volume 106, Issue 9 (September 2016), 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303336  
135 http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303345  
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of mortality compared with abstainers and women who consumed 
substantially more than 1 drink per day.” 
 
We would make the following further observations on Section 2 of the RIA: 
 The Guidelines state that this section “should include a brief (1-2 pages 
at most) summary of the existing regulatory framework and its 
drawbacks and may necessitate reference to relevant EU or 
international obligations” (p.16). This is not included in the RIA, and is 
a significant omission as alcohol is already one of the most highly 
regulated and highly taxed sectors of the Irish economy. 
 Furthermore, there is no discussion of the economic role and 
importance of the sector, which is also part of the policy context, in this 
section of the RIA. Brief reference is made to the economic benefits of 
the industry in Section 4. 
 
Having set out the origin and evolution of the measures contained in the 
PHAB, the RIA states: 
“The aim is to reduce alcohol consumption in Ireland to 9.1 litres per person 
per annum (the OECD average when the Strategy was published) by 2020, 
and to reduce the harms associated with alcohol. It is expected that the 
effective implementation of the measures contained in the (National 
Substance Misuse Strategy) along with the measures provided for in the 
proposed Public Health (Alcohol) Bill will significantly reduce consumption 
and related harm. 
The measures contained in the proposed Public Health (Alcohol) Bill relate to 
the recommendations outlined in the Supply (availability) and Prevention 
pillars of the Steering Group Report on a National Substance Misuse Strategy, 
2012. The strategic objectives (of the Bill) are:  
to ensure that the supply and price of alcohol is regulated and controlled in 
order to minimise the possibility and incidence of alcohol related harm; and 
to delay the initiation use of alcohol by children and young people.”  
(p.3, our emphasis) 
 
Thus the overarching aim of wider Government policy is to reduce alcohol 
consumption and reduce the related harm, with the PHAB specifically 
seeking to regulate price and supply in order to reduce harm, and to delay 
alcohol use by children and young people. 
 
3. Identification and Description of Options 
The options considered in the RIA are: 
(a) No Policy Change (the counterfactual against which other options can be 
tested); 
(b) An Awareness/Information Campaign; 
(c) Self-Regulation/Co-Regulation;  
(d) Increase Taxes on all alcohol products; 
(e) Legislate as per the PHAB. 
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We would argue that this list is incomplete, as it does not include the option 
of a ban on below cost selling of alcohol (a form of below cost selling is 
considered briefly and dismissed on page 11 of the RIA).   
 
We would make a number of observations on how these options are dealt 
with in the RIA. Firstly, as a general point, we note that the RIA comes to a 
conclusion on each option, before presenting the detailed analysis in Section 
4 of the RIA. More specifically: 
(b) An Awareness/Information Campaign in isolation is dismissed as 
ineffective and expensive. However, the RIA does state that “evidence 
indicates that when these campaigns are accompanied by the imposition 
of higher prices/taxes or disincentives they have a direct effect in 
changing behaviour” (p.5), albeit the source of this evidence is not given. 
  
(c) Voluntary/self-regulation is dismissed as ineffective: “Overall there is no 
evidence to support the effectiveness of industry self-regulatory codes, 
either as a means of limiting advertisements deemed unacceptable or as 
a way of limiting alcohol consumption.” (p.6/7). 
 
(d) Increasing taxes is given a significant amount of space in the RIA. We 
would note however that many of the statements made are 
contradictory and not backed up by evidence. For instance (p.7/8 of the 
RIA): 
 “The introduction of a 10% increase on the price of alcohol across all 
types of alcohol (cheap and expensive) would affect consumption by 
low-risk, increasing-risk and high-risk drinkers more or less equally.”  
but 
“Further increases in excise rates would affect moderate drinkers 
disproportionately and would equally affect the operating costs of 
the on-trade (pubs, restaurants, etc.) when the problem lies mainly 
with the off-trade.”  
It is difficult to see how these two statements are reconcilable with 
respect to the impact on moderate (presumably low risk?) 
consumers.  
The meaning of ‘operating costs’ in this quote is not clear: excise 
increases impact on operating costs in that they increase the cost 
price of stock for resale and thus of stock-holding costs – it is not 
clear whether these costs are higher or lower in the on- or off-trade.  
Increased excise rates clearly affect selling prices in the off-trade 
more than for the on-trade, however, since taxes represent a higher 
proportion of the off-trade price of alcohol than of the on-trade 
price. 
 
 “Excise rates are currently regulated by European Directives. These 
do not currently take into account the strength of the drink and excise 
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is therefore less effective in targeting products that are cheap relative 
to their strength.”  
This is factually incorrect. Both beer and spirits – which account for 
approximately 2/3s of total alcohol consumption in Ireland136 - are 
subject to excise directly by reference to their alcohol content, while 
wine and cider are subject to tax bands reflecting step changes in 
alcohol content. Furthermore spirits, whose pre-tax price is low 
relative to its strength, is significantly more heavily taxed under the 
excise duty regime. 
 
 “Mixed trade outlets in particular continue to sell alcohol products at 
below cost prices (at an estimated cost to the Exchequer of €21m in 
reclaimed VAT) and it is likely that this practice would continue if 
excise rates were increased – exacerbating the differential between 
on-trade and off-trade prices.”  
While below-cost selling would likely continue as the RIA indicates, 
the only way this would exacerbate the price differential between 
the on- and off-trade is if the degree of below-cost selling increased 
very substantially on foot of the Excise increase. No evidence is 
presented that this would happen, and on the face of it, it is unlikely. 
Given the degree of price competition already in place in the off-
trade compared to the on-trade, there is less scope for the producer 
and/or the retailer to absorb the tax increase in the former than in 
the latter. 
 As an illustration, according to the CSO’s national average price 
statistics for December 2015137, a litre of vodka in off-licences retails 
at €25.91 on average, while a litre of vodka in the on-trade retails at 
€116.56 on average. A 10% increase in excise on spirits would – all 
else equal – lift the price of a litre of vodka by €1.96 (VAT inclusive) 
in both streams. This represents an increase of 7.6% in the off-trade 
price and 1.7% in the on-trade price. It is clear that the impact is 
greater in the off-trade than in the on-trade. The same applies 
across the range of alcohol products in the off- versus the on-trade. 
It also applies for more expensive brands compared to cheaper 
brands. 
 
 “The “Higher Taxes” option on its own was discounted on the basis 
that increases in excise rates would render premium and higher-
priced alcohol more expensive, which would not achieve the objective 
of targeting hazardous and harmful drinkers”   
This is poorly stated: it is a tautology to state that increased excise 
would make high-priced alcohol more expensive, since it would 
make all alcohol more expensive. If what is meant is that increased 
excise will make high-priced alcohol more expensive relative to low-
                                                          
136 Based on Revenue Commissioners’ data for the 12 months to September 2015. 
137 http://www.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?Maintable=CPM12&PLanguage=0   
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priced alcohol, then - as has been demonstrated above - this is 
clearly not true. Increased excise has a bigger relative impact on the 
price of cheap alcohol and through the cheaper retail channel (off-
licences) than on more expensive alcohol and through the more 
expensive channel (on-licences). By the same token, this means that 
the assertion that increased excise does not target hazardous and 
harmful drinkers – as characterised in the RIA - is incorrect.  
 
 As a final point with regard to taxes, we note that earlier in the RIA 
the author states: 
“Evidence indicates that when these (Awareness/Information/Social 
Marketing) campaigns are accompanied by the imposition of higher 
prices/taxes or disincentives they have a direct effect in changing 
behaviour.” (p.5).  
This begs the question as to why the option of higher taxes 
combined with awareness campaigns was not considered in the 
RIA.    
 
4. Analysis of Costs, Benefits and Other Impacts for Each Option 
Each of the five options (a) to (e) is considered, though it must be stated that 
for a number of them the analysis of costs, benefits and other impacts is 
somewhat perfunctory. In most cases costs, benefits and other impacts are 
not specifically considered, though they are summarised under these 
headings in Appendix A of the RIA. Only Option (e), implement the PHAB, is 
given detailed consideration. 
 
We would make the following specific points with respect to the analysis of 
options (d) and (e), in Section 4: 
 
(d) Increasing Taxes: 
 Under Exchequer Costs, it is stated: 
“Mixed trade outlets could continue to sell alcohol at below cost 
prices as a 'loss leader'. Retailer could continue to claim VAT 
refunds from the Exchequer, as a result of this practice.”  
This ignores the fact that the Exchequer would gain from the 
increased Excise duty rates, regardless of the price at which the 
product is sold.  
 Under Industry/Retail/Consumer Costs, the RIA states: 
“Previous experience suggests that higher taxes do not prevent 
below cost selling of alcohol particularly in mixed trade outlets. 
This in turn would exacerbate the differential between the on 
and off-trade margins. Further, the University of Sheffield study 
noted that a ban on below cost selling (i.e. below the cost of duty 
and Value Added Tax) would have a negligible impact on alcohol 
consumption or related harms. It is likely that any increase in 
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excise duty would, in most cases, be passed on to the consumer, 
at least in part.” 
 
This set of statements is contradictory and misleading: 
o It is true that higher taxes would not prevent below cost 
selling, but unless one can argue that the level of below 
cost selling would increase, prices would go up. As 
indicated above, an increase in the level of below cost 
selling is unlikely. Indeed, as the last sentence in the above 
quote acknowledges, the excise duty increase would be at 
least partly passed on, and this is confirmed by experience 
in recent years. 
o The statement “this in turn would exacerbate the 
differential between the on and off-trade margins” is 
factually incorrect, as demonstrated above. 
o The statement dismissing below cost selling is 
disingenuous: it defines cost as the excise duty plus the VAT 
thereon, which is the definition used in the UK when so-
called “below cost” selling ban was introduced there in 
2014138. However, it grossly understates the actual prices 
that would pertain if a true below cost selling ban were to 
be introduced in Ireland.  
For instance, the excise on a 500ml can of beer @ 4.2% ABV 
is currently 47c; adding VAT @ 23% brings this up to 58c, 
far below the price of even the cheapest beers on the 
market. The equivalent figure for a 750ml bottle of wine is 
€3.92. Therefore the experiment undertaken by Sheffield 
University has no meaning, and the same is true of the 
conclusion drawn in the RIA139. 
 
(e) Implementing the Measures in the PHAB: 
 
 MUP 
The analysis of the impact of MUP on consumption and alcohol-
related harm in Ireland relies heavily on the University of Sheffield’s 
“Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model” (SAPM) as applied to Ireland. The 
main conclusion, based on econometric analysis, is that introduction 
of MUP as envisaged by the PHAB would lead to reduced alcohol 
consumption, but in particular reduced alcohol consumption by 
heavy drinkers and young drinkers, as well by those in poverty, while 
having relatively little impact on low risk drinkers. University of 
Sheffield estimate a net saving to the Exchequer of €1.7 billion 
cumulatively over 20 years.  
                                                          
138 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05021.pdf     
139 It is worth noting that defining “cost” as Excise plus VAT in this way makes a below cost ban very similar to MUP, albeit 
at a very low rate. 
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However, we would have a number of reservations regarding the 
methodology used and conclusions arrived at by University of 
Sheffield, which can be summarised as follows (see Appendix E for a 
more detailed discussion): 
 The analysis is based on a diary survey covering a single week in 
the lives of respondents; although respondents are also asked 
about their usual consumption patterns, this methodology is 
subject to serious error and bias. 
 This is confirmed by the fact that the price levels of alcohol 
purchases reported by respondents is significantly higher than 
the market price levels per Nielsen market data, while at the 
same time the consumption volumes are significantly lower 
than what one would expect by reference to overall annual duty 
payment data per the Revenue Commissioners. 
 The Sheffield report authors adjust the survey price data to 
match the Nielsen data, but crucially change not only the level 
but also the distribution of the data. This is perhaps the largest 
flaw in their methodology. 
 They do not however adjust the survey volume data, which is 
valid in itself, but in combination with adjusted price data 
undermines the statistical basis of their analysis. 
 Rather than attempt to estimate price elasticities of alcohol 
demand for the Irish market, the Sheffield report authors use 
adjusted elasticities for England, which is another weakness 
with their analysis. 
 In general, the Sheffield report authors are forced to make a 
very large number of assumptions and adjustments to the 
available data to fit it to the SAPM model, and this undermines 
the validity of their results and conclusions. 
 
With regard to the impact on consumers, the SAPM report generates 
estimates of the impacts on consumption and expenditure for “high 
risk”, “increasing risk” and “low risk” drinkers, as well as with respect 
to drinkers who are “in poverty”. Because of the increased prices, all 
consumers are found to consume less alcohol, with at risk drinkers 
reducing by the most.  
 
Because of increased prices, low risk and increasing risk drinkers are 
found to spend slightly more, while high risk drinkers are found to 
spend less. This implies that low risk and increasing risk drinkers’ 
demand is not price elastic, while high risk drinkers’ demand is price 
elastic. Two points can be made about this: 
 The SAPM as applied to Ireland relies on UK-derived price 
elasticity data. Given the centrality of this result to the 
conclusions drawn from the model, it is a significant weakness 
that Irish elasticities were not generated. 
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 As pointed out earlier, the literature is mixed with regard to 
whether heavy drinkers are more price sensitive than light 
drinkers.  
 
No attempt is made to estimate the loss of utility on the part of 
consumers. Given the level of expenditure on alcohol annually and 
the price changes that are being proposed, the loss of utility would 
be significant. Notably, the SAPM results indicate that those “in 
poverty” would be significantly impacted by MUP, and this implies 
that there is an income distribution effect, which has not been 
estimated.  
 
Likewise, no attempt is made to estimate the impact on producers 
(as opposed to retailers), in particular small producers, new market 
entrants and overseas producers. As indicated in Chapter 3 of this 
report, these would be significantly negatively impacted compared 
to more established producers.  
 
The impact on overseas producers is particularly relevant in terms of 
the functioning of the Single Market, an issue that is not considered 
at all in the RIA, except insofar as it references the September 2015 
opinion of the Advocate General of the ECJ on Scottish proposals to 
introduce MUP. Significant volumes of alcohol consumed in Ireland 
are produced outside of Ireland, notably wine, which to all intents 
and purposes is 100% imported. 
 
An important issue that arises with proposals to increase consumer 
prices or taxes is the impact on cross-border trading. Historically, 
Irish consumers have shown themselves to be willing to cross the 
border with Northern Ireland to avail of lower prices, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this report.  
 
This issue is addressed in both the RIA and the University of Sheffield 
paper; the latter states: 
“However; the fact that alcohol represents a relatively small 
percentage (12%) of the total spend on cross-border shopping trips 
suggests that it may not be the principal motivation for most of these 
trips. Whilst it is therefore likely that MUP policies or promotions 
bans which increase the price of some alcohol may lead to some 
increase in cross-border purchasing in Northern Ireland, reducing the 
estimated impact of the policies, it is probable that such changes in 
purchasing habits will be small, especially for the large majority of 
the population (90%) who live outside the Border region.” 
 
This is a very off-hand dismissal of the issue, based on an analysis of 
the status quo at a particular point in time. No attempt is made to 
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model the drivers of cross-border shopping for alcohol, to analyse 
the impact of the proposed change, or even to review the extensive 
historic literature on this matter, which as pointed out earlier 
indicates that in certain years in the 1980s, 25% of the spirits market 
in the Republic was leaking across the border. Adoption of MUP 
would be a major change to the status quo and to relative prices 
north and south, and warrants proper analysis. 
 
In a similar manner, the RIA notes that (at the time of its writing), 
with the strengthening of Sterling, the flow of cross-border trade is 
moving in the opposite direction. The weakness of this argument is 
highlighted by the subsequent depreciation of Sterling, which has 
accelerated since the Brexit vote:  
 
Figure E1: Sterling Vs Euro, December 2015 - November 2016 
 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland  
 
MUP is a long term policy prescription, that in the absence of similar 
measures in Northern Ireland would cause a permanent relative 
increase in prices in the Republic, and would leave the market more 
vulnerable to cross-border market leakage. The economic reality of 
this is acknowledged in the RIA when it notes:  
“The Government decision from October 2013 indicted (sic.) the need 
to ‘act simultaneously’ with Northern Ireland ‘to allay concerns about 
negative impacts of cross-border trading’”.  
Brexit will undoubtedly become a complicating factor in achieving 
this policy coordination with Northern Ireland140. 
 
 
                                                          
140 The prospect of duty-free shopping returning between the UK and Ireland post-Brexit – while perhaps unlikely - cannot 
be dismissed, and would effectively eliminate the capacity to coordinate MUP policy.  
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 Health Labelling  
With respect to the costs to industry of health labelling, no attempt 
is made to measure the monetary impact, or to assess the impact 
on small producers or those with a small presence in the Irish 
market, or new market entrants. As indicated in Chapter 3 of this 
report, these could be significantly negatively impacted compared to 
more established producers.  
 
The RIA states: 
“There is also increasing pressure at EU level to include alcohol 
products in existing labelling provisions. Therefore, these measures 
may eventually put manufacturers/producers that operate in the 
Irish market at a competitive advantage.”   
This is an off-hand remark that has no validity. Firstly, if EU-wide 
labelling is to be introduced, the Irish measures should be postponed 
until that time, and made compatible therewith. Secondly, there is 
no circumstance under which the Irish proposals would confer a 
competitive advantage on operators in the Irish market. The best 
they can do is confer no disadvantage, and that would only be the 
case if the Irish measures are synchronised and compatible with EU-
wide measures.  
 
 Restrictions on Marketing, Sponsorship & Promotion 
The RIA assesses the impacts on industry – i.e. the media - of the 
various advertising restrictions, and concludes in general that the 
impacts would not be significant, as alcohol is not a major share of 
advertising on any of the media, and that alternative sources of 
revenue would be found over time. No attempt is made to assess 
the impact of: 
 The proposed restrictions on the content of advertising (PHAB 
Section 12(7)), in terms of potential migration of advertising to 
overseas broadcasters and the loss of business for Irish 
advertising agencies, creators of content and related activities. 
 Advertising restrictions on imported publications, and the 
possibility that these would exit the Irish market if forced to 
produce a special edition for Ireland, carrying less alcohol 
advertising, to meet the restrictions.  
 The overall restrictions on the advertising sector: 
“Recent data show that the total advertising spend for the past 
year is in the order of €854m with alcohol products accounting 
for 3.4% of that figure, well behind financial products, 
entertainment and automotive category products”.  
This is rather dismissive of a sector of the market that is worth 
€29 million (€854 million x 3.4%). 
 The overall restrictions on producers, in terms of making it 
more difficult and expensive to access the Irish market 
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
(particularly for new market entrants), and indeed the 
possibility that it may benefit existing well-established 
producers at the expense of other producers.  
 Reduced market choice (for publications as well as for alcohol) 
on consumers. 
 
 Structural Separation in Mixed Retail Outlets 
While acknowledging that there is a significant one-off cost for mixed 
retailers, and there may be a loss of revenue from the removal of 
point of sale advertising, the RIA counters that: 
“however, these costs may be off-set with the introduction of 
minimum pricing or indeed with the abolition, voluntary or 
otherwise, of below cost selling of alcohol products in these outlets.”  
 
This assumes that the retailer would absorb the some or all of the 
price increase as a result of MUP. While probably valid for the larger 
retailers, it might not be the case for smaller retailers who have 
limited market power. 
 
Also, there are likely to be a proportion of smaller (rural) retailers for 
whom – as Minister Varadkar has alluded to – the extra cost may 
make it not worth their while to continue selling alcohol. This would 
result in a loss of revenue which at the extreme could undermine 
their overall business, as well as reducing product availability and 
choice for their customers. 
 
Again, the impact on small producers, overseas producers and 
market entrants is ignored. 
 
 Restrictions on Promotions   
The RIA states: “There is no cost to industry in restricting promotions 
even though their intake is likely to decrease.” This is clearly a 
contradictory statement. Further, the impact of the restrictions on 
the ability of new market entrants and smaller producers to market 
their products is ignored. The impact on consumers in terms of 
reduced choice is likewise ignored. 
 
Other Impacts – National Competitiveness 
The RIA states:  
“Most of the measures proposed in the legislation will have no 
significant negative impact on national competitiveness. All alcohol 
products (domestic and imported) will be subject to the conditions 
set out in the legislation. It is likely that production/consumption 
levels for the domestic market will fall but will be offset by the higher 
income for the alcohol industry from sales arising from the MUP 
proposal.”  
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This statement betrays a misunderstanding of the concept of 
national competitiveness. National competitiveness relates to the 
capacity of Irish economic agents to compete with their equivalents 
in other countries. A key issue is the cost of living, which feeds 
through to wage pressure and directly affects the attractiveness of 
Ireland for internationally mobile labour, as well as for the tourism 
sector. MUP would specifically lead to an increase in price levels in 
Ireland and thus would have a negative impact on Ireland’s 
competiveness. 
 
Socially Excluded and Vulnerable Groups 
The RIA notes that alcohol-related harm is higher among the poor, 
socially excluded and vulnerable groups. It further notes that the in 
poverty would be more impacted by MUP than those not in poverty. 
While noting that the former would gain more in terms of improved 
health and would spend slightly less, according to the Sheffield 
University analysis, there is no acknowledgement of the loss of utility 
by lower income groups. 
 
Economic Market/Impact on Consumers and Competition 
Under this heading the RIA considers the impact on competition as 
arising between the on-trade and the off-trade. This is an incomplete 
analysis. There is also a clear issue of competition between 
established domestic producers on the one hand, and small and 
overseas producers and new market entrants on the other. Almost 
all the proposed measures in the PHAB would advantage established 
domestic producers vis à vis other market participants, and would 
therefore stifle competition, to the detriment of consumers and the 
Single Market. 
 
North-South and East-West Relations 
The potential for cross-border leakage is an obvious concern with 
regulations that can impact on consumer prices, as is the case with 
MUP. The RIA repeats is dismissal of the scope for this, citing 
University of Sheffield research and the fact that (at the time of 
writing) Sterling had strengthened. As discussed earlier in this 
Chapter, this is a very incomplete and inadequate analysis of the 
issue. 
 
The scope for cross-border leakage in an East-West direction is 
entirely ignored, despite the proximity, frequency of connections, 
and the fact that the UK Government has favoured a ban on “below-
cost selling” (in fact a ban on selling alcohol below the level of excise 
plus the VAT thereon) over MUP for England and Wales, which would 
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still enable alcohol to be sold in England and Wales very much more 
cheaply than in Ireland under MUP141. 
 
5. Consultation 
Consultation is a vital element of the RIA process, particularly for a proposal 
such as the PHAB which would have such far-reaching impacts if 
implemented. It is noteworthy then that this section of the RIA starts with: 
“While no formal specific consultation process has been entered into for the 
introduction of these measures, engagement with the various stakeholders 
took place during the process for drafting the Steering Group Report on a 
National Substance Misuse Strategy, 2012.“ (our emphasis) 
 
The only consultation that appears to have occurred is in relation to the 
transition times for the introduction of the health labelling provisions. The 
RIA notes that most industry and media stakeholders do not support the 
measures in the Bill. It is clearly inadequate in these circumstances that the 
only consultation that was undertaken occurred over three years before the 
publication of the Bill. Furthermore, the only industry consultation the 
Department proposes to undertaken with the industry post publication of 
the Bill will be with regard to the transitional period for the marketing and 
advertising provisions. 
 
6.  Enforcement and Compliance 
The RIA states:  
“It will not be difficult for all sectors of the alcohol trade and other 
stakeholders to comply with the introduction of these measures over a period 
of time.”  
This is a rather glib statement, given that the Department has not consulted 
with the industry. At a minimum, significant impositions would be placed on 
mixed retail outlets with regard to structural separation. The Minister himself 
highlights the possibly that some traders may withdraw from selling alcohol 
altogether. Significant financial burdens would also be placed on small 
producers, those with a small share of the Irish market, and new market 
entrants, and costs and/or revenue losses would also be imposed on various 
elements of the media. 
 
7. Review 
With regard to regular review, the RIA Guidelines indicate: 
“The final step in the RIA is to identify mechanisms for periodically reviewing 
the regulations to evaluate the extent to which they are achieving the 
objectives/intended benefits. ……… Provision for review is particularly 
important given that the analysis within the RIA will be based on certain 
assumptions which may not hold in reality.”  
and 
                                                          
141 Woodhouse & Ward, 2015, Alcohol: minimum pricing, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper Number 5021, 25 
September 2015. www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05021.pdf  
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“Performance indicators should be identified to indicate the extent to which 
the regulations are meeting their objectives.”  (p.34) 
 
The RIA fails to set out an ongoing review process for this major legislative 
proposal. Reference is made only to the first annual review of the National 
Substance Misuse Strategy, due at the end of December 2015, around the 
same time as the PHAB was published. 
 
E3: Conclusions on the RIA 
An RIA has been undertaken with respect to the measures proposed in the 
PHAB, as is appropriate given the scope of these measures and their potential 
impacts. However, the RIA is deficient in a number of important respects, by 
reference to the Department of the Taoiseach’s 2009 RIA Guidelines.  
 
Notably: 
 A key rationale for the Bill is to reduce the level of alcohol-related harm 
in Irish society. It is therefore incumbent on the promoters of the Bill to 
produce an economic estimate of that harm. While an estimate is 
produced, it is inadequate in many respects, including: 
 Many of the values are based on percentages of the health, justice 
and other national budgets for a recent year; these percentages are 
drawn from an earlier report, which itself drew them from earlier UK 
studies. Falling public expenditure in the meantime has meant that 
the money value of the estimate harm has fallen, but the estimate is 
really without solid basis, as is acknowledged by its author. 
 By the same token, no cognisance has been taken of the fact that 
alcohol consumption has fallen significantly since the early 2000s. 
Since it is a central premise of the RIA that reducing aggregate 
consumption will reduce harm, this should have been reflected in the 
estimate of harm. 
 A number of estimates are rounded percentages which are then 
applied to aggregate expenditure figures based on very weak 
evidence. 
Taking all this into account, the estimate of harm is seriously deficient 
and cannot be depended upon. However, it is compared with the total 
Exchequer revenues from alcohol to conclude that the harm done 
exceeds the revenues generated. There is no gainsaying that alcohol 
abuse inflicts significant harm on Irish society, but all the more reason 
why a robust calculation of this harm should be undertaken, not just for 
the current context but to inform wider health and social policy.  
 
 Proper consultation with the industry was not undertaken. This is a far-
reaching piece of proposed legislation and would affect many aspects of 
the alcohol industry, the wider economy and consumers, significantly 
restricting market activities and imposing costs on businesses and 
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consumers. Proper consultation is absolutely essential in these 
circumstances. 
 
 A list of regulatory options for achieving the stated objectives is 
presented at the start of the RIA, but this excludes the option of a ban 
on below-cost selling. Below cost selling is briefly considered but 
dismissed later in the RIA, as having a negligible impact on prices and 
thus on behaviour. However the form of below cost ban considered is 
that introduced in England and Wales in 2014, i.e. a ban on selling below 
the level of excise plus related VAT. This is clearly not the same as a true 
below cost selling ban, and greatly underestimates the potential impact 
of such a policy. 
 
 The assessment of the option to increase alcohol taxes contains a 
number of important errors. For instance, it is asserted that: 
 Increasing taxes would affect operating costs in the on- and off-trade 
equally. This is not correct – increasing taxes clearly impacts the off-
trade more as they represent a higher proportion of the total price. 
 Excise rates, as regulated by EU Directives, do not take into account 
alcohol content. This is not correct – excise on beer and spirits are 
directly related to alcohol content, while those on wine and cider are 
levied in stepped bands related to alcohol content. Spirits carry a 
significant excise burden relative to their alcohol content. 
 Increasing taxes in the presence of below cost selling would 
exacerbate the price differential between the off- and on-trade. This 
would only be the case if the degree of below-cost selling increased 
very substantially as taxes increased. No evidence is presented for 
this, and on the face of it, it is unlikely, as recent experience indicates 
that excise increases are passed on to consumers. Indeed, the RIA 
itself recognises this - “it is likely that any increase in excise would, in 
most case, be passed onto the consumer, at least in part” – thus 
contradicting itself. Under most conceivable outcomes, increased 
excise would reduce the differential between the off- and on-trade. 
 It would render higher-priced alcohol more expensive, which would 
not achieve the objective of targeting harmful drinkers. However, 
increasing excise has a greater relative impact on the price of cheap 
alcohol than of more expensive alcohol. 
 
 MUP is subjected to assessment by University of Sheffield, who conclude 
that it would be highly effective is reducing harm from alcohol, and in 
general achieving the objectives of the Bill. However, there are serious 
flaws in the University of Sheffield analysis, including that: 
 it is based on a one-week diary survey, and extrapolated to a year’s 
consumption. 
 the authors significantly adjust both the level and distribution of 
reported prices downwards to match Nielsen market date, while 
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they do not adjust reported volume data upwards to match Revenue 
Commissioners’ aggregate volume data; neither should be adjusted, 
but there is inconsistency in adjusting one but not the other.  
 the authors apply UK price elasticity of demand data to the Irish 
model. 
 
These are serious flaws that introduce significant bias into their analysis, 
and undermines their results. Furthermore: 
 no attempt is made to estimate the loss of consumer utility or the 
cost to producers; and  
 the scope for increased cross-border leakage if similar measures are 
not introduced in neighbouring jurisdictions is dismissed without any 
analysis, and despite established evidence that Irish consumers have 
historically diverted significant portions of their alcohol expenditure 
across the border when price differentials are substantial. 
 
 The impact on national competiveness is dismissed, but the text betrays 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept. 
 
 Difficulties for the sector in implementing the regulations are dismissed, 
but this it to ignore for instance the impacts on retailers of implementing 
structural separation, and the financial burden on smaller producers 
and new entrants, as well as on sections of the media. 
 
Other deficiencies in the RIA include: 
 The current regulatory framework is not described. 
 The economic importance of the alcohol sector is not adequately 
presented.  
 The RIA contains no assessment of the compliance burden. 
 A Cost Benefit Analysis is not undertaken, and no reason for this given. 
 The RIA is required to be produced early in the process, to act as a basis 
for consultation, and must be produced before the Heads of Bill goes to 
Government; this has not been done. 
 A review process is required to be established, but this is not done. 
 
E4: University of Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) 
The university of Sheffield alcohol paper 142  is an ambitious attempt to 
analyse the effects of: 
 Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP),  
 a ban on below-cost selling and  
 a ban on price-based promotions on different drinker groups (low 
risk, increasing risk and high risk) as well as income groups (in 
poverty and not in poverty),  
in an Irish context, using their Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM).  
                                                          
142 Angus, C., Meng, Y., Ally, A., Holmes, J. and Brennan, A. (2014). Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for 
alcohol in the Republic of Ireland – An adaption of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version3. University of Sheffield.  
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Accomplishing such a task requires detailed and comprehensive data. This is 
however the central flaw in the analysis, as the necessary data needed to 
arrive at the conclusions in the paper is not available. Therefore the paper 
adjusts and corrects the dataset, which is not generally acceptable in this 
field of research.  
 
The paper uses data from the National Alcohol Diary Survey (NADS) from 
2013 with a sample size of approximately 6,000 individuals. The survey 
records a range of characteristics including age, sex, workplace abstinence 
and mean consumption of alcohol. The diary is used by the respondents to 
record the previous week’s alcohol purchases, including the channel of 
purchase (on- or off-licence), the price they paid and the type and quantity. 
Additionally the survey has questions on the quantity and frequency of usual 
consumption. Based on this data the authors derive the mean weekly 
consumption, which is the dependent variable in their model. However, as 
indicated, the authors then make adjustments to the data.  
 
Reported Prices and Consumption Levels 
A general issue for alcohol research is the data quality gathered in surveys. 
Non-response bias, response biases and failure to recall often result in 
misreporting. Additionally, as many diary surveys only cover short periods of 
time the average weekly consumption in the survey period is unlikely to 
reflect the average weekly consumption throughout the year. In particular 
the proportion of high alcohol consumers and low alcohol consumers can be 
overestimated and the moderate consumers underestimated, due to the 
variance that could be expected in a single week’s consumption 
(notwithstanding that respondents are asked about usual consumption 
patterns)143. Therefore diary surveys will often misclassify respondents in 
consumption categories.  
 
The NADS data is subject to misclassification, which the authors acknowledge 
and try to correct for. However, as pointed out in Duffy (2015)144, they do not 
differentiate between structural zeroes (i.e. abstainers or non-consumers) 
and stochastic zeroes which occur due to the short reference period. 
Therefore the method used to correct for misclassification is undermined 
and according to Duffy “…accuracy of the classification of drinkers by usual 
consumption is questionable.”  
 
Duffy (2015) additionally points out that The NADS data did not have 
sufficient information about the respondents to classify them in “poverty” or 
“not in poverty” categories based on the income data. The authors therefore 
match the household composition and income data from NADS with income 
                                                          
143 Duffy, J. C. and Alanko, T. (1992). “Self-reported consumption measures in sample surveys – a simulation study of alcohol 
consumption” Journal of Official Statistics. Vol 8, p. 327-350. 
144 Duffy J. (2015). “Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in the Republic of Ireland – an adaptation 
of the Sheffield alcohol policy model version 3”. 
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data from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) from the CSO. 
Thereby the authors derive an equivalised household income. However this 
exercise is very tenuous and conclusions based on this data should not be 
relied upon when evaluating pricing policies and their effect on consumption.  
 
In the diary data the respondents report the quantity bought and price paid 
for alcoholic beverages, and the channel in which they purchased them. The 
data was then converted into price per standard drink based on estimated 
alcohol content of different alcohol types. However, the price distribution 
reported in the diaries was higher than that generated by Nielsen for the DoH 
for the purpose of the study. Nielsen reported the off-trade price distribution 
for Ireland based on aggregated sales data with 17 price bands and 24 
beverage categories.  
 
The authors argue that the survey respondents are overestimating the price 
of the alcoholic beverages they have purchased the week before due to 
issues of memory, or biases introduced by missing price data. This may very 
well be the case but the authors decide to adjust the survey price data to the 
Nielsen sales data, which not only shifts the distribution down but changes 
the shape of the distribution, as can be seen in Figure C1 overleaf, taken from 
the Sheffield paper. Therefore the authors are subjecting themselves to 
direct bias, and this undermines all of their results which use price data. 
  
Additionally, this adjustment is only made for off-trade purchases as Nielsen 
does not supply on-trade sales data. Therefore they change the distribution 
for one part of the price data and not the other, but still expect to get reliable 
overall price elasticities. Generally one should always use the survey 
responses in these analyses. Overall, by adjusting the price data the results 
are subject to severe biases and are underestimated, which will overestimate 
the effect of a MUP strategy. Although the authors admit this flaw with their 
methodology, they nonetheless rely on the model results for their 
conclusions.  
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Figure E1: NADS Raw & Nielsen Adjusted Price Distributions for Off-Licence Beverages 
 
Source:  Angus et al. (2014)  
 
The authors argue in an earlier section of their paper that under-reporting of 
alcohol consumption can be caused deliberately or due to recall issues, and 
that methods to adjust for this under-reporting can be applied. However, the 
authors correctly state that these methods assume that under-reporting only 
varies by drinking level (i.e. heavy drinkers may under-report to a greater 
degree than light drinkers), whereas in reality gender and age are also 
important determinants of consumption.  
 
Additionally, as alcohol-related health conditions are also self-reported, 
adjusting for this under-reporting will introduce a bias and impact the results. 
Therefore the authors argue against adjusting the consumption data. 
However, how can it be acceptable to adjust self-reported price data and link 
it to self-reported consumption data without being subject to the same 
unknown bias? The same arguments can be used to argue that adjusting the 
self-reported price data will undermine the results.  
 
Price Elasticity Estimates 
The above adjustment issue is at the core of the problem with the University 
of Sheffield report. However there are additional issues with the price 
elasticity of alcohol demand estimation. The ‘pseudo-panel’ methodology 
used by the authors requires data on the alcohol volume purchased, price, 
and demographic variables (age and gender). For this they consider using the 
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CSO’s Household Budget Survey (HBS) from 1987, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 
2009; however they are unable to as the HBS does not record volumes of 
alcohol purchased (only expenditure levels). Therefore they cannot calculate 
the price per standard drink, and are forced to attempt a Tobit estimation 
using the NADS data.  
 
The Tobit model can however produce elasticity estimates which are larger 
than estimates from large scale international meta-analysis, as the authors 
admit. In order to adjust for this overestimation they assume that the price 
elasticity of alcohol demand is the same in Ireland and in England. Essentially 
they fit the same model on the NADS data (Ireland) and LCF/EFS data 
(England), then compare the English results to the ‘pseudo-panel’ elasticities 
estimated for England, and use that ratio to adjust the Irish data.  
 
This approach assumes that the alcohol demand and demographic factors in 
Ireland are identical to those of England, which is quite an assumption and 
not adequately defended in the paper. Using these elasticities to analyse the 
effect of alcohol price increases on alcohol demand in Ireland is unwise. 
Detailed aggregate alcohol market data is available for Ireland, from which it 
would have been possible to estimate the required elasticities.   
 
Because of these issues, the conclusions regarding the effects of a general 
10% price increase on all alcohol products, the implementation of the MUP 
policies (40c, 50c, 60c, 70c, 80c, 90c, 100c, 110c, and 120c), the ban on below 
cost selling, the ban on all price based off-trade promotions and a ban on 
promotions in tandem with each of the modelled MUP policies are 
undermined and biased.  
 
Alcohol related harm and risk functions 
Duffy (2015) further points out that, as noted in INSERM (2002) 145  and 
Benichou (2007)146 there are a number of issues when applying average risk 
functions to different populations. The authors assume that the risk 
functions used to establish the relationship between alcohol consumption 
and the risk of health conditions are applicable to the Irish population, which 
is not necessarily true. Drinking patterns, genetics, choice of beverage and 
the fluctuating exposure to other risk factors are among the reasons why risk 
functions for various populations can differ significantly from each other.  
 
Additionally, the level of intoxication is measured by peak alcohol 
consumption in the previous week as a proxy. However, similarly to the other 
measures of consumption discussed above, it is not legitimate to assume that 
this peak consumption level is representative of the year.  
                                                          
145 INSERM (2002). “Meta-analysis of observational studies” Ateliers de Formation 137:INSERM: Paris. 
146 Benichou, J. (2007) “Biostatistics and epidemiology: measuring the risk attributable to an environmental or genetic 
factor” C. R. Biologies. Vol 330, p. 281-298. 
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APPENDIX F: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
F1: Data Sources and Methodology 
Our econometric modelling attempts to explore the relationship between consumption of 
various types of alcohol, and price, income and other factors.  
 
A Priori, one would expect a negative relationship between price and consumption of alcohol 
– consumption could be expected to decrease if the price increases. Income on the other hand 
would be expected to have a positive coefficient as consumption of alcohol per adult should 
(as with most products) increase as income increases.  
 
However, experience indicates that consumption of alcohol is relatively insensitive or inelastic 
to changes in both income and price (the impact is less than one-for-one)147. So the results of 
the analysis may reflect this characteristic of alcohol demand. 
 
The data has been collected from Q4 1996 to Q4 2015 inclusive, yielding 77 quarterly 
observations, as follows: 
 Consumption of total alcohol, spirits, cider, beer and wine is proxied by Revenue 
Commissioners monthly excise duty data. In other words the data relates to Irish duty-
paid volumes released from bond or imported directly for distribution. 
 Consumption data is expressed as consumption per capita aged 15 years and older, which 
is the internationally established norm for alcohol consumption analysis. 
 The CSO’s Retail Sales Index (RSI) excluding motor sales is used as a proxy for income.  
 Annual population data is derived from the CSO Census of Population and inter-censal 
estimates, with interpolations for quarterly data148.  
 Price data is expressed in relative terms, i.e. the price of a particular type of alcohol 
relative to the overall consumer price level. The relative price is derived as the CSO’s 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each alcohol type divided by the overall CPI excluding 
housing.  
 We also tested the relative price of alcohol in the UK compared to in Ireland, as historically 
a relationship has been found between duty-paid spirits sales in Ireland and the relative 
price of alcohol in the UK. We only present the results for spirits here, as we were unable 
to detect such a relationship for alcohol as a whole, beer, wine or cider. 
 A time trend is also included, to test whether there are long term trends in consumption 
on top of the other factors tested here. These could be related to wider cultural, lifestyle 
or fashion changes. 
                                                          
147 Alcohol is seen as one of the “old reliables” in the annual Budget – an increase in Excise Duty can be expected to generate an increase in 
Exchequer revenue, because the reduction in consumption will be less than the increase in price. 
148  The data is interpolated using the equation 𝑦 =
𝑦1−𝑦0
𝑥1−𝑥0
(𝑥 − 𝑥0) + 𝑦0 with 𝑦 representing the missing quarter of population estimate, 𝑦0 and 
𝑦1 are population estimates before and after the missing population estimate, 𝑥 is the quarter of the missing population estimate and 𝑥0 and 
𝑥1 are the quarters immediately before and after. Thereby the interpolation generates population estimates based on the observed population 
estimates before and after in time.  
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 Consumption and RSI data were seasonally adjusted to account for seasonal variability, 
and data were converted to natural logarithms to minimize the standard deviation and 
generate direct constant elasticities in estimation.  
 
For convenience, in the following discussion, we use the terms consumption, price and income 
to refer respectively to – 
 duty paid volumes per population aged 15 and over, seasonally adjusted;  
 the alcohol CPI relative to the overall CPI (excluding housing); and  
 the RSI (excluding motor sales), seasonally adjusted.  
 
Tables F1 and F2 overleaf summarise the key statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables respectively. 
 
Specification tests revealed autocorrelation of varying degree which can be modelled using 
the AutoRegressive Moving Average (ARMA) methodology. No unit roots were observed. The 
models will thereby follow the specification shown in the equation below, which models the 
relationship between alcohol consumption per adult, price and income, accounting for an 
AR(1) process.  
 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡  
where 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜌𝜇𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 and           𝜖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)  
 
The econometric analysis employs different versions of this model, depending on the alcohol 
category and the order of autocorrelation. The order of autocorrelation will be indicated by 
the significance of the L.ar variable (signifying an AR (1) process) and the L2.ar variable 
(signifying an AR (2) process). All coefficients are accompanied by the standard errors below 
in brackets and the asterisks indicating the significance of the coefficient based on a standard 
t-test. 
 
Note: In the following analysis, cross-price elasticities (the sensitivity of demand for one type 
of alcohol to a price change in another type) are not presented, except to the degree that 
demand for an alcohol type in the on- or off-trade is affected by price changes in the other 
sales channel. Cross-price elasticities were tested for, but were not detected in the model.  
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Table F1: Dependent Variables Summary Statistics Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Div. Min Max 
      
Alcohol Consumption SA 77 1.025e+07 689,462 8.388e+06 1.129e+07 
Alcohol Consumption Per Adult SA 77 3.139 0.301 2.661 3.545 
Ln(Alcohol Consumption Per Adult SA) 77 1.139 0.0970 0.979 1.266 
Beer Consumption SA 77 5.443e+06 550,355 4.353e+06 6.013e+06 
Beer Consumption Per Adult SA 77 1.682 0.304 1.207 2.073 
Ln(Beer Consumption Per Adult SA) 77 0.503 0.187 0.188 0.729 
Beer Consumption Off-trade SA 77 1.305e+06 519,116 488,857 1.895e+06 
Beer Consumption On-trade SA 77 4.143e+06 1.010e+06 2.736e+06 5.465e+06 
Beer Consumption Off-trade Per Adult SA 77 0.386 0.130 0.177 0.537 
Beer Consumption On-trade Per Adult SA 77 1.298 0.430 0.759 1.897 
Ln(Beer Consumption Off-trade Per Adult SA) 77 -1.020 0.391 -1.734 -0.621 
Ln(Beer Consumption On-trade Per Adult SA) 77 0.205 0.341 -0.276 0.640 
Spirits Consumption SA 77 1.996e+06 221,370 1.583e+06 2.462e+06 
Spirits Consumption Per Adult SA 77 0.612 0.0912 0.481 0.797 
Ln(Spirits Consumption Per Adult SA) 77 -0.501 0.147 -0.732 -0.227 
Spirits Consumption Off-trade SA 77 1.133e+06 202,714 652,296 1.483e+06 
Spirits Consumption On-trade SA 77 880,787 237,223 539,957 1.356e+06 
Spirits Consumption Off-trade Per Adult SA 77 0.343 0.0423 0.235 0.413 
Spirits Consumption On-trade Per Adult SA 77 0.276 0.0947 0.150 0.439 
Ln(Spirits Consumption Off-trade Per Adult SA) 77 -1.079 0.133 -1.447 -0.884 
Ln(Spirits Consumption On-trade Per Adult SA) 77 -1.349 0.354 -1.894 -0.822 
Cider Consumption SA 77 766,805 114,350 489,458 934,942 
Cider Consumption Per Adult SA 77 0.235 0.0388 0.177 0.303 
Ln(Cider Consumption Per Adult SA) 77 -1.463 0.166 -1.732 -1.193 
Cider Consumption Off-trade SA 77 286,244 73,237 169,524 388,830 
Cider Consumption On-trade SA 77 482,948 139,630 279,447 757,984 
Cider Consumption Off-trade Per Adult SA 77 0.0859 0.0157 0.0562 0.108 
Cider Consumption On-trade Per Adult SA 77 0.150 0.0509 0.0775 0.255 
Ln(Cider Consumption Off-trade Per Adult SA) 77 -2.473 0.195 -2.878 -2.223 
Ln(Cider Consumption On-trade Per Adult SA) 77 -1.956 0.347 -2.558 -1.368 
Wine Consumption SA 77 2.068e+06 596,121 880,781 2.693e+06 
Wine Consumption Per Adult SA 77 0.618 0.136 0.318 0.750 
Ln(Wine Consumption Per Adult SA) 77 -0.511 0.254 -1.145 -0.287 
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Table F2: Independent Variables Summary Statistics Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Div. Min Max 
Relative Consumer Price Index Alcohol 77 1.000 0.0301 0.944 1.053 
Ln(Relative Consumer Price Index Alcohol) 77 -0.000578 0.0302 -0.0576 0.0520 
Relative CPI Alcohol Off-trade 77 1.037 0.0785 0.870 1.141 
Relative CPI Alcohol On-trade 77 0.992 0.0534 0.896 1.082 
Ln(Relative CPI Alcohol Off-trade) 77 0.0330 0.0771 -0.139 0.132 
Ln(Relative CPI Alcohol On-trade) 77 -0.00958 0.0543 -0.110 0.0787 
Relative Consumer Price Index Beer 77 0.999 0.0347 0.934 1.064 
Ln(Relative Consumer Price Index Beer) 77 -0.00171 0.0348 -0.0684 0.0622 
Relative CPI Beer On-trade 77 0.997 0.0494 0.912 1.087 
Relative CPI Beer Off-trade 77 1.037 0.0977 0.860 1.181 
Ln(Relative CPI Beer Off-trade) 77 0.0321 0.0954 -0.151 0.166 
Ln(Relative CPI Beer On-trade) 77 -0.00431 0.0497 -0.0919 0.0831 
Relative Consumer Price Index Spirits 77 0.991 0.0526 0.906 1.059 
Ln(Relative Consumer Price Index Spirits) 77 -0.0104 0.0537 -0.0990 0.0570 
Relative CPI Spirits On-trade 77 0.976 0.0795 0.831 1.089 
Relative CPI Spirits Off-trade 77 1.022 0.0716 0.859 1.152 
Ln(Relative CPI Spirits Off-trade) 77 0.0195 0.0711 -0.152 0.141 
Ln(Relative CPI Spirits On-trade) 77 -0.0275 0.0838 -0.186 0.0848 
Relative Consumer Price Index Cider 77 0.989 0.0372 0.911 1.035 
Ln(Relative Consumer Price Index Cider) 77 -0.0115 0.0381 -0.0929 0.0344 
Relative CPI Cider On-trade 77 0.986 0.0424 0.893 1.045 
Relative CPI Cider Off-trade 77 0.994 0.0418 0.927 1.091 
Ln(Relative CPI Cider Off-trade) 77 -0.00673 0.0417 -0.0754 0.0874 
Ln(Relative CPI Cider On-trade) 77 -0.0147 0.0437 -0.113 0.0444 
      
Relative Consumer Price Index Wine 77 1.040 0.0812 0.877 1.157 
Ln(Relative Consumer Price Index Wine) 77 0.0364 0.0788 -0.131 0.146 
Relative CPI Wine Off-trade 77 1.061 0.120 0.850 1.244 
Relative CPI Wine On-trade 77 1.003 0.0525 0.896 1.112 
Ln(Relative CPI Wine Off-trade) 77 0.0524 0.113 -0.163 0.219 
Ln(Relative CPI Wine On-trade) 77 0.00168 0.0525 -0.110 0.106 
Relative UK RPI Alcohol in Euro 77 100.7 12.13 74.08 123.5 
Ln(Relative UK RPI Alcohol in Euro) 77 4.605 0.122 4.305 4.816 
Retail Sales Index All Businesses SA 77 103.3 12.90 70.84 124.6 
Retail Sales Index Excl. Motor Sales SA 77 109.9 14.12 75.36 132.0 
Ln(Retail Sales Index All Businesses SA) 77 4.629 0.134 4.260 4.825 
Ln(Retail Sales Index Excl. Motor Sales SA) 77 4.690 0.138 4.322 4.883 
 
 
F2: Overall Alcohol Consumption 
Two models for overall alcohol consumption are presented in Table F3 overleaf. These 
respectively explore the relationship between alcohol consumption per capita and  
(1) income and the overall price of alcohol,  
(2) income and the price of alcohol in the on- and off-trade.  
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Table F3: Total Alcohol Models Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   
Variables Ln(Alcohol Consumption Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Alcohol Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
       
Ln(Relative CPI Alcohol) -0.378***      
 (0.144)      
Ln(RSI Excl. Motor Sales SA) 0.313**   0.509***   
 (0.156)   (0.187)   
L.ar  1.198***   0.958***  
  (0.0743)   (0.0502)  
L2.ar  -0.204***     
  (0.0684)     
Ln(Relative CPI Alcohol Off-trade)    -0.00950   
    (0.0994)   
Ln(Relative CPI Alcohol On-trade)    -0.390   
    (0.259)   
Quarter    -0.00450**   
    (0.00186)   
Constant -0.385  0.0117*** -0.437  0.0111*** 
 (0.707)  (0.000763) (0.625)  (0.000770) 
       
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:     Separate on- and off-trade alcohol consumption was not tested because of a lack of reliable on- and-off-trade wine data. Time trend (Quarter) was not significant 
in Model (1). 
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The first model indicates that a 1% increase in the price of alcohol generates a 0.38% decrease 
in consumption, while a 1% increase in incomes generates a 0.31% increase in consumption. 
This implies that consumption of alcohol is relatively insensitive or inelastic to changes in both 
income and price (the impact is less than one-for-one), which is indicated above is not 
unexpected for alcohol demand.  
 
The second model, which incorporates alcohol prices in the on- and off-trades, indicates that 
a 1% increase in income results in a 0.51% increase in the consumption. The price variables in 
the on- and off-trades are not statistically significant, which implies that the overall 
consumption of alcohol is only sensitive to the joint price in the on- and off-trade alcohol, not 
the individual sales channel price levels. That is, the model implies that if the price level 
changes in the on-trade only or the off-trade only, there would not be a change in overall 
consumption. 
 
In model two there is also a significant negative time trend present. That is as time goes by, 
alcohol consumption gradually falls, holding everything else steady. This matches the fact that 
consumption of alcohol per capita is falling over time. 
 
F3: Beer Consumption 
A number of models for beer consumption are estimated, respectively testing: 
 beer consumption in total,  
 beer consumption in the off-trade and in the on-trade, and 
 consumption of lager, stout and ale. 
 
Total Beer 
Two versions of the total beer model were run: (1) where the overall price of beer was used 
and (2) where prices in the on- and off-trade were used (Table F4 and Figure F1 overleaf). 
Results were as follows: 
 Income was found to have a significant effect on consumption: a 1% increase in 
incomes yields a modest 0.24% increase in total beer consumption.  
 We could not detect a price impact, whether in terms of overall price or prices in the 
on- and off-trades. 
 The time trend is small and negative, reflecting the downward trend in actual beer 
consumption over time.  
 
Models (3) and (4) in Table F4 attempt to measure demand for beer in the off-trade and on-
trade respectively. They find that: 
 Neither a price nor an income effect were found for consumption of beer in either 
channel.  
 There is a very small negative time trend in the on-trade, again matching the fact that 
beer consumption per capita is falling over time. 
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Figure F1: Estimated Vs Actual Beer Consumption [Logged, Model (1), Table F4] 
 
 
 
Lager 
We likewise ran models testing demand for lager, as presented in Table F5, testing respectively 
the sensitivity of total lager consumption (1) to overall lager prices, and (2) to prices in the off- 
and on-trades. The results were as follows: 
 Demand for lager was found to be slightly sensitive to the overall price of lager, but 
when considering separately prices on the off- and on-trade, only an effect for the 
latter was found, and this was marginal. 
 No impact from income was detected. 
 There was a gradual downward time trend in lager consumption, independent of 
either income or price. 
 
Models (3) and (4) in Table F5 tested demand for on-trade lager and off-trade lager. The results 
were as follows:  
 No impact from income was detected. 
 Lager in the on-trade was weakly sensitive to price in the on-trade, but no other price 
relationship was detected. 
 There was a gradual downward time trend in on-trade lager consumption, 
independent of either income or price. 
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Table F4: Overall Beer Models Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Variables Ln(Beer 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Beer 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Beer 
Consumption 
Off-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Beer 
Consumption 
On-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
Ln(Relative CPI Beer) -0.0109            
 (0.0640)            
Ln(Relative CPI Beer Off-trade)    0.0245   -0.0303   -0.00632   
    (0.0600)   (0.509)   (0.0119)   
Ln(Relative CPI Beer On-trade)    -0.0502   -0.0442   -0.0216   
    (0.0824)   (0.846)   (0.0225)   
Ln(RSI Excl. Motor Sales SA) 0.241***   0.240***   0.142   0.0106   
 (0.0454)   (0.0453)   (0.673)   (0.0165)   
Quarter -0.00837***   -0.00819***   0.0122   -0.0122***   
 (0.000833)   (0.000875)   (0.00970)   (0.00163)   
L.ar  0.989***   0.988***   1.423***   1.976***  
  (0.0252)   (0.0253)   (0.0704)   (0.0107)  
L2.ar        -0.44***   -0.98***  
        (0.0603)   (0.0105)  
Constant 0.894***  0.00441*** 0.864***  0.00440*** -4.025*  0.0273*** 2.394***  0.00159*** 
 (0.208)  (0.000356) (0.218)  (0.000356) (2.405)  (0.00124) (0.316)  (0.000139) 
             
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table F5: Lager Models Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
VARIABLES Ln(Lager 
Consumpti
on Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Lager 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Lager 
Consump
tion Off 
Trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Lager 
On Trade 
Per Adult 
SA) 
ARMA sigma 
             
Ln(Relative CPI Lager) -0.0667**            
 (0.0325)            
Ln(RSI Excl Motor Sales SA) 0.0204   0.0191   0.0762   0.0109   
 (0.0351)   (0.0354)   (0.646)   (0.0468)   
Quarter -0.0023***   -0.00220***   0.0136   -0.009***   
 (0.000780)   (0.000804)   (0.0108)   (0.00244)   
L.ar  1.929***   1.929***   1.465***   1.939***  
  (0.0343)   (0.0344)   (0.102)   (0.0331)  
L2.ar  -0.947***   -0.946***   -0.478***   -0.953***  
  (0.0353)   (0.0356)   (0.101)   (0.0322)  
Ln(Relative CPI Lager     0.00570   -0.0810   0.0286   
Off-trade)    (0.0294)   (0.567)   (0.0404)   
             
Ln(Relative CPI Lager     -0.0808*   0.0381   -0.137***   
On-trade)    (0.0450)   (0.774)   (0.0511)   
             
Constant 0.240  0.00302*** 0.221  0.003*** -4.189*  0.025*** 1.040**  0.004*** 
 (0.167)  (0.000291) (0.171)  (0.00029) (2.501)  (0.0001) (0.468)  (0.00043) 
             
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure F2: Estimated Vs Actual Lager Consumption [Logged, Model (1), Table F5] 
 
 
 
Stout 
We ran a model, as presented in Table F6 and Figure F3, testing the sensitivity of total stout 
consumption to overall stout prices, and income. The results were as follows: 
 Demand for stout was found to be slightly sensitive to the overall price of stout. 
 No impact from income was detected. 
 There was a gradual downward time trend in stout consumption, independent of 
either income or price. 
Table F6: Stout Model Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
VARIABLES Ln(Stout 
Consumption Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
    
Ln(Relative CPI Stout) -0.0422*   
 (0.0241)   
Ln(RSI Excl. Motor Sales SA) 0.0119   
 (0.0249)   
Quarter -0.0138***   
 (0.00206)   
L.ar  1.944***  
  (0.0216)  
L2.ar  -0.955***  
  (0.0226)  
Constant 1.981***  0.00213*** 
 (0.414)  (0.000208) 
    
Observations 76 76 76 
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Figure F3: Estimated Vs Actual Stout Consumption (Logged, Table F6) 
 
 
 
Ale 
Finally, we ran a model, as presented in Table F7 and Figure F4, testing the sensitivity of total 
ale consumption to overall ale prices, and income. The results were as follows: 
 Demand for ale was found to be slightly sensitive to the overall price of ale. 
 No impact from income was detected. 
 There was a gradual downward time trend in ale consumption, independent of either 
income or price. This is despite the fact that consumption of ale has started to recover 
in recent years (see chart). 
 
Table F7: Ale Model Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
VARIABLES Ln(Ale Consumption Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
    
Ln(Relative CPI Ale) -0.109**   
 (0.0534)   
Ln(RSI Excl. Motor Sales SA) 0.0245   
 (0.0456)   
Quarter -0.0105**   
 (0.00496)   
L.ar  1.935***  
  (0.0553)  
L2.ar  -0.945***  
  (0.0591)  
Constant -0.309  0.00539*** 
 (0.918)  (0.000451) 
    
Observations 76 76 76 
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Figure F4: Estimated Vs Actual Ale Consumption (Logged, Table F7) 
 
 
 
F4: Cider Consumption 
A similar set of models is estimated for cider (Table F8 and Figure F5 overleaf):  
 The first model tests overall demand for cider against the overall price of cider. It finds a 
modest impact from price - a 1% increase in the overall price results in a 0.24% decrease 
in overall cider consumption. No impact from income was found. 
 The second model tests overall demand against price in both the on-and off-trades, but 
could only find an impact from the off-trade price. A 1% increase in the off-trade price 
results in a modest 0.14% decrease in overall cider consumption. Again, this model did 
not find an impact from income levels. 
 The 3rd model indicates that cider consumption in the off-trade is sensitive to both the 
off-trade price and income levels. A 1% increase in the off-trade price leads to a 0.74% 
decrease in consumption in the off-trade, while a 1% increase in incomes results in a 0.8% 
increase in off-trade consumption.  
 The results of the 4th model indicate that a 1% increase in income leads to a modest 
0.21% increase in the consumption in the on-trade (albeit the coefficient is only significant 
at the 10% confidence level). Unlike the other models, no price effect was found. 
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Table F8: Cider Models Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Variables Ln(Cider 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Cider 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Cider 
Consumption 
Off-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Cider 
Consumption 
On-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
Ln(Relative CPI Cider) -0.239***            
 (0.0652)            
             
Ln(Relative CPI Cider Off-    -0.139**   -0.740**   -0.0698   
trade)    (0.0703)   (0.358)   (0.137)   
             
Ln(Relative CPI Cider On-    -0.0648   0.300   -0.327   
trade)    (0.0978)   (0.580)   (0.224)   
             
Ln(RSI Excl.  0.109   0.108   0.804***   0.211*   
Motor Sales SA) (0.0712)   (0.0741)   (0.226)   (0.114)   
  1.926***           
L.ar  (0.0406)   1.927***   1.543***   1.912***  
  -0.936***   (0.0408)   (0.0781)   (0.0401)  
L2.ar  (0.0394)   -
0.937*** 
  -
0.669*** 
  -
0.919*** 
 
     (0.0395)   (0.0719)   (0.0411)  
Constant -2.052***  0.00725*** -2.048***  0.00719*** -6.246***  0.0340*** -3.135***  0.0132*** 
 (0.362)  (0.000751) (0.371)  (0.000730) (1.053)  (0.00262) (0.663)  (0.00125) 
             
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Time trend was not significant. 
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Figure F5: Estimated Vs Actual Cider Consumption [Logged, Model (1), Table F8] 
 
 
F5: Spirits Consumption 
Two model structures are tested for spirits. The first (”basic”) models are the same 
structure as is used for beer and cider. The second (“UK”) models include the price of 
alcohol in the UK, to test the scope for cross-border leakage of consumption. 
 
Spirits “Basic” Models  
The basic models for spirits follow the same structure as the ones for beer and cider (Table 
F9 overleaf): 
 The first model measures the impact of the overall price of spirits on overall demand 
for spirits, and indicates that both price and income are significant in explaining 
demand – 
 A 1% increase in the overall price of spirits was found to lead to a 2.1% decrease 
in the overall consumption of spirits, indicating that spirits consumption is highly 
sensitive to changes in the price of spirits.  
 A 1% increase in income results in a 0.53% increase in consumption (albeit at a 
10% significance level).  
 The 2nd model, which tests demand against price in the on- and off-trades, again 
indicates that both price and income are significant – 
 A 1% increase in the on-trade price of spirits was found to lead to a 2.1% decrease 
in the overall consumption of spirits, indicating that spirits consumption is highly 
sensitive to changes in the on-trade price of spirits.  
 A 1% increase in the price of spirits in the off-trade was found to yield a modest 
0.24% decrease in consumption of spirits (albeit at a 10% significance level).  
 A 1% increase in income was found to result in a 0.73% increase in consumption.  
 The 3rd model considered consumption of spirits in the off-trade, and found that it 
is sensitive to both price and income –  
 A 1% increase in the off-trade price generates a 0.57% decrease in the 
consumption of spirits in the off-trade.  
Socio-Economic Impacts of Proposed Regulations under the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill Final Report 13/02/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
 Off-trade consumption was also found to be sensitive to price in the on-trade. A 
1% increase in the on-trade price generates a 1.59% decrease in off-trade 
consumption. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive, as one might expect price 
increases in the off-trade to have more of an impact on demand in the off-trade, 
and indeed that on-trade price increase might drive consumption increases in the 
off-trade (in other words, that they are substitutes for one another). 
 A 1% increase in income was found to increase the consumption of spirits in the 
off-trade by 1.47%. Again, this might be seen as somewhat surprising, as this is 
the strongest income effect among the types of alcohol tested, and significantly 
stronger than the income effect for overall spirits consumption, or for on-trade 
spirits consumption, as the 4th model indicates. 
 The 4th model examines demand in the on-trade, and indicates that on-trade 
consumption of spirits is highly sensitive to prices, but not to income – 
 A 1% increase in the price of on-trade spirits leads to a 2.2% decrease in the 
consumption of on-trade spirits.  
 A 1% increase in the price of spirits in the off-trade yields a 0.6% decrease in the 
consumption of spirits in the on-trade. Once again, the results indicate that on- 
and off-trade spirits are not substitutes for each other.  
 
Overall, the basic models indicate that total spirits consumption is highly sensitive to the 
on-trade price, and relatively insensitive to off-trade prices and to income. This indicates 
that consumers are more price sensitive in the on-trade than in the off-trade. However, 
consumption in the off-trade is highly positively sensitive to income levels, signifying that 
individuals consume significantly more off-trade spirits as their income increases. 
 
Figure F6: Estimated Vs Actual Spirits Consumption [Logged, Model (1), Table F9] 
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Table F9: Spirits “Basic” Models Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Variables Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Spirits 
Consumption Off-
trade Per Adult 
SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
On-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
Ln(Relative CPI  -2.06***            
Spirits) (0.131)            
             
Ln(Relative CPI Spirits     -0.238*   -0.574***   -0.604***   
Off-trade)    (0.139)   (0.138)   (0.177)   
             
Ln(Relative CPI Spirits     -2.078***   -1.586***   -2.225***   
On-trade)    (0.299)   (0.307)   (0.456)   
             
Ln(RSI Ex. Motor  0.526*   0.726***   1.472***   0.449   
Sales SA) (0.283)   (0.212)   (0.190)   (0.307)   
             
L.ar  0.973***   0.951***   0.818***   0.990***  
  (0.0274)   (0.0467)   (0.0775)   (0.0194)  
Constant -3.042**  0.0274*** -3.994***  0.0277*** -8.025***  0.0294*** -3.583**  0.0350*** 
 (1.408)  (0.00205) (0.992)  (0.00203) (0.896)  (0.00261) (1.458)  (0.00227) 
             
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Time trend was not significant. 
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Spirits “UK” Models  
Historically, a number of econometric analyses have found that consumption of Irish tax-
paid spirits is sensitive to the price of spirits in Ireland compared to the UK149. In other 
words, there appears to be scope for cross-border leakage of consumption, where there 
is a price differential between the two jurisdictions. The high price sensitivity of spirits 
consumption per the “basic” model might also be capturing some of this effect.  
 
The “UK” models (Table F10 overleaf) explore this relationship, using the same 
independent and dependent variables as the “basic” spirits models but adding a new 
variable, i.e. the UK alcohol Retail Price Index (RPI)150 relative to the Irish alcohol CPI, 
adjusted for the exchange rate. The same models are tested as before, with the following 
results: 
 In the first model  – 
 No relationship between the relative UK price of alcohol and total consumption 
of duty-paid spirits in Ireland was found.  
 Increases in income is found to have a positive impact on consumption – a 1% 
increase in income drives a 0.8% increase in total spirits consumption. 
 An increase in the overall price of spirits in Ireland is found to have a strongly 
negative impact. 
 There is a weak negative time trend, although it is only significant at the 10% 
confidence interval. This does not feature in the “basic” model, but matches the 
reality that spirits consumption per capita is falling over time. 
 The 2nd model tests for the price of spirits in the off- and on-trade in Ireland, as 
opposed to the overall price of spirits. It finds essentially the same results as the first 
model, but it is price in the on-trade that appears to have the impact on demand – 
off-trade prices were not found to be significant. Also, no time trend was detected. 
 Model 3 tests demand in the off-trade as opposed to overall demand. In contrast to 
the overall demand models, it finds an impact from the relative UK price: 
 A 1% increase in the relative UK price of alcohol leads to a 0.21% increase in off-
trade consumption, albeit this is only significant at the 10% confidence interval.  
 A 1% increase in incomes results in a 1.35% increase in off-trade consumption.  
 A 1% increase in off- and on-trade prices of spirits lead to 0.56% and 1.3% 
decreases in off-trade consumption respectively.  
 
 
                                                          
149 For example Fitz Gerald, J., 1998, The Distortionary Effects of Taxes on-trade in Border Areas: The Case of the Republic 
of Ireland - United Kingdom Border. ESRI Memorandum Series 183. https://www.esri.ie/pubs/MEMO183.pdf  
150 The UK alcohol RPI was used as the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) does not produce a separate RPI for spirits in 
the UK (there is a combined spirits and wine RPI). Neither is there a regional Alcohol RPI for Northern Ireland. ONS 
Research from 2010 indicates that while Northern Ireland has lower prices overall than the UK average, there is very little 
regional variation with respect to off-trade alcohol, as “a high proportion of items within this division were affected by 
the dominance of large retailers who displayed consistency in their pricing across regions.” 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/regional-consumer-
price-levels/2010/index.html  
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Table F10: Spirits “UK” Models Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Variables Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
Off-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Spirits 
Consumption 
On-trade Per 
Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
             
Ln(Relative CPI Index Spirits) -1.86***            
 (0.187)            
Ln(Relative UK RPI Alcohol) 0.0672   0.0345   0.207*   0.289**   
 (0.120)   (0.150)   (0.124)   (0.128)   
Ln(RSI Excl. Motor Sales SA) 0.834***   0.789**   1.354***   0.803**   
 (0.314)   (0.336)   (0.249)   (0.410)   
Ln(Relative CPI Spirits     -0.254   -0.564***   -0.729***   
Off-trade)    (0.156)   (0.163)   (0.175)   
             
Ln(Relative CPI Spirits     -1.94***   -1.298***   -1.195**   
On-trade)    (0.456)   (0.420)   (0.501)   
             
Quarter -0.0047*   -0.00127   0.00007    -0.0136***   
 (0.00262)   (0.00337)   (0.00179)   (0.00345)   
L.ar  0.921***   0.939***   0.834***   0.941***  
  (0.0654)   (0.0569)   (0.0817)   (0.0531)  
Constant -3.88***  0.027*** -4.2***  0.028*** -8.431***  0.029*** -3.979***  0.033*** 
 (1.030)  (0.00191) (1.107)  (0.00209) (1.008)  (0.00225) (1.277)  (0.00231) 
             
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Model 4, which tests demand in the on-trade as opposed to overall demand, also finds an impact 
from the relative UK price: 
  A 1% increase in the relative UK price of alcohol to a 0.29% increase in the on-trade 
consumption.  
 The coefficient on the income variable is positive and the on two price variables, on- and 
off-trade, are negative.  
 On-trade spirits consumption is subject to a negative time trend.  
 
Somewhat counterintuitively, our results find a stronger relationship between the relative UK/Ireland 
price of alcohol, and consumption in the on-trade, than in the off-trade. Our overall spirits 
consumption model did not find a relationship with the relative UK/Ireland price of alcohol, however. 
 
F6: Wine Consumption  
The wine model (Table F11 overleaf) uses the same structure as for the other alcohol categories, but 
only for wine in total, due to data limitations (a large majority of recorded wine sales are in the off-
trade).  
 
The first model tests demand versus the overall price of wine, whereas the second tests demand 
versus prices in the on- and off-trades. However, both models return almost identical results: 
 Wine consumption is only marginally sensitive to incomes levels - a 1% increase in the incomes 
leads to a 0.07% increase in consumption. 
 Consumption is insensitive to price.  
 The analysis does however indicate a positive time trend for wine. This matches the reality that 
consumption has been increasing over most of the time period under consideration, albeit 
recent data points to a plateauing of consumption (Figure F7 overleaf).  
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Table F11: Wine Model Q4 1996-Q4 2015 
 (1)   (2)   
Variables Ln(Wine 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma Ln(Wine 
Consumption 
Per Adult SA) 
ARMA sigma 
       
ln_Relative CPI Wine -0.00711      
 (0.0135)      
Ln(Relative CPI Wine Off-trade)    -0.00576   
    (0.0153)   
Ln(Relative CPI Wine On-trade)    -0.00502   
    (0.0522)   
Ln(RSI Excl. Motor Sales SA) 0.0698**   0.0694**   
 (0.0317)   (0.0321)   
Quarter 0.00886***   0.00888***   
 (0.00330)   (0.00331)   
L.ar  1.949***   1.949***  
  (0.0412)   (0.0418)  
L2.ar  -0.955***   -0.955***  
  (0.0406)   (0.0412)  
Constant -2.565***  0.00374*** -2.566***  0.00374*** 
 (0.584)  (0.000333) (0.585)  (0.000333) 
       
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure F7: Estimated Vs Actual Spirits Consumption [Logged, Model (1), Table F11] 
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